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Rv-Enabled Framework For Self-Adaptive Software
Abstract
Software systems keep increasing in scale and complexity, requiring ever more effort to design, build,
test, and deploy. Systems are integrated from separately developed modules. Over the life of a system,
individual modules may be updated, which may allow incompatibilities between modules to slip in.
Consequently, many faults in a software system are often discovered after the system is built and
deployed.
Runtime verification (RV) is a collection of dynamic techniques for detecting faults of software systems.
An executable monitor is constructed from a formally specified property of the system being checked
(denoted as the target system) and is run over a stream of observations (events) to check whether the
property is satisfied or not. Although existing tools are able to specify and monitor properties efficiently, it
is still challenging to apply RV to large-scale real-world applications. From the perspective of monitoring
requirements, we need a formalism that can describe both high and low-level behaviors of the target
system. Complexity of the target program also brings some issues. For instance, it may contain a set of
loosely-coupled components which may be added or removed dynamically. Correspondingly, monitoring
requirements are often defined upon asynchronous observations that carry data of which the domain
scale up along with expansion of the target system. How to conveniently specify these properties and
generate monitors that can check them efficiently is a challenge.
Beyond detecting faults, self-adaptive software is desirable for tolerating faults or unexpected
environment changes during execution. By equipping monitors with reflexive adaptation actions, runtime
enforcement (RE) can be used to improve robustness of the system. However, there is little work on
analyzing possible interference between the implementation of adaptation actions and the target
program.
In this thesis, we present SMEDL, a RV framework using a specification language designed for high
usability with respect to expressiveness, efficiency and flexible deployment. The property specification is
composed of a set of communicating monitors described in the form of EFSMs (extend finite state
machines). High-level properties can be straightforwardly transformed into SMEDL specifications while
actions can be specified in transitions to express low-level imperative behaviors. Deployment of monitors
can be explicitly specified to support both centralized and distributed software. Based on dynamically
scalable monitor structure, we propose a novel method to efficiently check parametric properties that rely
on the data events carry. To tackle challenges of monitoring timing properties in an asynchronous
environment, we propose a conceptual monitor architecture that clearly separates monitoring of time
intervals from the rest of property checking.
To support software adaptation, we extend the SMEDL framework to specify enforcement specifications,
generate implementations and instrument them into the target system. Analysis of interference between
the adaptation implementation and the target system can be performed statically based on Hoare-logic.
Instead of building a whole new proof for the target system globally, we present a method to generate
local proof obligations for better scalability.
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ABSTRACT
RV-ENABLED FRAMEWORK FOR SELF-ADAPTIVE SOFTWARE
Teng Zhang
Oleg Sokolsky
Insup Lee
Software systems keep increasing in scale and complexity, requiring ever more effort to design,
build, test, and deploy. Systems are integrated from separately developed modules. Over the life of
a system, individual modules may be updated, which may allow incompatibilities between modules
to slip in. Consequently, many faults in a software system are often discovered after the system is
built and deployed.
Runtime verification (RV) is a collection of dynamic techniques for detecting faults of software systems. An executable monitor is constructed from a formally specified property of the system being
checked (denoted as the target system) and is run over a stream of observations (events) to check
whether the property is satisfied or not. Although existing tools are able to specify and monitor
properties efficiently, it is still challenging to apply RV to large-scale real-world applications. From
the perspective of monitoring requirements, we need a formalism that can describe both high and
low-level behaviors of the target system. Complexity of the target program also brings some issues.
For instance, it may contain a set of loosely-coupled components which may be added or removed
dynamically. Correspondingly, monitoring requirements are often defined upon asynchronous observations that carry data of which the domain scale up along with expansion of the target system.
How to conveniently specify these properties and generate monitors that can check them efficiently
is a challenge.
Beyond detecting faults, self-adaptive software is desirable for tolerating faults or unexpected environment changes during execution. By equipping monitors with reflexive adaptation actions,
runtime enforcement (RE) can be used to improve robustness of the system. However, there is little

v

work on analyzing possible interference between the implementation of adaptation actions and the
target program.
In this thesis, we present SMEDL, a RV framework using a specification language designed for high
usability with respect to expressiveness, efficiency and flexible deployment. The property specification is composed of a set of communicating monitors described in the form of EFSMs (extend finite
state machines). High-level properties can be straightforwardly transformed into SMEDL specifications while actions can be specified in transitions to express low-level imperative behaviors.
Deployment of monitors can be explicitly specified to support both centralized and distributed software. Based on dynamically scalable monitor structure, we propose a novel method to efficiently
check parametric properties that rely on the data events carry. To tackle challenges of monitoring
timing properties in an asynchronous environment, we propose a conceptual monitor architecture
that clearly separates monitoring of time intervals from the rest of property checking.
To support software adaptation, we extend the SMEDL framework to specify enforcement specifications, generate implementations and instrument them into the target system. Analysis of interference
between the adaptation implementation and the target system can be performed statically based on
Hoare-logic. Instead of building a whole new proof for the target system globally, we present a
method to generate local proof obligations for better scalability.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction
Modern software systems are increasing in scale and complexity. Systems are integrated from separately developed modules, both vertically and horizontally. Distributed computation are extensively
used in the integration of modules. Over the life of a system, modules will be updated, replaced and
added to fit the fast-evolving requirements. All these complexities make software systems easier to
fail, which may lead to serious consequences.
Testing is widely used to detect defects before deployment. However, it cannot guarantee the software is free of bugs and it is hard to apply testing in a post-deployment manner. In contrast, formal
methods use mathematical model to guarantee full correctness of the system. However, formal
verification becomes intractable as the system becomes more complicated. Moreover, for systems
constructed by components which are treated as black boxes, some problems may happen during
runtime because of incompatibility with the environment or malicious attacks. Thus, flaws in a
software system are often discovered after the system is built and deployed.
Runtime verification (RV) is a kind of dynamic technique widely used for detecting flaws of software systems. The objective of RV is to check if a run of the system, usually abstracted as a trace
of events extracted from an execution, satisfies or violates certain properties. It can be applied in
multiple phases of software development. During the development phase, RV can be treated as a
testing technique to find bugs by detecting violation of properties. After deployment, it can be used
to analyze executions of the target system for diagnosis or generate alerts when the system behaves
abnormally.
To further improve the robustness of a system in reaction to internal failures or environment changes
dynamically, the concept of self-adaptive software has been brought up. Compared to sophisticated
techniques which usually rely on system models or heuristics of existing error handling mechanisms, runtime enforcement (RE) specifies actions in an enforcement monitor (EM) to guarantee
satisfaction of properties in event traces. By instrumenting actions back to the system, software
adaptation can be achieved. This pattern can be used as sanitizers between two systems or policy
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enforcers to guarantee correct use of APIs in the target system. The adaptation is reflexive in a sense
that instrumented actions are pre-defined and would not permanently solve the problems. However,
they can be used as effective temporary repairs and are more feasible for validation.
In this thesis, we aim to propose a RV-enabled software adaptation framework. Figure 1 illustrates
the architecture. Monitor specifications are created from properties, which are then compiled into
runtime monitors. During runtime, the monitor observes the event trace obtained from the target
system and generates verdicts on whether the property is violated. To support software adaptation, program actions can also be generated and integrated into the target system. Applying our
framework to real-world software systems need to overcome challenges from multiple aspects.

Figure 1: Monitoring/adaptation architecture

1.1. Challenges
1.1.1. Specification language and code generation
First, we want the specification language that can describe a variety of properties for complex software systems and correct and efficient monitor code can be synthesis from the monitor specification.
In this thesis, we study the following challenges.
Properties with multiple forms. Many formalisms for runtime verification are suitable to describe
2

high level properties, such as API policies or protocols. Efficiency of monitoring is guaranteed
by well-designed algorithms. For a property involving imperative operations such as arithmetic or
logic aggregation, writing a specification in a high level formalism is more challenging, especially
for a user with less experience in those formalisms. Instead, using general programming language
is more intuitive. However, efficiency depends on the concrete implementation. It is desirable to
have a formalism to describe multiple forms of properties in a unified and elegant way.
Properties for complex software. For complex software such as a component-based system, a property may rely on compositional behaviors of multiple components. Using a single monitor to collect
observations from different components may incur prohibitive overheads and interfere with system
operation. It is more sensible to implement a global property as a set of local monitors of which
local verdicts are combined together during execution. As a result, the technique should provide a
modular-style specification language and generate monitors that can be deployed in a flexible way.
Correctness of monitor implementations. Executable monitors are generated from property specifications. Informal code generation processes are error-prone and may lead to serious consequences.
How to bridge the gap between the specification and the implementation is a challenge.
1.1.2. Monitoring complex properties
Beyond the language and code generation, properties to be monitored also brings challenges. In the
thesis, we focus on two types of complicated properties, parametric properties and timing properties.
Monitoring parametric properties. Properties of large-scale systems are often parametric, which
means events in a trace may carry data of which the domains expand along with scaling of the
system. As an example, we want to guarantee that the iterator of a collection created from a map
must not be used after the map has been updated in a program. During execution, maps, collections and iterator objects may be created dynamically. The monitor needs to recognize relationship
among them and track their behavior. These properties can be specified and monitored using multiple techniques [75], such as temporal based formalism, stream-processing and trace slicing. These
techniques have subtle differences on expressing parametric properties and the monitoring algo-
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rithms. For instance, MOP (monitoring oriented programming) [101] and QEA (quantified event
automata) [14] both uses the trace slicing method but adopt different slicing semantics. While QEA
can express more parametric properties, it is less efficient than MOP [112]. Due to their difference
view on parametric properties, it is hard to achieve both expressiveness and efficiency by directly
extending either of them. It is thus desirable to have a technique that provides a common ground to
describe parametric properties in a unified way and implement parametric monitoring in a flexible
fashion, which would not only help people understand distinctions between multiple techniques, but
also pave the way towards more efficient monitoring algorithms.
Monitoring timing properties. Timing properties are often defined in the form of checking one event
occurring after another event within certain time bound or counting the number of events that occur during an interval of time. In both cases, a monitor needs to not only evaluate the logic of the
property but also determine whether events fall within a given time interval. Correctly monitoring interval is challenging in an asynchronous setting where monitors and the target system have
different clock and event delivery delays are introduced by unstable network.
1.1.3. Software adaptation
For software adaptation, since enforcement actions may change the state of the program, correctness is a vital issue to handle. Existing work on runtime enforcement have studied principles of
specifying enforcement and generate implementations that comply with the specification, there is
little work on analyzing how a poor implementation of actions or ill-formed instrumentation may
influence execution the target program. We need to define a reasonable correctness criteria, express
possible behavior changes after integrating adaptation actions into the target system and statically
decide whether the instrumented target system still meets the correctness criteria.

1.2. Contributions
Aiming to solve challenges stated above, we make the following contributions, as shown in Figure 2.
SMEDL: a RV framework. We propose a new formalism, SMEDL (Scenario-based Meta Event
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Figure 2: Contributions
Description Language) for property specification [136]. A SMEDL specification is composed of a
set of single monitor specifications connecting with each other. Each single monitor is described
as composition of EFSMs (extend finite state machines), which is suitable for describing not only
high-level temporal properties, but also low-level properties described as explicit state transitions
with imperative actions such as logic or arithmetic computations. In the architecture description,
users can flexibly specify how monitors are deployed with the target system or communication
between monitors, either synchronously or asynchronously. During runtime, monitor instances can
be instantiated potentially multiple times to form a dynamically scaling monitor network. The
notion of monitor network provides a unified way to compose verdicts of properties and by nature
facilitates flexible deployment of monitors to adapt to a variety of software systems such as single
process programs and distributed software [138]. To bridge the gap between the specification and
the monitor implementation, we formalize the semantics of single monitor execution using Coq[25]
to generate the executable code, which is guaranteed to progress in reaction to incoming events
and generate deterministic verdicts [139]. To demonstrate usability of our technique, we conduct
performance evaluations. We focus on time efficiency of monitor implementations. We compare our
technique to representative RV tools in both online and offline settings against multiple benchmark
programs and properties. We then profile execution of SMEDL monitors and present intuitions of
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optimization from both the perspectives of language design and implementation. Finally, we study
how deployment of monitors influence time overheads.
Monitoring parametric properties using SMEDL. By using dynamically scalable monitor network, SMEDL provides a natural and general way to express and monitor parametric properties. To
demonstrate this idea, we encode the trace slicing algorithm of MOP by proposing a transformation
from MOP to SMEDL. Then, by transforming from QEA specifications into SMEDL monitor network, we can monitor QEA properties more efficiently by applying the trace slicing algorithm of
MOP.
Monitoring timing properties in asynchronous environments. We study how to monitor time
intervals in an asynchronous environment parameterized by network delay, clock skew and clock
rate, and propose a mechanism to separate monitoring of time intervals from the rest of property
checking [137].
Reflexive adaptation framework. We extend the SMEDL framework to enable runtime software
adaptation. The enforcement specification is expressed as SMEDL monitors with a map from abstract events to concrete adaptation actions. We define the semantic rules to express how adaptation
actions may change the behavior of the target program and present a method to generate implementations of actions and integrate them into the program. Based on this implementation, we propose a
Hoare-logic based method to verify non-interference of adaptation implementation with respect to
the target system. Because proof obligations are generated locally at each instrumentation point, our
method can be scaled up to multiple instrumentation points without considering possible inference
among actions.

1.3. Structure
The thesis is organized as below. Chapter 2 surveys related work on runtime verification and software adaptation. Chapter 3 presents SMEDL as the specification language. Chapter 4 presents
a novel method to specify and monitor parametric properties using SMEDL monitor network. Depending on the knowledge on parametric monitoring, we put the performance evaluation of SMEDL
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in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 studies monitoring timing properties in asynchronous environments and proposes a conceptual monitor architecture that clearly separates monitoring of time intervals from the
rest of property checking. Chapter 7 extends SMEDL to support software adaptation and presents
a Hoare-logic-based method to verify correctness of adaptation implementations with respect to the
execution of the target program. Chapter 8 makes conclusions and discusses future work.
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CHAPTER 2 : State of the Art
This chapter gives an introduction to the background of the thesis, including a brief account and
state of the arts of runtime verification and software adaptation.

2.1. Introduction to runtime verification
Runtime verification (RV), also referred to as runtime monitoring, is a kind of technique for checking properties against behaviors of systems. This section first introduces key concepts of RV and
then presents typical applications of runtime verification.
Observations, events, and traces. In RV, behavior of a system is usually represented as a trace
of observations obtained from a system execution. Representative types of observations include
samples and updates of a system state, calls to functions and transfer of program controls. These
observations are abstracted as events. The choice of abstraction is determined by the property we
care and knowledge and assumptions about the target system to be monitored. For instance, an
event can be an atomic proposition on a state variable or a snap shot of the system state. A trace
is a sequence of events produced by execution of the system, which can be potentially extended
indefinitely.
Properties and specification languages. A property is a set of traces. RV techniques usually provide a specification language (also referred to as a formalism) to describe properties. Specification
languages can be divided into two styles: declarative and operational style [15]. In declarative-style
formalisms, such as temporal logic and its variants, specifications describe what to monitor, which
are suitable for high-level behaviors. Operational-style formalisms, such as automata-based languages, describe monitoring logic in an imperative way. It is also possible to transform temporal
formula into automata [63].
Monitoring system. Figure 1 captures process of runtime monitoring. Monitor specifications are
created from properties, which are then synthesized into runtime monitors. A monitor can be either encoded as a data structure to be interpreted by a monitoring algorithm or compiled into pro-
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grams [9]. Monitors can check execution of a system and generate verdicts in an online manner
when the system is running or in an offline manner by consuming an event trace from a log file.
In either case, instrumentation is necessary as an interface between the system and the monitor.
Not shown in the figure, the instrumentation script specifies how to instrument the target program
and map from interesting observations into events to be handled by monitors. Instrumentation
techniques then analyze the program, at the source code level using AOP (aspect oriented programming) [84] or using binary analysis, and integrate the code that generates event traces during runtime
into the target program.
Application of runtime verification. Here we give two representative examples to illustrate that
RV can be applied to verify both high and low-level behavior of a system.
Case 1: Correctness of using library APIs. Many programs rely on standard libraries which provide
APIs to manipulate complicated data structures or control concurrent behaviors. These APIs usually
come with a specification. Some of them are propositions on the input and output while others
are temporal policies on the order of using them. Legunsen et al. [92] formalize specifications
of standard Java APIs using the RV tool JavaMOP [81] and check whether the specifications are
satisfied in 200 in open-source projects. For instance, the Iterator HasNext property states that each
call to next on an Iterator object must be preceded by a call to hasNext. The monitor specification
of this policy can be expressed as a state machine, as shown in Figure 3. If next is called at the state
ready st, the monitor detects this violation by transforming into the state error.

Figure 3: State machine of the Iterator HasNext policy
Case 2: Quality of the tracking application. This example comes from in the RINGS project, led
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by BAE Systems. The project focuses on a target tracking application, developed by BAE Systems
and continuously evolved over a period of over 15 years. A tracking application receives data from
a number of sensors that supply information about observed objects, and contains algorithms that
parse sensor inputs and compose observations into tracks, i.e., sequences of points representing
position of an object over time. There are a number of metrics that characterize track output quality.
These metrics, collected using a sliding window time interval, include average duration of a track
observed in a time interval and the number of observations of objects that are not associated with
any track. A monitor can be modeled to collect observations, compute metrics and raise an alarm
when significant changes are observed.

2.2. RV techniques
2.2.1. RV formalisms
Many RV techniques have been proposed based on temporal logic. Havelund and Roşu [73] present
rewriting-based algorithms for past and future time LTL (linear temporal logic) formula. Bauer et
al. [22] propose a 3-value logic LTL3 for runtime verification LTL and TLTL (timed linear temporal
logic) formula. A third verdict ? is introduced to denote that the result of an extension of the current
prefix of the event trace is not decidable yet. This is particularly useful when monitoring properties
that are not pure safety. Some tools such as JPAX [74], DIANA [125] and RiTHM [105] use LTL
or extension of LTL as the formalism to describe properties to monitor.
Another powerful formalism is the rule system. The specification is composed of a set of rules.
Upon receiving events, rules are evaluated to trigger removal of old rules and add of new ones. EAGLE [11] is a rule-based monitoring system which are expressive to describe multiple formalisms
such as past and future time LTL, interval logics and extended regular expressions. To improve efficiency and usability, RuleR [13] is presented to describe properties as executable low-level rules.
Several tools and techniques have also been derived such as LogScope [12], TraceContract [10],
LogFire [71] and data automata [70].
Automata-based techniques directly describe how properties are monitored and suitable for describ-
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ing low-level behaviors. In MaC (monitoring and checking) [87], MEDL (meta event description
language) is used to describe monitoring requirements in the form of state transitions triggered by
events. Larva [40] uses DATE (dynamic automata with timers and events) [39] to describe properties. Aktug and Naliuka [3] present ConSpec, an automata-based policy language whose semantics
is described as security automata [122]. Its specifications can be generated into inline monitors for
recognizing security properties [4]. MOP [101] supports using FSM (finite state machine) to describe properties. Reger et al. [115] present MARQ to monitor Java programs, which uses QEA [14]
as the formalism to specify parametric properties.
2.2.2. Monitor deployment
Monitors may be deployed synchronously or asynchronously with the target system. Synchronous
monitors block execution of the target system until validity of an observation is confirmed. Synchronous instrumentation can be implemented using AOP. While suitable for safety- and securityrelated contexts, synchronous monitoring might sometimes incur high execution overhead for the
target system when execution of the monitoring logic is time-consuming. Moreover, when monitoring multiple programs running in different processes, synchronization is not realistic. In this
case, asynchronous deployment comes into play, which is usually implemented by communication
middleware [132] or shared buffer [85]. The downside of asynchronous monitoring may come from
several aspects: 1) it is difficult to locate the point where the violation happens; 2) the overhead of
asynchronous monitoring depends on the underlying communication mechanism, which is harder
to predict and may require more efforts to optimize; and 3) timing properties are harder to check
when the clock relation between the target system and the monitor cannot be described accurately.
Consequently, flexible deployment of monitors is desirable for a RV technique to support different
monitoring requirements in different environments. Thanks to the separation between the monitor specification and deployment, many RV techniques such as MOP and Larva support generating
both synchronous or asynchronous monitors. Some existing techniques also support hybrid monitoring. Colombo et al. [41] propose an architecture allowing for switching between synchronous
and asynchronous monitoring. PolyLarva [42] supports hybrid monitoring of Java programs. Val-
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our [7] supports dynamic instantiation and hybrid monitoring. detectEr [59] is an actor-based [2]
RV tool for monitoring distributed Erlang programs. A hybrid instrumentation technique used by
detectEr is presented by Cassar and Francalanza [32] to dynamically switch between synchronous
and asynchronous monitoring, which would reduce the overhead by minimizing the synchronous
instrumentation while ensuring timely detections.
2.2.3. Decentralized and distributed runtime verification
Design and implementation of component based systems is hard, especially when modules are deployed in asynchronous environments. Many studies have been proposed to describe properties and
generating monitors for these systems. According to whether there exists a global clock between
monitors and the target program, there are two categories: decentralized and distributed monitoring [121].
In decentralized monitoring, a monitoring requirement is fulfilled by coordination between a set
of monitors. All monitors share the same clock so that a global order between events can be determined. Bauer and Falcone [21] propose a decentralized LTL monitoring algorithm. There are
multiple processes which generate different predicates for a formula. To monitor the whole formula
locally, the algorithm generates a monitor for each process. Monitors communicate with each other
using synchronous communication. At each global tick, each local monitor decides whether a verdict can be generated. If not, it will request results of predicates from other processes. Falcone et
al. [54] further generalize the algorithm to support monitoring regular language in a decentralized
way. Automata is used to specify local monitors. At each step, the local monitor either gets the
update from the component to which it attaches or receives state updates from other monitors. If the
information is not enough, it will send state update to other monitors. Colombo and Falcone [38]
present another decentralized algorithm for LTL monitoring, which forms a hierarchical network of
local monitors according to the structure of the formula statically. During execution, the state of a
formula is updated after receiving the update on its sub formulas. El-Hokayem and Falcone [51]
present algorithms for monitoring decentralized specifications where monitors can be attached to
various components.
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Different from decentralized monitoring, distributed monitoring does not assume existence of a
global clock. Mansouri-Samani and Sloman [100] present a rule-based language to monitor distributed systems. Given a maximum communication delay, the framework can delay the application
of rules and reorder events. Sen et al [125] present a distributed algorithm for monitoring PTDTL (past time distributed temporal logic), which extends of past time LTL by adding operators to
specify formula or values to be computed remotely by other nodes. An algorithm for synthesizing
distributed monitors is presented, which relies on knowledge vectors. Each process contains a copy
of the vector. The monitor can always obtain the newest evaluation from other processes by knowledge vectors. Francalanza et al. [60] present mDPI, a location-aware π-calculus [102] extension for
monitoring distributed systems. Multiple forms of monitoring strategies are presented and evaluated
in which one method use migration of monitors to support dynamic architectures. Zhou et al. [141]
present DMaC (distributed MaC), which extends MaC system with declarative networking to support checking safety properties of network protocols. The protocol is expressed as NDlog (network
datalog) rules [98].
2.2.4. Correctness and verification of runtime monitors
Trustiness of runtime monitors is a vital issue because they are responsible for generating warning and recovery actions correctly when the properties are violated. There are multiple aspects of
correctness. If a specification is modeled from a property, guaranteeing that the specification correctly describes the property is important. Some sophisticated monitoring algorithms have been
proposed to improve efficiency but correctness of the algorithm must be proved. For some techniques, specifications are transformed into executable monitor code to be inlined with the target
program. Verification of compliance between the implementation and the specification is necessary.
Representative work on verification on runtime monitors are introduced below.
Laurent et al. [89] present a model checking framework to verify correctness of specifications written in Copilot language [109]. Correctness of a monitor specification is described using invariant
properties. A k-induction based model-checker is then applied to check whether the invariant is
preserved. The method is useful when the specification is complicated and some invariants should
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be discovered and verified to improve trustiness of the specification. However, it requires efforts to
write the correct invariants.
Blech et al. [29] present a framework for certified RV using Coq theorem prover [25]. The paper
states correctness of monitors from three aspects: instrumentation, integration and compliance of
the property specification. The system, system with instrumentation and system with monitor are
described as functions to the set of traces. The instrumentation correctness is defined on the equivalence between on the original and instrumented system with respect to projections of system states
and concrete events. The integration correctness is defined with respect to non-interference between
the monitor and the instrumented system. Monitor correctness is defined on the equivalence of the
language. The paper further explores the issue of compliance for the properties described as regular
expressions. Both regular expressions and monitor functions are formalized in Coq and preservation
of a simulation relation between them is proved inductively. The corresponding relation between
concrete and abstract events are also proved.
For formalization and correctness proof of monitoring algorithms, Schneider et al. [123] formalize
the monitoring algorithm of MFOTL (metric first order temporal logic) using Isabelle/HOL proof
assistant [107] and prove its correctness by establishing an invariant to preserved at each step of the
algorithm and verifying that the verdicts generated reflect MFOTL’s semantics.
A lot of RV techniques support automatic synthesis of monitors from the property specification
and the correctness of synthesis algorithm should be verified. For instance, correctness of the synthesis algorithm for generating automata-based monitors have been proved [62, 124]. Francalanza
and Seychell [59] present an automated procedure for synthesizing concurrent monitors for Erlang
programs from the property expressed using a subset of HML (Hennessy Milner logic). Due to
non-determinism of execution of concurrent programs, correctness of a monitor is defined based on
the property violation of a system with respect to an execution. Then, correctness of the synthesis
is proved from aspects of violation detectability, detection preservation and monitor separability.
Mitsch and Platzer [103] present ModelPlex, a RV framework for CPS systems. The method as-
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sumes a verified model of a CPS system of which the non-determined number of executions preserves a post-condition given a pre-condition. Soundness and computability of the synthesis algorithm are proved.
Finkbeiner et al. [56] propose a verifying compiler that can generate verification conditions as
the correctness criteria along with the Rust implementation of Lola monitors [44], which are then
proved by the Viper toolkit [104]. Functional correctness, memory safety and termination can be
proved in this framework.
2.2.5. Parametric monitoring
Software systems often expand in the sense of data or control by creating new instances of data
structure, thread or process. Observations (events) generated from these dynamically scalable structures are attached with identities as attributes of events to distinguish them. Parametric properties
are defined on traces of events with attribute bindings. Due to their dynamic nature, parametric
properties are hard to be verified statically [34]. Many RV techniques support monitoring parametric properties [75]. Several formalisms of temporal logic have been proposed for parametric
monitoring such as JLO (Java logical observer) [130], LTL-FO+ [67], LTLF O [23], MFOTL [18]
and monitor modulo theories [46].
Goubault-Larrecq and Olivain present Orchids [65], an intrusion detection tool. Monitors can by
dynamically spawned reacting to possible beginnings of attacks. Yamagata et al. [134] present a
formalism CSPE for monitoring concurrent systems. Parametric properties are expressed by recursive parametric processes. Extended from Lola, Lola 2.0 [55] supports parameterized templates and
dynamic generation of event streams for parametric monitoring of complex security properties in
network traffic.
In our work, we focus on parametric monitoring by trace slicing, which partitions a whole trace into
sub traces according the attribute values they carry. Non-parametric properties are then checked
against the sub traces. Allan et al. [5] first implements trace slicing in Tracematches to support event matching with values of parameters. MOP implements an efficient trace slicing al-
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gorithm [34] for parametric monitoring, which has also been used in other tools such as RVmonitor [99], MOVEC [35] and QEA. QEA checks parametric properties using the same trace
slicing mechanism with MOP. However, parameters can be quantified by a nested list of universal
and existential quantifiers. As a result, QEA is more expressive than MOP in parametric monitoring
but less in time efficiency due to the difference in the binding semantics. We will further study this
difference in Chapter 4.
There is also work on exploring the relation between specification techniques for parametric monitoring. Reger and Rydeheard [114] present a transformation from QEA to rule-based system and
differences between these two techniques with respect to parametric monitoring are highlighted.
Reger et al. [113] present a subset of syntactic fragments in first-order temporal logic that are sliceable and transform them into automata for slicing. The core of parametric monitoring is using
indexing to access states for an incoming event [72].
2.2.6. Stream processing
Stream processing [8] is a technique to handle data flow at large scale. A stream processing system is usually composed of a set of nodes. On each node, operations such as union, join, filter
and arithmetic computation can be specified. Nodes are connected to form a DAG to transform
event streams. Compared to traditional batch processing, stream processing can efficiently deal
with real-time data and it is suitable to be used in event-driven applications. Many stream processing frameworks, such as Storm [1], Flink [31] and Spark [135] have been proposed. With support of
stream operators, properties over data streams can be conveniently described in stream processing
programs and the mature framework makes it suitable to handle large-scale data. However, because
general stream processing frameworks handle large-scale data in a distributed way, which requires
more sophisticated control and brings more runtime overhead, it is not suitable when the target system is not at large scale. To monitor properties over data streams, many stream runtime verification
(SRV) techniques have been proposed such as Lola [44] and its successor Lola 2.0 [55], Striver [64],
TeSSLa [94], Copilot [109] and Quantitative regular expressions (QREs) [6]. They have different
application targets and thus make different assumptions over streams and provide different language
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features. For instance, Lola is a DSL for specifying properties for synchronous systems. Each data
point comes with a timestamp and different streams are synchronized by a global clock. Lola 2.0
gets rid of the global clock and provides sliding window expressions to aggregate events for time
intervals. Moreover, as already mentioned above, dynamic generation of event streams to support
large-scale inputs. More complicated properties such as network traffic can be described. QRE is
a specification language for complex numerical queries over data streams. Stream composition and
arithmetic operators such as sum and average are supported.
2.2.7. Summary
In this section, we have introduced some representative studies on runtime verification. To monitor
a variety of properties for different types of systems, existing studies focus on multiple aspects such
as design of specification languages, monitoring algorithms, decomposition of specifications and
deciding deployment of monitors. However, fulfilling two requirements introduced in Section 2.1
is still challenging for many existing RV techniques. In Chapter 3, we present a new formalism,
SMEDL for RV which utilizes automata to specify properties at multiple abstract levels. A complicated monitoring requirement can be decomposed into a set of monitors that can communicate with
each other during runtime. Moreover, users can specify deployment of monitors in a flexible way.
To bridge the gap between the monitor specification and the implementation, we propose a method
to generate correct-by-construct implementation of monitors using Coq theorem prover and the
Fiat framework. In Chapter 4, we present a novel method to use dynamically scalable SMEDL
monitor network for parametric monitoring. In Chapter 6, we will also study monitoring timing
properties in distributed environments where network delay and clock difference need to be taken
into consideration.

2.3. Self-adaptive software
Software adaptation is a technique to enable software to dynamically adjust changes during execution. According to the objective of adaptation, there are four types of goals [119]: self-configuration,
self-optimization, self-healing and self-protection. We will first introduce work on general tech-
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niques for adaptation, which are divided into two categories, method-based and model-free methods. Then, we present work on runtime enforcement, which uses monitoring techniques to detect
violation of properties during runtime and then generates reflexive actions to prevent software failure or malicious attacks.
2.3.1. Model-based methods
The adaptation process contains four steps, monitor, analyze, plan, and execute, which require
knowledge of the target system (referred as MAPE-K [82]). In model-based software adaptation, a
model provides hints on when and how to apply adaptation actions and guarantees correctness of
the adaptation. Both architecture and behavior models can be used in the adaptation.
The rainbow framework [61] uses style-specific software architectures and a reusable infrastructure
to support self-adaptation. An architecture model contains properties to be maintained during execution. After a violation is observed and analyzed, repairs are conducted which would change the
architecture. MADAM [57] uses architecture models to realize software adaptation. The adaptation
is implemented as a middleware, which monitors user and system contexts and uses an architecture
model to decide whether adaptation is needed and how to apply it. Utility functions are used to
decide when to switch between implementations to achieve the adaptation goal. The application
variant with the highest utility will be chosen. ActivFORMS [79] is an adaptation technique which
implements the MAPE-K loop formally and supports changing goals at runtime. Models of timed
automata can be executed by a virtual machine so that no coding is required.
Studies introduced above can support sophisticated adaptation actions. However, a large fraction
of software failures, especially ones depending on the environment and concurrent behaviors can
be solved by simply rebooting the system. Microreboot [30] uses local recovery to increase the
availability of Java-based Internet systems. Compared to global recovery, local recovery is more
efficient and potentially has less influence to the user. However, the only type of actions microreboot
supports is restarting a subset of components. Sözer et al. [128] propose the Flora framework
to support local recovery based on decomposition of component-based system. Components are
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partitioned based on the independent relation and the cost to execute restarting operation. During
execution, Flora will detect whether failure happens in each partition and only reboots the failing
ones.
Easwaran et al. [49] explore a control-theoretic view of software adaptation and present an architecture for steering of discrete event system [111]. The steering architecture contains a system, a
monitor and a steerer. The system is modeled as a transition system receiving activation or deactivation signals sent from the steerer. Activation signals carry the actions to be executed in the system
and deactivation signals halt the specified actions. Monitors are used to return possible violations
that the system may encounter so that the steerer can generate actions to prevent the violation. The
communication delay between the system and the controller is handled as a control problem under
partial observation.
2.3.2. Model-free methods
Model-free methods do not require systematic knowledge on the system or the environment. ASSURE [126] is a system introducing rescue points that recover from unanticipated problems from
known error conditions. Prior to deployment, ASSURE uses fuzzing to discover candidate rescue
points. During execution, when a fault is detected, ASSURE analyzes the fault, selects a proper
rescue point and then produces a patch. The patch instantiates a rescue point inside the application
to avoid the fault. Ares [66] also tries to leverage existing error handlers to recover from unexpected errors. It intercepts the exception handling of the underlying JVM. A synthesizer generates
a set of candidate solutions by analyzing the exception type and the call stack. Java PathFinder
then analyzes candidates and ranks them to choose the most viable one to patch. Nielebock [106]
presents an API-specific program repair mechanism. The method utilizes API information from the
erroneous code to search for API usage patterns from which patches can then be generated. Kim
et al. [86] extend MaC with a feedback capability. Steering specification includes the target objects
and actions to be executed. When the system deviation is detected by the runtime checker, actions
are invoked and transferred to the target system and executed when the system is ready.
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2.3.3. Runtime enforcement
Runtime enforcement (RE) extends runtime verification with the ability to transform from an input
event trace to an output trace that follows the specification. Some EMs (enforcement monitors) are
utilized as the interface to generate property-compliant data for two systems communicating with
each other using events. Reference monitors [68], on the other hand, intercept actions generated
from the target system and generates actions to change the state of the program directly to prevent
violation of the property. There have been many studies focusing on multiple perspectives of RE
from specifications to principles of RE. Some representative ones are introduced below.
The initial formalism of RE is security automata (SA) [122], which is a büchi automata with partial
transition functions. When a security automata receives an event, it checks whether there is a defined
transition. If so, the transition is executed and the target system can continue execution. Otherwise,
the target system will be halted. SA needs to memorize potentially unbounded execution history.
Fong [58] presents SHA (shallow history automaton) which only tracks what events have been
received without recording the order among them. Although strictly less expressiveness than SA,
SHA requires less memory and can still enforce some famous security policies such that the Chinese
Wall policy. Sometimes, security related method calls to be enforced will return value, Ligatti and
Reddy [95] present MRA (mandatory result automata) which is used as an interface between the
untrusted application and the executing system. The MRA sends valid calls from the application to
the system and returns valid results generated from the system back to the application. Under certain
environments where MRAs can explicitly observe termination of the application and the executing
system always return results, MRAs can enforce action-life properties.
SA can only enforce safety properties. Ligatti et al. [96] present edit automaton which supports
suppressing and inserting actions. Renewal properties can be enforced by edit automata [97]. Renewal properties contain all safety and certain liveness properties. Falcone et al. [52] present GEM
(generalized enforcement monitors) with finite control states and a memory device. Store and dump
operations are supported to memorize events and re-insert them when necessary. GEM can enforce
response properties which expect good things should happen infinitely often. Response properties
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coincide with renewal properties [53]. Bielova and Massacci [28] study enforcement of iterative
properties. Informally, a property is iterative if concatenation of two property-compliant traces still
satisfy the property. They present iterative suppression automata to remove invalid subparts of the
trace.
RE mechanism has been used to implement security policies. Bauer et al. present Polymer [24],
a system using edit automata to specify and compose security policies for Java programs. Another
application of runtime enforcement lies in the usage control policy. El-Harake et al. [50] apply
enforcement techniques to block advertisements embedded in the Android applications. Riganelli
et al. [117] introduce proactive library for API usage in the Android ecosystem. At the development phase, developers model usage policies as edit automata, which will be compiled into policy
enforcer which guarantees correct API usage by intercepting API calls from applications to the
libraries.
Since enforcement mechanisms may directly change behavior of the target system, correctness is
an important issue. Current studies focus on two aspects. The first aspect is defined on the specification, which says soundness and transparency must be guaranteed by an EM [96]. Soundness
means the output of an EM must comply with the property while transparency means a correct input
trace should not be altered. For EMs of safety properties, two principles can be satisfied directly
since the prefix of a trace must also satisfy the property. For properties having invalid prefixes,
we want to output a correct trace that is as close as to the input trace. The notion of precise and
effective enforcement are defined. Precise enforcement requires that if the input trace is valid, the
output trace must not be modified. Effective enforcement is based on equivalence relation between
executions. One instantiation of equivalence relation is the longest valid prefix [52]. Bielova and
Massacci [27] distinguish different ways of executing suppression and insertion actions. An All-OrNothing automaton stores invalid prefix until the stored trace complies with the property while a late
automaton only outputs some valid prefix. They also discuss the case where soundness and transparency are too strict to define bad traces [26]. Distance between two traces are used to measure
closeness between two traces and boundedness and predictability are defined as a weaker notion of
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soundness and transparency.
The second aspect is the gap between the specification and the implementation. Several studies
have been proposed to verify correctness of in-line monitors. Hamlen et al. [69] present MOBILE,
a framework to certify monitors on Microsoft .NET architectures using type theory. The method
assumes a security property is defined correctly but the rewriter, which is responsible for generating
the implementation, cannot be trusted. The compliance of property is checked by type-checking
rules defined upon bytecode programs. Aktug et al. [4] present a proof-carrying monitor inlining
mechanism for Java Virtual Machine. The inlining correctness is described using the annotations in
the form of Hoare logic. A ghost monitor represents the policy specification, which is transformed
into checks before and after security-related calls. The proof of state synchronization between the
ghost monitor and the in-line monitor is built locally as pre- and post-condition for each relevant
program points. Using the verification condition checker, the adherence proof is validated. Sridhar
and Hamlen [129]. design and implement a model checking framework for the correctness of inline reference monitor. The method assumes that the in-line monitor is generated and integrated into
the ActionScript bytecode programs by an untrusted third-party. The verifier non-deterministically
explores the untrusted code and obtains an abstract machine describing the behavior of the monitor.
The model checker then verifies whether the abstract states comply with the security property. The
soundness and convergence of the abstract machine is proved.
2.3.4. Summary
Runtime enforcement has been used to either prevent the system from property violation or generate reflexive fixes. Compared to general techniques which require models or existing error handling
mechanism, RE is light-weighted and easy to validate. However, even though existing techniques
have provided ways to check transparency and soundness of a formalism and compliance between
the specification and the implementation, there is little work on interference between the target
system and the implementation of adaptation actions. In Chapter 7, we will extend SMEDL to support reflexive adaptation actions and present an initial work on verifying correctness of adaptation
actions with respect to the target system.
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CHAPTER 3 : Scenario-based Meta Event Description Language
This chapter presents Scenario-based Meta Event Language (SMEDL) as a formalism to express
monitoring logic. The formalism is divided into two parts: single monitor specifications and architecture descriptions. A single monitor specification is composed of a set of EFSMs which share data
states and synchronize with each other using internal events. In Section 3.1, we formally define the
specification language and propose a method to generate correct-by-construction implementation of
single monitors. By using single monitors, many properties can be expressed from ones describing
high-level temporal relations to ones involving primitive computations and state updates. To further
conveniently describe and efficiently check properties of component-based systems that may scale
during runtime, in Section 3.2, we use single monitor specifications as building blocks to construct
a more complicated monitoring system as a monitor network. An architecture description specifies
flows of information between monitors. Monitor deployment and communication between monitors can also be described. A single monitor specification is extended to carry identities to support
dynamic instantiation of instances on demand. The semantics of dynamic instantiation of monitor
instances and synchronized collaboration of monitors will be proposed.
To make this chapter more self-contained, we first introduce terminologies, notations and definitions. Sets are denoted by single uppercase letter or strings starting with a capital letter. The power
set of S is denoted as 2S or P(S). Lowercase letters or strings are used to denote variables or
values. Symbols may be attached with subscripts of natural numbers. The symbol → will be overloaded when defining a function space, mapping or transition. The symbol + denotes a partial
function. When denoting the internal structure of a set, we will use curly brackets. Comprehension
notation is used to describe the condition to be satisfied in the set. The tuple is represented using
angled brackets or parentheses. We use θ to denote a map, which can be expanded using the notation [x1 7→ v1 , x2 7→ v2 ...]. We use the operation θ[x1 ] to return v1 . The symbol = is used for
assignment or equality. The symbol ≡ is used for equivalence relation or definition. Dot notation
and subscripts are used to represent the relation between the element and the tuple to which it belongs. For instance, for a tuple T ≡ hA, Bi, the field B of T can be denoted either as T.B or BT .
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Dot notation is also used to concatenate lists and the empty list will be denoted by .

3.1. Single monitor: design, semantics and correct-by construction code generation
A SMEDL single monitor specification is an entity that can be used to describe a complete monitoring requirement or as a building block to form a monitor network to describe more complicated
properties. By using a higher-level specification language than common programming languages,
monitors can succinctly describe what monitors should do: implementation details are crucial for
performance, but they can be determined separately, along with a proof of preservation of semantics between the specification and implementation. One challenge is to design semantic rules that
can be used smoothly in the specification, while remaining amenable to refinement so that such
preservation can be proved without excess difficulty.
Additionally, to generate a correct monitor, we have to ensure that the monitor specification is
well-formed. This thesis focuses on two properties: responsiveness and determinism. Informally,
responsiveness means the monitor always returns a result when fed with an event, which is important
because if a monitor gets stuck during the execution, it cannot receive events from the system and
catch property violations. Moreover, a synchronous monitor that gets stuck or aborts will directly
influence execution of the target system. Determinism ensures that the monitor always produces the
same output given the same input and the state. The code generation process needs to detect and
reject any “bad” monitor specifications that may behave non-deterministically during runtime.
In this section, we first present the definition of single monitors. Then, we present an operational
semantics for SMEDL monitors written in a relational way which ensures that the functionality of a
specification and its implementation are separated. Based on the semantics, we define a predicate on
the definition of SMEDL monitors to ensure responsiveness and determinism. Finally, we present
a method for generating correct-by-construction implementations of single monitors. Our method
is based on Fiat [47], a deductive synthesis framework embedded in the Coq theorem prover. Users
start by embedding their DSL (domain specific language) into Coq, so that each DSL program is
understood as a mathematical description of the set of results it may return. Using stepwise refine-
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ment, each program can be translated into a correct-by-construction executable implementation. A
case study illustrating the usability of the code generation will be presented1 .
3.1.1. Definitions
A SMEDL monitor is a reactive entity interacting with the environment by receiving and generating
events. A monitor is composed of a set of scenarios. Each scenario is an EFSM reacting to events.
Scenarios interact with each other using shared state variables or by triggering execution of other
scenarios through raised events. Each transition is labeled with a triggering event and attached to
a boolean expression as the guard condition and a list of actions to be executed after the transition.
Primitive data types such as integer, float and boolean types and arithmetic and logical operations
are supported in SMEDL. The definition of the monitor is given below.
Definition 1 (Monitor) A monitor M is a triple hV, E, Si, where V is a set of state variables; E is
a set of event declarations and S is a non-empty set of scenarios.
Definition 2 (Event declaration) An event declaration is a triple hevName, attributeTypes, event
Typei where evName is the name of the event, attributeTypes is a list of data types for the
attributes of the event; eventType is an enumeration of three values: imported , exported and
internal to denote how the event is used in the monitor specification.
Imported events are received from the environment to trigger execution of the monitor; exported
events are raised within the monitor and sent to the environment; internal events are also raised
within the monitor but are only seen and processed within a given monitor.
Definition 3 (Scenario) A scenario of a monitor M is an EFSM hSt, Σ, ι, ψ, F i, where St, F , ι are
respectively a set of states, a set of final states and the initial state; Σ is the alphabet—events that
can trigger the transitions of M , which is a subset of M .E; ψ is a set of transitions. All scenarios
are assumed to be complete with respect to transitions.
Definition 4 (Transition) A transition is a 4-tuple hqsrc, qdst, ev , Ai where qsrc and qdst are the
1

https://github.com/PRECISE/smedl-fiat-code
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source and target state of the transition; ev is an event instance that triggers the transition; A is a
list of actions to be executed after the transition.
Definition 5 (Event Instance) An event instance of a transition tr is a 3-tuple hevent, eventArgs, g
i where event is a reference to the event declaration, eventArgs is a list of variables that are local
to tr and g is the guard condition of tr .
For each event instance ev of the transition tr defined in the scenario sce, ev.event ∈ sce.Σ. Moreover,
the data type of local variables in eventArgs are implicitly declared in ev.event.attributeTypes. We
ev {A}

will use the notation qsrc −→ ev .g qdst to denote the transition hqsrc, qdst, ev , Ai.
Supported actions are state update and raising events. In state update actions, state variables or local
variables can be updated by normal arithmetic or logical operations. Events to be raised must be an
internal or exported event.
Definition 6 (State Update) A state update action is a tuple hv, expri where v is the variable to be
updated and expr is the expression computing the value to be assigned to v.
Definition 7 (Event Raising) A event raising action is a tuple he, exprListi where e is the name
of the event to be raised and exprList is a list of expressions to be computed and bound to the
attributes of e.
To give an illustrative example of a single monitor, the SMEDL specification for Iterator HasNext
of Case 1 in Section 2.1 is given below. Note that self-looping transitions are omitted. Three events
create, next and hasNext represent operations of creating an iterator, calling to the next and hasNext
API. The attribute b is the return value of hasNext. If the call to next is made at the ready st
state, the monitor will raise an exported event error to indicate the violation of the API policy. The
concrete syntax of single monitors is given in Appendix A.1.1.
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object IteratorHasNext
events:
imported create();
imported next();
imported hasNext(int);
exported error(int);
scenarios:
main:
init_st -> create() -> ready_st;
ready_st -> hasNext(b) when (b == 1) -> next_st;
next_st -> next() -> ready_st;
ready_st -> next() {raise error();} -> error_st;

3.1.2. An Operational Semantics of SMEDL
This section presents an operational semantics for a single monitor, which is represented as transitions between configurations.
Definition 8 (Configuration) A configuration of a monitor M is a five-tuple hMS , DS , PD, EX ,
SC i where
• MS is a mapping from M.S to their current states;
• DS is a well-typed function M.V → Val where Val is the set of values;
• PD is a set of pending events to trigger transitions within M in the current macro-step;
• EX is a set of raised exported events;
• SC is a set of scenarios that have been executed during the current macro-step.
Each configuration conf relates to a monitor M, denoted as confM . The subscript is omitted whenever the context is clear. Each element in PD and EX is a raised event, which is defined below.
For both raised events and event instances, we abuse the word type to state their relation with the
corresponding event declaration. For a well-typed raised event e, all values of e.valList should be
compatible with types specified in e.event.attributeTypes.

27

Definition 9 (Raised Event) A raised event is a tuple hevent, valListi where event is a reference
to the event declaration and valList is a list of values.
To trigger a transition, its event instance ei must be matched with a raised event e in PD and local
variables ei .eventArgs are bound to e.valList. A function bind (ei , e) is defined to generate a
mapping θ from ei .eventArgs to corresponding values in e.valList. For succinct representation,
we will use the terminology event to denote the concept of event declaration, event instance and
raised event.
Definition 10 (bind function) bind(ei, e) returns a mapping θ where ei.event = e.event ∧ θ[nj ] =
vj for all variables nj ∈ ei .eventArgs and its corresponding value vj ∈ e.valList at the same
position in the list.
When an imported event is sent to a monitor, state transitions within the monitor are triggered.
Actions attached to transitions may raise internal or exported events. Internal events are used to
trigger further transitions in other scenarios. After all triggered transitions are completed, exported
events are output and the monitor waits for the next imported event. This process is denoted as three
e

levels of transitions. At the highest level, a macro-step, denoted as conf * conf 0 , represents that
the evolution of a monitor from conf to conf 0 by an imported event e. A macro-step is constructed
e

by chaining a series of consecutive micro-steps, denoted as conf ,→ conf 0 . Each micro-step is a
synchronous composition of a set of scenario-steps on scenarios with the same triggering event.
e

At the lowest level, each scenario-step, denoted as conf −→ conf 0 , is applied to a scenario. Each
scenario can take at most one scenario-step in each macro-step so that there are no infinite interactions between scenarios. For constructing three types of transitions, basic rule, synchronoy rule and
chain merge rule are proposed below. The semantic rules have been encoded in Coq. For succinct
representation, type checking rules, evaluation of expressions and sequence rules performed on a
list of actions are omitted.
Basic rule. The basic rule is applied to a scenario whenever a transition is triggered by a pending
event. In the definition below, the scenario performing the transition is denoted as mh, conf denotes
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0 denotes the configuration after applying the
the configuration before applying the rule, and confmh

rule on mh. The union operator ∪ is overloaded for generating the union of two mappings. The
function eval (expr , m) evaluates expr given a mapping m from variables to values.
ei{a}

tr : s1 −→ c s2
MSconf (mh) = s1

tr ∈ mh.δ
mh ∈
/ SCconf

e ∈ PDconf θ = bind (ei , e)
DSex = DSconf ∪ θ

eval (c, DSex ) = true

hDS 0 , PD 0 , EX 0 i = updateConfig(a, DSex )
0
confmh
= hMSconf [mh 7→ s2 ], DS 0 , (PDconf \ {e}) ∪ PD 0 , EXconf ∪ EX 0 , SCconf ∪ {mh}i
e

0
conf −→ confmh

When receiving an event e, tr is the enabled transition in mh from s1 to s2 by ei which matches
e. To execute the transition, the following preconditions must be satisfied: 1) current state of mh is
s1 and 2) c, the guard condition of tr, is evaluated to true given the current data state which is the
union of DS and the mapping θ from local variables in ei to attribute values stored in e, 3) e is in
PD, and 4) mh is not in SC.
When tr is taken, mh transitions to s2 and is put into SC and e is removed from PD. By executing
actions in a under the context DSex (represented by the function updateConfig), DS is updated to
DS’; and raised events are respectively added to PD and EX according their types.
Synchrony rule. One or more scenarios may be enabled by a triggering event from the same source
configuration. The basic rule creates new configurations for each scenario by taking these transitions. The synchrony rule then combines scenario’s resulting configuration into a new configuration.
Combination of two configurations conf1 and conf2 under the origin configuration conf is defined
below.
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• ∀mh ∈ S,



MS conf1 (mh) , MS conf1 (mh) = MS conf2 (mh)



MS conf 0 (mh) =
MS conf1 (mh) , MS conf1 (mh) 6= MS conf (mh)




 MS conf (mh) , MS conf (mh) 6= MS conf (mh)
2
2

• ∀v ∈ V ,




DS conf1 (v), DS conf1 (v) = DS conf2 (v)



DS conf 0 (v) =
DS conf1 (v), DS conf1 (v) 6= DS conf (v)





DS conf2 (v), DS conf2 (v) 6= DS conf (v)

• PD conf 0 = PD conf1 ∪ PD conf2
• EX conf 0 = EX conf1 ∪ EX conf2
• SC conf 0 =SC conf1 ∪ SC conf2
The synchrony rule given below is used to create a micro-step. confs is the set of target configurations obtained from the basic rule given a source configuration conf and an event e. MergeAll
combines each configuration in confs into a new configuration by repeatedly combining configurae

tions pairwise. The micro-step from c to c0 by e is denoted as c ,→ c0 .
e

confs = {confmh |conf −→ confmh }
e

conf ,→ MergeAll (confs)
Chain merge rule. The objective of the chain merge rule is to construct a macro-step, which is the
transitive closure of micro-steps. Case (1) shows that a micro-step triggered by an imported event is
the basic case. The corresponding source configuration is denoted as an initial configuration, which
is defined below. The inductive case is shown in case (2). Note that all internal events are forgotten
because they are not observable from the outside of the monitor. There is no restriction on how to
choose the next event from pending events of conf’. Note that integer subscripts are attached in the
chain merge rule to indicate the number of micro-steps from the initial configuration to the current
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configuration, which will be used to prove the responsiveness property below.
e1

conf ,→ conf 0
e1 .event.eventType = imported (1)
e1

conf *1 conf

0

e1

conf *n conf 0
e2

conf 0 ,→ conf 00
(2)
e1

conf *n+1 conf

00

3.1.3. Towards a well-formed monitor specification
To bridge the gap between the semantic rules and the monitor implementation, we need to overcome
some challenges. Firstly, the basic and the synchrony rule are encoded as partial functions in Coq,
which means some restrictions are necessary to make sure their application always succeeds. Secondly, the chain merge rule is defined relationally because it does not specify which event to choose
from PD to trigger the next micro-step, nor does it guarantee termination during the combination of
micro-steps. To derive a computable version, which must terminate because of restrictions in Coq,
the chaining process must terminate normally each time given an imported event. Moreover, all
possible implementations of the chain merge rule must be equivalent in the sense of verdicts they
produce given the same input and the same state. To summarize, a monitor must satisfy two properties, responsiveness and determinism. To describe a state that a monitor can stay after a macro-step,
we define the concept of an initial configuration and a final configuration.
Definition 11 (Initial Configuration) A configuration conf is an initial configuration if 1) SCconf
= ∅ and 2) PDconf = {e} where e is an imported event.
Definition 12 (Final Configuration) A configuration conf is a final configuration if 1) SCconf 6= ∅
and 2) PDconf = ∅.
Definition 13 (Responsiveness) A monitor M is responsive iff for any two of its configurations
e

confM and confM0 and an imported event e that satisfies the relation confM *n confM0 , if M cannot
take any micro-step from confM0 , then confM0 is a final configuration and n is equal to or less than
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|M.S|.
Definition 14 (Determinism) A monitor M is deterministic iff given the configuration confM ,
e

e

confM0 and confM00 , if confM * confM0 , confM * confM00 and both confM0 and confM00 are final, then
confM0 = confM00 .
As a side note, we can make informal connection from the evolution of configurations to the theory
of abstract rewriting system (ARS) [88] where configurations and micro-step are the alphabet and
the binary relation of an ARS. Responsiveness and determinism correspond to the strong normalizing and confluent property. Although we will not formalize this connection in this work, some idea
will be used below to prove the determinism property of a monitor.
Table 1 lists predicates on the syntactic structure of a monitor, which are divided into three categories
indicating which parts of the semantic rules are influenced. Note that subscript is used to denote the
relation between a tuple and its fields.
Table 1: Predicates for well-formedness
Name Definition
∀s ∈ SM , ∀tr1 tr2 ∈ δs , qsrc tr1 = qsrc tr2 ∧
ev tr1 .event = ev tr2 .event
P1
Scenario-step level
⇒ gev tr1 = ¬gev tr2
∀v ∈ VM , ∀s1 s2 ∈ SM , updateVar (v , s1 ) ∧
Micro-step level
P2
updateVar (v , s2 ) ⇒ Σs1 ∩ Σs2 = ∅
=
P3
∀e
∈
EM ,
eventType e
imported ∨ eventType e = internal ⇒ ∃s, s ∈
SM ∧ e ∈ Σs
Macro-step level
P4
∀e e1 e2 ∈ EM , e1 6= e2 ∧ e ⇑M e1 ∧ e ⇑M e2 ⇒
¬∃s, s ∈ SM ∧ e1 ∈ Σs ∧ e2 ∈ Σs
P5
∀e e1 ∈ EM , eventT ypee = imported ∧ e 6=
e1 ∧ e ⇑M e1 ⇒ ¬∃s, s ∈ SM ∧ e ∈ Σs ∧ e1 ∈ Σs
∀e ∈ EM , ∀ s1 s2 ∈ SM , raiseEv (s1 , e) ∧
P6
raiseEv (s2 , e) ∧ s1 6= s2 ⇒
¬∃e0 ∈ EM , trigSce(s1 , e 0 ) ∧ trigSce(s2 , e 0 )
P7
∀e
∈
EM , s
∈
SM , stp
∈
δs ,
noDuplicatedRaise(e, s, stp)
P8
∀e1 e2
∈
EM ,
∀v
∈
VM ,
∃e, noDependency(e, e1, e2)
∧updateVarEv (v ,e1) ⇒ ¬updateVarEv (v ,e2) ∧
¬usedVarEv (v ,e2)
Classification
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P1 guarantees that exactly one transition is triggered for a scenario during the application of the
basic rule, by an event from the alphabet for that scenario. P2 guarantees that when applying
the synchrony rule to construct a micro-step, scenarios that share the same triggering event never
update the same variable. updateVar (v , sce) means that variable v is updated by actions from the
transitions of scenario sce.
The tricky part is that all pending events must be consumed at the end of each macro-step, i.e. there
are no pending events when all available scenarios have finished execution and that the execution of
a monitor never gets stuck because of a mismatch between enabled scenarios and pending events.
P3 guarantees that all imported events or internal events can trigger execution of some scenarios.
P4 and P5 ensure that imported or internal events that may be raised in the same macro-step cannot
directly trigger execution of the same scenario. e ⇑M e1 means that e1 is raised by the actions
of transitions transitively triggered by e. P6 and P7 guarantee that in each macro-step, an internal
event cannot be raised multiple times. raiseEv (sce, e) means that the actions of transitions defined
in sce contain raising e. trigSce(sce, e) means that e may transitively trigger a transition of sce.
noDuplicatedRaise(e, sce, stp) means that e can only be raised once in stp of sce.
The chain merge rule does not specify an order for the chaining of micro-steps. If a monitor is
not well defined, the result of a macro-step could be non-deterministic. P1 ensures scenario-level
determinism. P4 to P7 also prevent some behaviors that may lead to non-determinism. We define
a proposition noDependency(e, e1 , e2 ) ≡ eventTypee = imported ∧ e ⇑M e1 ∧ e ⇑M e2 ∧
¬e1 ⇑eM e2 ∧ ¬e2 ⇑eM e1. This means that e1 and e2 may be raised in the macro-step triggered
by imported event e, and that during this macro-step, e1 can not transitively raise e2, and vice
versa. P8 guarantees that updating a state variable is mutually exclusive. updateVarEv (v , e) and
usedVarEv (v , e) respectively mean that v may be updated and used in any actions transitively
triggered by e.
We use the notation Pi (M ) to represent that a monitor M satisfies predicate Pi . A well-formed
V
monitor satisfies the eight predicates defined above, Wellformed(M) ≡ 1≤i≤8 Pi (M ).
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Given a monitor that is well-formed, and starts execution from an initial configuration, we can now
prove that it always reaches a final configuration deterministically within a bounded number of
micro-steps, as described in Theorem 15 and Theorem 16 below:
Theorem 15 A well-formed monitor M is responsive.
Theorem 16 A well-formed monitor M is deterministic.
To prove Theorem 15, we need to first prove that the number of micro-steps taken within a macrostep is bounded. Because each scenario can only transition once during each macro-step, and at
least one scenario executes in each micro-step, the number of micro-steps to be taken is bounded
by the number of scenarios in the monitor. So we first prove that |SCconf | strictly increases in a
micro-step.
e

Lemma 17 Given two configurations conf conf 0 and an event e, if conf ,→ conf 0 , then |SC conf | <
|SC conf 0 |.
With Lemma 17 and the fact that SC confM is a subset of |SM |, we can prove that the number of
micro-steps taken by a well-formed monitor in a macro-step is bounded by the number of scenarios:
Lemma 18 Given a well-formed monitor M , two of its configurations confM and confM0 and an
e

imported event e, if confM *n confM0 , then n ≤ |SM |.
Next we need to prove that a well-formed monitor cannot be stuck in a non-final state:
Lemma 19 Given a well-formed monitor M , two of its configurations confM and confM0 and an
e

imported event e, if confM *n confM0 and confM0 is not a final configuration, then M can take a
micro-step on all of its pending events from confM0 .
With the three core lemmas presented above, and other auxiliary lemmas, Theorem 15 can be proved
by using the idea of confluence in rewriting systems. First, we prove the diamond lemma defined
below:
Lemma 20 (Diamond) Given a well-formed monitor M , if confM is an initial configuration or
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e1

e

e2

there exists a configuration oconf such that oconf * confM , and confM ,→ conf1M and confM ,→
e2

e1

conf2M , then there exists a configuration confM0 such that conf1M ,→ confM0 and conf2M ,→
confM0 .
The precondition of Lemma 20 on the source configuration is used to guarantee that the transition is
performed from a legal configuration. Then, by induction on the number of micro-steps to be taken
by two transition chains, we can prove the confluence lemma:
e

e

Lemma 21 (Confluence) Given a well-formed monitor M , if confM * conf1M , confM * conf2M
, there exists a configuration confM0 such that conf1M ,→∗ confM0 and conf2M ,→∗ confM0 .
Transition ,→∗ represents multiple micro-steps. Lemma 21 ensures that if an initial configuration
conf can transition into two non-final configurations conf1 and conf2 , then they can always transition back to the same configuration. Using Lemma 21 and the fact that a final configuration cannot
take any micro-step, Theorem 16 can be proved.
With these two theorems, we can always pick an implementation that will not get stuck or aborts
abnormally for a well-formed monitor and all implementations generate the same verdicts as long
as their behaviors follow the semantic rules. In the next section, we will use Fiat to generate an
implementation by refinement.
3.1.4. Code generation by refinement using Fiat
Overview of Fiat. Stepwise refinement derives executable programs from nondeterministic specifications. In each step, some details of the computation are decided upon, proceeding this way until a
computable program is derived. Each refinement step must not introduce new behavior: the values
that a refined program may produce must be a subset of the values allowed by the specification.
Fiat is a stepwise refinement framework, providing a semi-automatic way of deriving correct and
efficient programs. Here semi means that while the derivation process is automatic, it depends on
manually verified refinement lemmas, specific to the domain that Fiat is applied to. Readers can
refer to [47, 36, 133] for more information.
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Key syntax structures in Fiat. In Fiat, specifications are logical predicates characterizing allowable output values. These specifications are called computations, and written in the non-determinism
monad: deterministic programs can be lifted into computations using the ret combinator, computations can be sequenced using the bind combinator (written “x ← c1 ; c2 (x)”), and a nondeterministic
choice operator written {a|P a} is used to describe programs that may return any value satisfying
a logical predicate P . Concretely, the result of binding two computations c1 and c2 as shown above
is simply the set {y|∃x, x ∈ c1 ∧ y ∈ c2 (x)}.
Fiat computations are organized into an ADT (abstract data type), a structure used to encapsulate a
set of operations on an internal data type. In Fiat, an ADT contains an internal representation type
rep, a list of constructors for creating values of rep, and a list of methods operating on values of
rep. A well-typed ADT guarantees that rep is opaque to client programs using the operations of the
ADT.
Refinement calculus in Fiat. Refinement in Fiat is the process of transforming an ADT into a
more deterministic one, involving refining all constructors and methods defined in it and picking an
efficient internal representation using data refinement [76] of rep. When refining an expression, a
partial relation c1 ⊇ c2 must be preserved for each refinement step, meaning that the possible values
of expression c2 must be a subset of the possible values of expression c1 . For the data refinement,
changes of internal representation are justified using a user-selected abstraction relation, so that
if the internal states of two ADTs are related, calling their methods must preserve the relation and
produce the same client-visible outputs. Adding the abstraction relation r to the partial relation ⊇ of
refinement on expression, Fiat uses ⊇r to represent the relation to be preserved for each refinement
step: I1 ⊇r I2 ⊇r ... ⊇r Ii where I1 is the initial ADT and Ii is a fully refined (i.e. deterministic)
ADT.
Figure 4 gives an overview of the code generation process. The initial ADT describes the basic
behavior of monitors using semantic rules defined in the previous section. Then, the ADT is refined
by proving a sharpening theorem, wherein the representation type, constructors and methods of
the ADT are refined. The refinement of methods involves picking a specific implementation and
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proving that ⊇r is preserved between the specification and the implementation. The implementation
is parameterized by a specific monitor definition given a starting state (configuration) and proof of
well-formedness of that monitor. Executable code such as OCaml or Haskell can then be extracted
from this definition.

Figure 4: Code generation process
Definition of an ADT. The monitor ADT describes the common process of handling imported
events using the semantic rules defined in the previous section. The definition of this ADT is given
below.2
Definition confSpec : ADT _ := Def ADT {
rep := configuration M,
Def Constructor0 newS : rep := { c : configuration M | readyConfig c },,
Def Method1 processEventS (r : rep) (e: raisedEvent | raisedAsImported

M e) :

rep * list raisedEvent :=
{ p : rep * list raisedEvent
| exists conf’ econf,
chainMergeTrans r conf’ econf (‘ e) (fst p) (snd p) }
}.

The configuration of a given monitor M is used as the representation type for the ADT. Instead of
constructing a concrete value, Constructor newS specifies that the starting state of a monitor should
2

Some notations such as Def, Constructor and Method, are defined in Fiat
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be a ready configuration. A ready configuration has empty sets for PD and SC, indicating that the
monitor is ready to receive an imported event for the next macro-step. The method processEventS
specifies the non-deterministic action of taking a macro-step. The first parameter r represents the
current ready state of the monitor and the second parameter e is the imported event triggering the
macro-step. The return value is a tuple of a ready configuration that reflects the updated state of the
monitor after the macro-step and a list of raised exported events. The semantic rules from previous
sections were defined in a relational way to conveniently specify this method, since relations easily
model non-deterministic functions. To adapt the chain merge rule to the interface of processEventS,
chainMergeTrans is defined below:
Definition chainMergeTrans {M : monitor} (conf conf’ econf: configuration M)
(e: raisedEvent) (rconf: configuration M)

(events: list raisedEvent)

: Prop :=

configTrans conf conf’ /\
chainMerge conf’ econf e /\
finalConfig econf

/\

configTransRev econf rconf /\
events = EX econf.

configTrans conf conf’ represents the transformation from the ready configuration conf to initial
e

configuration conf’; chainMerge conf’ econf e is the Coq definition of conf 0 * econf with the
number of steps taken omitted; and configTransRev represents the transformation from econf to a
new ready configuration rconf. events is the set of exported events raised in this macro-step.
Refinement process. Refinement using Fiat requires proving the theorem FullySharpened
(confSpec M ), parameterized over some monitor definition M. The implementation is wrapped in
the proof object of the theorem. The first step refines the representation type. Here we choose the
same representation type—the configuration of monitor M—in the implementation. As a result, the
abstraction relation r is plain equality. Constructor newS is refined by choosing a ready configuration conf for monitor M, given by the starting state of monitor M. Just like parameter M, conf also
needs to be provided to generate a concrete, executable monitor. To refine method processEventS,
we need to provide a deterministic function that preserves the semantics of applying the chain merge
rule. Preservation of the specification’s semantics for this function is given by the lemma below:
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Lemma ProcessEventRefined M (C : configuration M) (W : Wellformed M)
(Cor:readyConfig C) (e: raisedEvent) (P : raisedAsImported M e) :
refine { p : configuration M * list raisedEvent
| exists conf’ econf, chainMergeTrans C conf’ econf e (fst p) (snd p) }
(ret (macroStepReadyFinal W Cor P (length (S M)))).

macroStepReadyFinal is a function which takes a ready configuration C and returns a new ready
configuration and list of exported events. Here we choose a straightforward implementation: a
fixpoint function that picks the first event from PD of the current configuration to trigger the next
micro-step. Note that in the Coq definition, we use a list to represent the set, and due to the predicates establishing well-formedness, PD can never have duplicate events. The number of times the
semantic function gets invoked is bounded by the number of scenarios in M. Provided that M is
well-formed, it is guaranteed that the resulting configuration is a final configuration. The lemma
ProcessEventRefined establishes that the return value is a subset of the results obtained by applying
chainMergeTrans used in the original ADT. From the proof object of the theorem, an executable
version of processEventS can be obtained.
It is worth noting that, the semantics of SMEDL can be directly expressed as a Coq function for
generating the Haskell code by native Coq. But through Fiat, we can refine from the SMEDL
semantics in relational style into a more efficient implementation by changing the data structure for
configuration, handling pending events more wisely, etc. Moreover, refinement can be conducted in
a more mechanical and extensible way in Fiat than using native Coq.
3.1.5. Case Study
A general event processing function is generated by refinement, parameterized by: a specific monitor specification, its well-formedness proof and a starting, ready state for that monitor. Therefore,
to obtain a correct-by-construction monitor, one needs to 1) write a monitor definition M; 2) prove
that M is well-formed; and 3) specify a starting state. A Haskell program is then be extracted, from
which a monitor is implemented by adding glue code to receive events from the target system. This
section uses a real-world monitoring requirement to illustrate the usability of this method.
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SMEDL specification. The monitoring requirement comes from a known vulnerability (CVE2017-9228),3 in Oniguruma v6.2.0 [108] which is related to incorrect parsing of character classes
in regular expressions, resulting in a crash due to access of an uninitialized variable. A character
class is a pattern that represents a set of characters that is matched by a single character in the
stream, if and only if that character belongs to the set. To parse a character set such as “[0-5]”,
a state machine is implemented, as shown in Figure 5. Omitted from the figure, transitions in the
state machine are triggered by tokens read by the parser and guarded with addition conditions.
For instance, the transition to the RANGE state requires a look-ahead token to recognize the ‘-’
character.

Figure 5: State machine of parsing character class
Based on the parsing state machine, and agnostic of the specific vulnerability, a SMEDL monitor is
constructed. Part of the SMEDL specification (denoted as parseCC) is given below. We concentrate
on a policy which says that the VALUE state cannot be reached from the START state when we
expect to parse a character class next. There are two scenarios in parseCC. The scenario main models the transitions of the parsing state machine. The scenario check class tracks whether to parse
a POSIX character class next. Imported events starting with state to

represent the transitions.

The imported event inClass and outClass represent beginning and exiting of setting the next state
to handle character classes. The monitor can detect the violation of this policy by raising the event
error when the state of main transitions to VALUE while the state variable in class is equal to 1.
We encode this specification in Coq, which will then be generated into executable code.
object parseCC
state:
int in_class = 0;
events:
imported inClass();//enter next_state_class
imported outClass();//exit next_state_class
3

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-9228
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imported state_to_start();//state is set to START
imported state_to_value();//state is set to VALUE
imported state_to_range();//state is set to RANGE
imported state_to_complete();//state is set to COMPLETE
exported error(int);
scenarios:
main:
START -> state_to_value() when (in_class != 1) -> VALUE;
START -> state_to_value() when (in_class == 1)
{raise error(0);} -> START;
VALUE -> state_to_value() -> VALUE;
VALUE -> state_to_range() -> RANGE;
VALUE -> state_to_start() -> START;
...

check_class:
idle -> inClass() when (in_class == 0)
{in_class = 1;} -> idle;
idle -> outClass() when (in_class == 1)
{in_class = 0;} -> idle;

Proof of well-formedness. Proving the well-formedness of a monitor seems hard because there are
multiple sub predicates needed to be proved and type correctness needs to be checked. However,
we have implemented decision procedures to check whether a monitor satisfies P1 to P3. Rest of
them can be proved using the auxiliary lemmas and tactics. The LOC of the proof is less than 1K of
Gallina and Ltac code, which takes about 30 minutes to finish.
Construction of the Haskell monitor. The core building block of a parseCC-based monitor is
given below. processEventS is the general event handling function refined from the Fiat ADT. The
Parameter r contains the information to be used by parseCC: the proof of well-formedness (denoted
as Well ParseCC) and a starting state. Parameter e is the imported, triggering event for parseCC.
Definition parseCC_processEvent (r : ComputationalADT.cRep
program Well_ParseCC configuration1_ready)
(e: raisedEvent | raisedAsImported
processEventS r e.
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parseCC e) :=

After a Haskell program is extracted, the monitor is constructed by adding glue code for receiving
events from the target system. We compile the Haskell code into an object file and expose two
functions to be instrumented into the target program. The type signature of these two Haskell
functions are given below:
cInitialRep :: IO (Ptr ())
cHandleImported :: CString -> Ptr () -> IO (Ptr ())

Both functions rely on the extracted Haskell code. cInitialRep provides a starting state for the
monitor. chandleImported takes the name of an imported event, and the current state of the monitor,
and returns a new state with any exported events printed out. The target system is responsible for
recording this state update transparently. Using the Haskell compiler, both an object file and a C
header file are generated. The header file contains the C API of the two functions, which are called
in the source code of Oniguruma. When an incorrect transition occurs in the library, an alarm is
raised and printed to the screen.
The difficult part of deriving a monitor is its proof of well-formedness, which can be simplified using
the provided decision procedures and tactics. Other steps are easily implemented using common
procedures. The methodology presented here provides an straightforward way to implement correctby-construction monitors. One concern of using formal techniques is the manual effort involved
in proof work. In our development, proofs are divided into two parts: one part includes proofs
used during the refinement process, and auxiliary tactics and decision procedures for proving the
well-formedness of any monitor; the other part is the proof of well-formedness for a particular
monitor. The raw LOC in Coq for the first part of proof (excluding the Fiat code) is about 30k lines.
However, to apply the technique, users only need prove well-formedness of their particular monitor,
which is not labor-intensive given the help of auxiliary tactics and lemmas. Therefore, we assert
that generating correct runtime monitors using a proof assistant is a feasible task.
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3.2. SMEDL monitoring system
In the previous section, we have proposed SMEDL to describe properties in a single monitor. Complicated requirements can be specified in a modular way as communicating scenarios, which are
convenient to design and organize. However, as software systems and properties become increasingly complicated, it is still intractable to solely use single monitors to fulfill all monitoring requirements. For instance, a property of a distributed system requires analyzing behaviors of sub
components but observations from different components are independent with each other. In this
case, rather than gathering all observations using a single monitor, it is more sensible to use monitors
to check sub components locally and then aggregate verdicts in a downstream monitor. Moreover,
target systems may evolve during runtime by extending dynamic data structure instances, adding or
removing components. As presented in Chapter 4, many properties for such kind of system rely not
only on the event order by also on the attribute values of which the domain are expanded during
runtime. To handle them, it is desirable to equip monitors with ability to dynamically scale together with the target system. In this section, we propose SMEDL monitoring system as a monitor
network. The SMEDL specification language is extended to express monitoring logic as a collection of monitors and monitoring architecture as flows of information between the target system and
monitors. The system supports synchronous as well as asynchronous deployment of monitors and
dynamic instantiation of monitors on demand. We will first introduce the overall system design
and salient features. Then, we will define the architecture description and present a semantics of
synchronous monitor network.
3.2.1. System design
Modular property specification. In order to effectively monitor a property in a large-scale distributed system, SMEDL allows us to specify properties in a modular fashion. In this way, a complex property can be decomposed into a set of monitoring modules that collectively implement
the monitor for the overall property. A common pattern for modular specification is partitioning a
global property for a distributed system into a set of locally deployed modules that operate on local
observations of each process in the distributed system and convey results of local processing to the
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global module that computes the overall result.
Monitor coordination and communication. After a complicated monitoring requirement is decomposed into multiple monitors, coordination between monitors needs to be achieved by communication. The flow of interactions between monitors depends on the property and how it is partitioned into modules. Specification of the monitoring architecture, described below, makes these
flows explicit.
Synchronous and asynchronous deployment. We specify the logic of each monitor module and,
separately, how this module is to be deployed. Often, the user has a choice of deploying the same
module synchronously or asynchronously, so decoupling the logic of the module from its deployment strategy increases flexibility of the framework. Deployment of monitors also influences how
monitors communicate with each other.
Dynamic monitor instantiation. Large-scale software systems typically contain many similar
components that can be added and removed dynamically. Monitors can be instantiated according to
the scaling of the target system.
Separation of property specification from observation extraction. A monitor specification describes, among other things, what observations are needed by the monitor in order to do its job.
In order to deploy monitors, we also need to know how to extract these observations from the target system. Extraction of observations can be performed in many different ways, for example by
instrumenting source code or binaries of system components, by snooping on the system bus, or
even offline, reading from a recorded trace. Over time, the target system may evolve and offer new
ways of observation extraction, or different variants of system component implementations may require different placement of instrumentation probes. It is important to accommodate these changes
in the monitoring setup with as little disruption as possible. SMEDL separates monitoring logic
from observation extraction using an event-based API, so that events can be raised in a specified
format by an appropriate extraction technology. In our work, we have experimented with several
such technologies, such as AspectC [37] for instrumenting C source code and a dynamic translation
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tool for capturing observations from binary code. The extracted event can either be delivered to a
synchronous monitor by calling an monitor API or to an asynchronous monitor by communication
middleware such as RabbitMQ [116].
3.2.2. Monitoring architecture
Before introducing the monitor architecture, we first extend the definition of a monitor with a name
and identity parameters (also referred to as parameter variables or just parameters). Choosing different parameter values allow us to have multiple monitor instances. To distinguish between a monitor
and its instance, we also use the terminology monitor type to refer a monitor. To describe communication between monitors while hiding the internal structure of the monitoring logic, we define the
interface for a monitor.
Definition 22 (Monitor interface) A monitor interface is a triple hmonName, paras, EvInterfacei
where monName is the name of the monitor; paras is a list of typed parameter variables;
EvInterface is a list of imported and exported events of the monitor.
Monitoring architecture is a directed graph that represents communication between monitors (or
monitors and the target system) that involve in a monitoring requirement. Nodes of the graph have
ports that correspond to events that the node can consume or produce. Ports of monitor nodes
match the interface of the monitor. Ports of the target system node represent observations that
are obtained from it. Edges in the graph represent communication flows from exported events of
one node to imported events of another node. Nodes in a monitoring architecture are partitioned
into synchronous sets. Monitors within a synchronous set use a single thread of control while
communication between synchronous sets is asynchronous. During runtime, a monitor instance
may be created either statically at the beginning of a monitored run of the system or dynamically
when new values of parameters are discovered. The formal definition is given below.
Definition 23 (Architecture description) An architecture description is a triple hMonDef , Sync
Def , Channel i where MonDef is a set of monitor interfaces; SyncDef partitions monitors in
MonDef into synchronous sets; and Channel is a set of event connection specifications.
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An event connection specification is a tuple hSrcMon, SrcEv, TarMon, TarEv, MonArgs, EvArgsi,
which specifies how an exported event SrcEv of a source monitor (or the target system) SrcMon is
delivered to a target monitor TarMon as its an imported event TarEv. MonArgs (EvArgs) is a set
of PatternExpr specifying how to bind a parameter variable in the target monitor or an attribute
of the target event with a value from the source monitor or the source event. Each parameter of a
monitor or an attribute of an event corresponds to an index according to its position in the parameter
or attribute list, starting from 0. A PatternExpr is a tuple htargetIdx, source, sourceIdxi, meaning
that the parameter value of TarMon (in MonArgs) or the attribute value of TarEv (in EvArgs) with
index targetIdx must be matched to the parameter value of source with index sourceIdx. source
can be either SrcMon or SrcEv. To correctly bind values, the type information of parameters and
event attributes carried by MonDef are used. Moreover, all attributes in EvArgs must be assigned
with a value. If all parameters are assigned with a value for MonArgs, the connection is unicast
because at most one instance can be the recipient. For multicast actions, one or more positions can
be assigned with an wildcard expression so that multiple instances may receive the event. For a
unicast connection, TarEv is also called an (implicit) creation event of TarMon because it is used to
create an instance when there is no instance that can consume the incoming event.
For example, an event connection specification (mon1 , e1 (x , y), mon2 , e2 (z ), MonArgs : {(0 ,
mon1 , 0 ), (1 , e1 , 0 )}, EvArgs : {(0 , e1 , 1 )}) specifies that instances of mon1 send e1 to mon2
as e2 . Note that type information of monitors and events are omitted here. When an event instance
e1 (x1 , y1 ) is sent from an monitor instance mon1 (a1 ), the monitor instance mon2 (a1 , x1 ) receives it as e2 (y1 ) as the specification requires that the first and second parameter of mon2 respectively match to the first parameter of mon1 and the first attribute of e1 and the attribute of e2
matches to the second attribute of e1 . If there is no instance of mon2 parameterized with (a1 , x1 ),
mon2 (a1 , x1 ) will be created. The concrete syntax of the architecture description is given in Appendix A.1.2.
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3.2.3. Semantics of synchronous set
Monitors in a monitor network are partitioned into synchronous sets in SyncDef. Monitors belonging to the same set communicate with each other synchronously. This section formally defines
the semantics for a synchronous set. We first define a monitor instance as a tuple hmonName,
parasBindingi where monName is the name of the monitor and parasBinding is a map from paras
to values they are bound to. For a raised event, we extend its definition with monInst to denote the monitor instance that raises it. The dynamic state of an instance is still represented by
a configuration and the configuration of a monitor M is a partial function monConfigM from
instances of M to configurations. The configuration of a synchronous set MSet is defined as
setConfigMSet = {monConfigM |M ∈ MSet}.
With our definitions in place, we now describe the semantics in three parts: first, we define the local
rules for handling an event for a specific a monitor. Since an event may be delivered to multiple
monitor types, we define the set rules for handling an event for a set of monitors. We finally define
the global rules to coordinate execution of an entire synchronous set. Each semantic rule takes the
architecture description arch as an implicit parameter.
Local rules. The local rules describes the behavior of a monitor M handling an event ei.
getInfo(monConfigM , ei , arch) = (ids, type, e)
0
monConfigM ↓ids
e,type (monConfigM , l )

[local-step]

0
monConfigM %ei (monConfigM
, l)

The function getInfo(M , ei , arch) retrieves instances of M that consume ei by looking up the
appropriate event connection definition in arch. ei carries the information of the SrcMon and SrcEv
while M is the target monitor TarMon. All matched instances of M are stored in ids. Note that
if there is no corresponding instance, ids represents parameters of the instance to be created. ei
is mapped to the raised event e to be consumed by ids. Moreover, by checking MonArgs of the
matched connection, we can also know whether it is unicast or multicast. Stored in type, we will
use it to apply different semantic rules below.
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The second portion of the rule above the line is defined in terms of the relation ↓ids
e,type , which we
define in terms of the action type we will perform. For presentation purposes, we will condense the
type arguments to U and M, corresponding to unicast and multicast respectively.
Unicast actions. The semantic rules for a unicast connection are defined in two cases. If the
instance already exists, unicast events proceed as:
ids ∈ dom(monConfigM )
monConfigM (ids) = conf
e

conf * conf 0
[unicast-no-create]
{ids}
monConfigM ↓e,U (monConfigM [ids

0

0

0

0

7→ conf ], {(e , ids)|e ∈ conf .EX })

The condition guarantees that the instance ids already exists and the corresponding configuration is
conf . By taking a macro-step, the state of the instance ids is updated to conf 0 . The raised exported
events are extended with ids.
If the monitor instance does not exist, we must first create an instance with ids before performing
the macro-step, as shown in the rule below.
ids 6∈ dom(monConfigM )
initDefaultConf (ids) = conf
e

conf * conf 0
[unicast-create]
{ids}

monConfigM ↓e,U (monConfigM [ids 7→ conf 0 ], {(e 0 , ids)|e 0 ∈ conf 0 .EX })
Finally, as part of the reduction, we update monConfig with this resultant instance and return any
events that macro-step produced.
Multicast actions. Multicast connections may need to update a number of objects over the course
of reduction. To this end, we define multicast operations. The first sub-rule addresses the case where
there is no instance.
[multicast-base]
monConfigM ↓∅e,M (monConfigM , ∅)
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The second case is defined by using the unicast rule on each single instance. Note that the final
union I1 ∪ I2 will be a disjoint union as each entry in I is parameterized by the ids used to create it.
{ids}

monConfigM ↓e,U (newConfigM , I1 )
newConfigM ↓rest
e,M (finalConfigM , I2 )
{ids}∪rest
monConfigM ↓e,M

[multicast-big-step]

(finalConfigM , I1 ∪ l2 )

Set rules. Multiple monitors may handle an incoming event. To achieve parametric monitoring
presented in Chapter 4, we need to specify an order between monitors. The order is decided by
relation of parameters between monitors. For two monitors, m1 and m2 , if a parameter variable p
of m1 matches with a parameter value q of m2 in an event connection specification regardless of
whether m1 and m2 are the source of the target monitor, we say p relates to q. Here we require
that the relation of parameters for two monitors are fixed, which means if p of m1 relates to q
of m2 , there is no other parameters in m2 (m1 ) that matches with p (q). The partial order (≤)
between monitors are defined upon relation of parameters between two monitors. For two sets
of parameters θ1 and θ2 for respectively for m1 and m2 , if all parameters of θ1 are related to
parameters in θ2 , we have m1 ≤ m2 . Then, we can order monitors in the synchronous set MSet
in the monTypeListMSet according to this partial relation: if m1 ≤ m2 , the index of m2 is less
than m1 in it. During execution, if an event can be handled by multiple monitors, the monitor with
smaller index in monTypeList will handle this event before ones that with a larger index.
To this end, we define set rules as reduction relations over set configurations as follows. We first
inductively define ⇒MLst
MSet , the basic set configuration reduction relation for MLst, which is a sub
list of monTypeListMSet .
The set of raised events L is divided into two parts L1 and L2 . L1 is the set of events to be consumed
by monitors in MSet while L2 are events to be sent to other synchronous sets. Note that the dot
operator appends two lists and MSet.monName denotes all names of the monitors in the set MSet.
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0
monConfigM %ei (monConfigM
, L)

L2 = L \ L1

L1 = {eo|eo ∈ L ∧ ∃ch, ch ∈ arch.Channel ∧

ch.SrcMon ∈ MSet.monName ∧ ch.SrcEv = eo.event.evName}
0
ei monTypeList

setConfig 0 ⇒MSet

(setConfig 00 , L01 , L02 )
0
ei M ::monTypeList

[set-reduce-inductive]

setConfig 0 ∪ {monConfigM } ⇒MSet

0
(setConfig 00 ∪ {monConfigM
}, L1 .L01 , L2 ∪ L02 )

[set-reduce-base]

ei []

setConfig ⇒MSet (setConfig, nil , ∅)
The sub rule set-reduce states that the execution of the set rule starts by picking up monitors in
the synchronous set MSet that can consume ei . The function sort is to sort monitors in MSet
according to the partial order ≤.
ML = {M |M ∈ MSet ∧ ∃ch, ch ∈ arch.Channel ∧
ch.SrcEv = ei .event.evName ∧ ch.TarMon = M .monName
∧ch.SrcMon = ei .monInst.monName}
monTypeListMSet = sort(ML)
ei monTypeListMSet

setConfig ⇒MSet

(setConfig 0 , L1 , L2 )
[set-reduce]

ei

0

setConfig ⇒MSet (setConfig , L1 , L2 )
Global rules. The global rule for the synchronous set MSet is defined as the update of configurations carrying two event collections: one to be consumed within the synchronous set and the other
one to be sent to the environment:
(setConfig, evQueue, exSet) ⇓MSet (setConfig 0 , evQueue 0 , exSet 0 )
setConfig and setConfig 0 are configurations of MSet before and after applying our global rules;
evQueue and evQueue 0 are the queue of events to be consumed within the monitor before and after
a step; and exSet and exSet 0 are the sets of events to be sent to the environment. Note that each
element of evQueue is a set of events, which is obtained when applying the local rule. This relation
has two reduction rules indicating how to retrieve the next event instance to process and how to
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remove an empty event instance set.
The first rule represents fetching a single event from the head of the queue, triggering its execution
and adding any resultant external events to the back of the external set:
e

setConfig ⇒MSet (setConfig 0 , L01 , L02 )
(setConfig, ({e} ∪ C ) :: L1 , L2 ) ⇓MSet (setConfig 0 , C :: L1 .L01 , L02 ∪ L2 )
We can observe that this rule leaves flexibility on which event to fetch next. As a future work,
we would adopt the similar method to define predicates on the structure of a synchronous set to
guarantee determinism. The second rule specifies how to proceed when the first event set in the
incoming event queue is empty, moving down the list of events:

(setConfig, ({}) :: L1 , L2 ) ⇓MSet (setConfig, L1 , L2 )
Note that nil is a valid list, and so {} :: nil will reduce to nil, cleaning up the remaining empty set in
the queue. If evQueue is empty, events in exQueue will be sent to the environment. Then, another
event from the environment can be sent to evQueue. The overall top level rule for the evolution of
synchronous set is then defined as below. With this rule, we can abstract each synchronous set as an
atomic entity when defining semantics of a monitor network with multiple synchronous sets.
(setConfig, {e} :: nil , ∅) ⇓MSet (setConfig 0 , {}, L)
[synchronous-set-evolution]
setConfig ⇓eMSet (setConfig 0 , L)
3.2.4. Case Study
To further motivate the design of SMEDL and illustrate its usability, we apply SMEDL to Case 2
in Section 2.1. More examples can be found in Appendix A.2 and corresponding explanations of
them will be given in Chapter 5. Consider the design of a track duration monitor. Recall that a track
is observed as a sequence of timestamped points. Each new point added to the track results in a
track event. The monitor consumes the track events and calculates the average duration of tracks
over sliding windows. Here we use SMEDL to specify this requirement. Compared to high-level

51

languages, monitoring logic can be expressed described by communicating monitors. Concerns of
computation and sliding window can be separated. Compared to general framework, using welldesigned DSL may also reduce the chance to make mistakes.
For the concrete design, because each track event carries the track identifier, there is a local monitor
for each track that calculates duration of the track in the current window and, at each window boundary, sends the value to the global monitor to calculate the metric for all tracks. As tracks are added
by the application, new track monitors are instantiated. To implement calculation of track duration
over a sliding window, the window is partitioned into a series of sub windows, each represented by a
separate monitor. A window manager monitor for each track handles moving of sub windows, while
the aggregator monitor combines calculations from each sub window into the overall track duration
within the whole window. The architecture of the monitor is shown in Figure 6 (a). Some events
are not shown for clarity, including ones that are sent from the environment to trigger execution of
the monitor network. Each box represents a monitor, with types of monitor parameters shown in
brackets. Edges represent events exchanged by monitors. Each edge is annotated with parameter
matching that determines replication of event flows when new instances are created. Consider, for
example, the track event raised by WindowManager and consumed by Subwindow. The matching
ties the first parameter of the WindowManager instance raising the event to the first parameter of
the Subwindow instance receiving the event. Since Subwindow has the second parameter, not bound
by the matching, the connection is a fan-out, when the track event is received by all instances of
Subwindow for that track. By contrast, event metric sub represents a fan-in, when events raised by
any sub window for a track are delivered to the instance of Aggregator for that track. Finally, metric
events raised by any instances of Aggregator are delivered to the same Metric monitor, which is not
parameterized. The add track event is sent to Metric whenever a new instance of WindowManager
is created. An instance of the architecture for two tracks, and two sub windows in a window, is
shown in Figure 6 (b).
We illustrate a single monitor specification using a simplified version of Aggregator, shown below.
A number of state variables are defined. It has two imported events, one representing a report from
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Figure 6: Monitoring architecture for the tracker monitor
a sub window and the other used for initialization, and one exported event, representing the track
duration calculated at the window boundary. It also has a number of internal events, described
below. Monitoring logic is represented by a collection of scenarios. In this example, each scenario
has a single state. Each transition in a scenario is triggered by an imported or internal event and
can happen only if a guard is satisfied. Guards are predicates over state variables of the monitor
and attributes of the triggering events. When a transition occurs, a series of actions is executed,
each of which either updates a state variable or raises an exported or internal event. For clarity,
we do not show details of the guards and elide most of the actions. We can see that each scenario
performs a certain check represented as a guard. For example, the check can determine whether the
track started or was dropped within the current window, and updates the state variables accordingly.
Then, an internal event is raised to trigger the next check.
On deployment of the monitor network. There are multiple ways of how four monitors coordinate
with each other. If all of them are placed in the same synchronous set, the behavior is determined by
the semantics of synchronous set proposed above. For instance, when a new track is observed, a new
instance of WindowManager is created, which then sends an add track event to Metrics. During this
process, WindowManager will not receive any events from the environment until Metrics finishes its
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execution. However, if WindowManager and Metrics are not in the same synchronous set, they can
execute in parallel and there is no order guarantee between events delivered to a monitor instance.
For instance, the timeout event (not shown in Figure 5) is consumed by WindowManager to move
the sliding window. At the same time, it triggers the computation of metrics for each track as well.
Metrics receives the verdict from Aggregator for each track and computes an average value of them.
However, if a new track is observed and Metrics receives an add track event before collecting all
verdicts from existing aggregators, the final verdict will be incorrect because the number of tracks
stored in Metrics reflects the new track. Whether this behavior happens depends on the underlying
mechanism of asynchronous communication, which is out of the scope of this thesis.
object Aggregator
state:
int msg_cnt = 0;
int event_cnt = 0;
boolean g1, g2, g3;
float observed_time = 0;
events:
imported initial(int, float, int, int);
imported metric_sub(int, float, float, int);
internal checkNum();
internal i1(int, float, float);
internal i2(float, float);
internal i3(float);
internal output();
exported metric(int, float);
scenarios:
initialization:
init -> initial(ts, sub_w, sub_size, prob) {...} -> init;
accumulation:
start -> metric_sub(n, ft, lt, flag) {msg_cnt = msg_cnt + 1; g1 = ...; raise i1(n, ft, lt); } -> start;
chk_n:
in -> i1(n, ft, lt) when (g1) {event_cnt = event_cnt + n; g2 = ..; raise i2(ft, lt); } -> in;
else {event_cnt = event_cnt + n; raise checkNum();} -> in;
check_ft:
in -> i2(ft, lt) when (g2) {...; g3 = ..; raise i3(lt)} -> in;
else {raise i3(lt)} -> in;
check_lt:
in -> i3(lt) when (g3) {...; raise checkNum();} -> in;
else {raise checkNum();} -> in;
check_num:
in -> checkNum() {observed_time = ...; raise output();...;} -> in;
output:
in -> output() {raise metric(event_cnt, observed_time); ...;} -> in;
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3.2.5. Discussion
The form of SMEDL monitor network is similar to general stream processing programs in the sense
that single monitors transform the input events into output events and multiple monitors can coordinate with each other to achieve an overall monitor requirement by forming into a DAG. However,
they are different in many aspects such as expressiveness, deployment of the system and the form
of target programs, as shown in Table 2. From the perspective of expressiveness, stream processing frameworks support built-in transform operators such as sliding windows while users need to
model operators as monitor specifications, like the case 2 illustrated above. Moreover, stream processing frameworks can handle large scale data with support of mature architecture and efficient
implementation. However, SMEDL also has its advantages. SMEDL supports both synchronous
and asynchronous deployment of monitors. Moreover, the implementation of a SMEDL monitor
does not rely on heavy-weight runtime specifically designed for distributed systems. For instance,
the monitor for Case 2 can handle thousands of dynamically created tracks very efficiently without
using multiple processes or threads. In Chapter 5, we will further demonstrate efficiency of SMEDL
monitors.
Table 2: Comparison between stream processing and SMEDL
Sstream processing framework SMEDL
Expressiveness predefined transform operators transform operators defined manually
Deployment
asynchronous deployment
synchronous and asynchronous deployment
Target program suitable for large scale systems support for different sizes of programs

As stated in Section 2.2.6, SRV techniques are good at monitoring properties over data streams. For
instance, QRE supports operations over streams at the language level while users need to manually
encode them in SMEDL specifications. Moreover, the synthesis algorithm of QRE can generate efficient implementation from succinct specifications. However, using state machine as the formalism,
SMEDL specifications are imperative and thus more intuitive, especially for users who are more
familiar with general programming languages.
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3.3. Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a specification language, SMEDL for runtime verification. Composed
of a set of EFSMs, the single monitor specification can describe different forms of properties. To
bridge the gap between the specification and the implementation, we proposed a method of correctby-construction code generation for SMEDL monitors using the Fiat framework. We further extended SMEDL with an architecture description which specifies how single monitors communicate
with each other to form a dynamically scalable monitor network. In the next chapter, we will present
a method to use a monitor network to efficiently monitor parametric properties.

56

CHAPTER 4 : Parametric Monitoring Using SMEDL
Many real-world programs may scale in the sense of data or control, probably by creating new
instances of data structure, thread or process. These instances are usually distinguished by identities.
In the event-based RV, when events are extracted from operations of these instances, identity values
are also attached to them as attributes. We denote these events as parametric events. Defined upon
traces with parametric events, parametric properties not only depend on event order in the trace
but also on the attribute values of events. As an example, the UnsafeMapIter [101] property shown
below says an iterator of a collection created from a map is not allowed to be used after the map has
been updated. The property is described as a regular expression and the alphabets of this property
are parametric events: createC (m, c) denotes creation of a collection c, the key set of a map m;
createI (c, i ) is creation of iterator i from c; updateM (m) is update of m; and useI (i ) is use of i.
Example 1 (UnsafeMapIter):
createC (m, c)updateM (m)∗ createI (c, i )useI (i )∗ updateM (m)+ useI (i )
When a monitor inspects event attributes during verification, we call it a parametric monitor which
checks parametric properties. These properties can be monitored using multiple techniques [75]
such as first-order temporal logic [18], monitoring modulo theories [46], rule-based system [114],
stream processing [44] and trace slicing [5]. These techniques describe and check parametric properties in different ways and it is hard to directly compare them with respect to expressiveness and
efficiency. In the previous section, we proposed the SMEDL framework, which utilizes dynamically scalable monitor networks to specify and check different types of properties for complicated
software systems. In this chapter, we propose a common ground for parametric monitoring using
SMEDL. More specifically, we focus on the trace slicing. The core idea of trace slicing is to slice a
parametric event trace into sub traces according to event parameters. Each sub trace is constructed
based on a binding from parameter variables to values and is checked against a non-parametric property. A trace slicing algorithm is implemented in MOP [101], which provides an efficient indexing
mechanism to reduce monitoring overhead on both time and memory usage. QEA [14] adopts a
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similar slicing mechanism but further supports aggregation of sub traces by explicit quantification
of parameter variables. However, it requires full combinations of parameters across all values in
their domains, which is different from MOP. Although it is in general more expressive, it is less
efficient in memory and time overhead because more instances may be maintained.
We present a novel perspective of parametric trace slicing based on SMEDL. Intuitively, we propose a method to naturally describe parametric trace slicing and the aggregation semantics using a
dynamically scalable monitor network. In this chapter, we :
• introduce preliminaries, including common notations and trace slicing monitoring of MOP
and QEA. (Section 4.1)
• present a method to encode the trace slicing semantics by transforming from MOP to SMEDL
with a formal proof of correctness. (Section 4.2)
• propose two syntactic fragments of QEA that can be transformed into equivalent SMEDL
monitors and by applying the MOP slicing algorithm encoded in SMEDL, QEA properties
can be efficiently monitored. (Section 4.3)

4.1. Preliminaries
4.1.1. Common definitions and notations.
Although definitions and notations related to trace slicing have been defined in MOP [34] and
QEA [14], for self-containment and unification of terminologies, some common notations in both
MOP and QEA are given in Table 3.
The relation between a parametric event type e(x̄) and the ground event e(v̄) is built by θ where θ
is a partial function X + Val of which the domain dom(θ) = x̄ and θ(x̄) = v̄. θ is also called as a
binding or a parameter instance. We will use the notation e(θ) to denote a parametric event from
which the event type e(x̄) and the ground event e(v̄) can be obtained.
The following definitions are used to describe relations between bindings:
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Variables Var
X, W
x, w

⊂
∈

Var
Var

Values Val

Set of all values
Σ ∩ Var = ∅

Events Σ
Trace Sets Σ∗

e ∈ Σ, x̄ ⊂ Var
e ∈ Σ, v̄ ⊂ Val

Parametric Event (e, x̄), e(x̄)
Ground Event (e, v̄), e(v̄)
Events

Σ(X)
ΣhXi

Traces

τ

Set of all variables
Parameter Sets

{e(x̄)|e ∈ Σ, x̄ ⊆ X}
{e(v̄)|e(x̄) ∈ Σ(X), ground}
≡

e(v̄)

Table 3: Common notations
Definition 24 (Containment) If dom(θ1 ) ⊆ (⊂) dom(θ2 ) and θ1 (x) = θ2 (x) for all x ∈ dom(θ1 ),
we say θ1 has equal or less (proper less) information than θ2 , denoted as θ1 v (@) θ2 .
Definition 25 (Compatible) Two bindings θ1 and θ2 are compatible with each other (denoted θ1 ∼
θ2 ) when θ1 (x) is equal to θ2 (x) for all x ∈ dom(θ1 ) ∩ dom(θ2 ),
Definition 26 (Consistent) Given a set of bindings Θ, if for any two bindings θ1 ∈ Θ and θ2 ∈ Θ
, we have θ1 ∼ θ2 , then Θ is consistent.
Definition 27 (Combination) The combination between two bindings θ1 and θ2 is defined as follows: if θ1 ∼ θ2 , θ1 tθ2 (x) = θ1 (x) if x ∈ dom(θ1 ); θ1 tθ2 (x) = θ2 (x) if x ∈ dom(θ2 ); θ1 tθ2 (x)
is undefined if x is undefined in θ1 and θ2 . θ1 t θ2 is the least upper bound (lub) of θ1 and θ2 . We
can also lift the lub operator to a set of bindings [112]: tΘ ≡ θ1 t ... t θk where Θ = {θ1 , ..., θk }.
Definition 28 (Lub-closed) A set of bindings Θ is lub-closed iff for any Θ0 ⊆ Θ, if Θ0 is consistent,
tΘ0 ∈ Θ.
We also define a predicate max (θ1 , Θ, θ) which says θ1 is a maximal binding in Θ that has equal
or less information than θ:
max (θ1 , Θ, θ) ≡ θ1 v θ ∧ θ1 ∈ Θ ∧ (∀θ2 , (θ2 ∈ Θ ∧ θ2 v θ) =⇒ θ2 v θ1 )
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4.1.2. Parametric trace slicing using MOP
In MOP, a slice is defined with respect to a parameter instance: given a parameter instance θ and
a parametric trace τ ∈ ΣhXi∗ , a θ-trace slice τ θ ∈ Σ∗ is a non-parametric trace. Each nonparametric event e ∈ τ θ corresponds to a parametric event e(θ0 ) ∈ τ where θ0 v θ. According to
the definition, all events of which parameters are not compatible with θ or have more information
than θ will not be in the θ-trace slice. A parametric property is a function of which the domain is a
parametric trace. It outputs a map from parameter instances to boolean verdicts, which is obtained
by checking against the non-parametric property for each slice sub trace.
A MOP monitor M (X) is a five-tuple hSt, Σ (X ), ι, σ : St × Σ (X ) → St, F i where X is a set of
parameter variables, St is a set of states, Σ (X ) is a set of parametric events, ι is the initial state, σ
is the transition function and F is a set of final states.4 MOP achieves parametric slicing using an
algorithm ChXi [34], presented as Algorithm 1 below. Parameterized with an parameter monitor
M (X ), Algorithm 1 maintains and updates ∆ and U reacting to the incoming parametric event e(θ).
∆ stores states for parameter instances while U maps a parameter instance θ to all instances in the
domain of ∆ that have more information than θ. If θ is not defined in ∆, the algorithm adds θ to ∆
by setting the state of the largest binding defined in ∆ that is less informative than θ by traversing
in the reverse topological order (line 7 - 10). If there is no such binding and e is a creation event, θ
is added to ∆ by assigning the initial state ι to it.
After θ has been added to ∆, it will be used to create bindings by extending the existing compatible
bindings in ∆ (line 13 - 16). Finally, e updates ∆(θ) and all instances that are more informative
than θ (line 17). We can prove that the domain of ∆ is lub-closed, which will be used below when
proving the relation between MOP and SMEDL.
Lemma 29 dom(∆) is lub-closed.
Proof(sketch): the proof is performed by induction on the length of the input trace τ . The basic step
is straightforward since the domain of ∆ only has one element after receiving the event e(θ). In
4

We modify the original definition of M(X) in [101] by adding events with parameter variables.
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Algorithm 1 ChXi(M = hSt, Σ(X), ι, σ, γi)
1: mapping ∆ : [[X + V al] + St]
2: mapping U : [[X + V al] → Pf ([X + V al])]
3: ∆(θ) ← undefined for any θ ∈ [X + V al]
4: U(θ) ← ∅ for any θ ∈ [X + V al]
5: procedure MAIN(e(θ))
6:
if ∆(θ) undefined then
7:
for θm @ θ (in reversed topological order) do
8:
if ∆(θm ) defined then goto 9
9:
if ∆(θm ) defined then
10:
defineTo(θ,θm )
11:
else if e is a creation event then
12:
defineNew(θ)
13:
for θm @ θ (in reversed topological order) do
14:
for θcomp ∈ U(θm ) compatible with θ do
15:
if ∆(θcomp t θ) undefined then
16:
defineTo(θcomp t θ,θcomp )
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:

foreach θ0 ∈ {θ} ∪ U(θ) do ∆(θ0 ) ← σ(∆(θ0 ), e) endfor
procedure DEFINE N EW(θ)
∆(θ) ← ι
for θ00 @ θ do U(θ00 ) ← U(θ00 ) ∪ {θ}
procedure DEFINE T O(θ, θ0 )
∆(θ) ← ∆(θ0 )
for θ00 @ θ do U(θ00 ) ← U(θ00 ) ∪ {θ}

the inductive step, suppose after consuming a trace τ , dom(∆) is lub-closed. After receiving e(θ),
if θ ∈ dom(∆), dom(∆) is unchanged. Otherwise, given an arbitrary Θ 0 ⊆ dom(∆0 ) where ∆0 is
updated from ∆ by receiving e(θ), if there exists a set of bindings Θ00 ⊆ Θ0 and Θ00 ∩ dom(∆) = ∅,
then there exists θ00 ∈ Θ00 is constructed by combining θ with an existing binding in dom(∆).
It is then easy to deduce that there exists Θ1 ⊆ dom(∆) that tΘ0 ≡ θ t (tΘ1 ). According to
Algorithm 1, U(∅) = dom(∆) after handling τ . Therefore, θ will be combined with all compatible
bindings in dom(∆) and the result bindings are in dom(∆0 ). On the other hand, due to the inductive
hypothesis, tΘ1 ∈ dom(∆), so tΘ0 ≡ θ t (tΘ1 ) ∈ dom(∆0 ).



4.1.3. Parametric slicing using QEA
A QEA (quantified event automata) Q(Λ) contains two parts. Q is an event automaton (EA) and
Λ ∈ ({∀, ∃} × vars(Q) × Guard )∗ is a list of quantifiers with guards of boolean expressions on
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parameters. An EA is an EFSM in which transitions are enriched with guard and assignments to
local variables; vars(Q) is the set of parameter variables appearing in Q.
QEA uses trace slicing to accomplish parametric monitoring. The big-step semantics for acceptance
for a parametric property for QEA is illustrated below [14]. θ1 † θ2 overrides the value in θ1 by θ2 ;
g(θ) is the guard condition over the quantified variable; Q(θ) is an event automaton Q with its
variables instantiated by θ; τ ↓Q(θ) is the projection of a trace τ over Q(θ); L(Q(θ)) is the set of
traces accepted by Q(θ). Bindings are generated by inductively traversing the derived domain of
each variable in the nested quantifiers. A full binding is a binding where all parameters in Λ are
bound with values. The verdict is computed over verdicts of all created full bindings.
Definition 30 (Acceptance in QEA) A QEA Q(Λ) accepts a ground trace τ if τ |=hi Λ where |=θ
is defined as:
τ |=θ (∀x : g)Λ0 iff ∀ d ∈ dom(τ )(x), if g(θ†hx → di) then τ |=θ†hx→di Λ0 .
τ |=θ (∃x : g)Λ0 iff there exists d ∈ dom(τ )(x), if g(θ † hx → d i) then τ |=θ†hx→di Λ0 .
τ |=θ  iff τ ↓Q(θ) ∈ L(Q(θ)).

4.2. Expressing trace slicing of MOP using SMEDL
This section presents how SMEDL expresses the trace slicing semantics by proposing a transformation from a MOP monitor to a SMEDL monitor network. We prove that the monitoring network in
SMEDL is equivalent to Algorithm 1 with respect to trace slicing.
4.2.1. Transformation from MOP to SMEDL
Intuitively, MOP slices a trace of parametric events into sub traces, which is identified by a binding of parameter variables. By analyzing M (X) statically, we can know which parameters will
be combined together and how bindings are generated. Each possible combination of parameters
corresponds to a single SMEDL monitor and the connection between two monitors represent the behavior of creating a new binding by extending an existing one. Consequently, M (X) is transformed
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into a set of SMEDL monitor specifications. Since each state in M (X) may be mapped to states
in multiple SMEDL monitors, we borrow the idea of labelled FSM [114] to label each state with
sets of parameters and transitions in it expand the sets of parameters in the target state based on the
parameters in the transition. A labelled FSM LM (X ) is a five-tuple hLSt, Σ (X ), (ι, {}), φ, LF i
where LSt = St × 2 X is a set of labelled states and LF and φ are defined as the smallest sets
satisfying the following relation:
h(q, S ), e(x ), (q 0 , S ∪ x )i ∈ φ if hq, e(x ), q 0 i ∈ σ

(q, S ) ∈ LF if q ∈ F

We use Example 1 to give an intuition of the algorithm. The labelled FSM is shown in Figure 7
(a). In the remainder of this chapter, all shaded states are final states while white ones are non-final
states. All self-looping transitions are omitted in the figure. The correspondence between the labelled FSM and the SMEDL specification (illustrated in Figure 7 (b)) is represented by numbers
marked at the transitions. The idea for our algorithm is that we identify connected components in
LM (X ) with the same set of parameters in labels and factor them out into separate SMEDL monitors, along with transitions between the states in the connected component. Transitions between the
connected components are turned into events transferred between the SMEDL monitors, captured
by the monitoring architecture. Due to the feature of labelled FSMs, the target state of a transition
must have equal or more parameters than the source state. For instance, transitions (4), (5) and
(6) and all implicit self-looping transitions connect component with the same set of parameters.
Transitions (1), (2) and (3), on the other hand, expand the set of parameters, which are transformed
into two transitions as shown Figure 7 (b). The one in the monitor with less parameter information (fewer number of parameters) raises an event to trigger the transition in the monitor with more
information.
When feeding the event trace τ0 : updateM (m1 ), createC (m1 , c1 ), createC (m2 , c2 ), createI (c1 ,
i1 ), useI (i1 ) [101] to the SMEDL monitors, state update of the monitor mc and mci is given in
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Figure 7: Labelled FSM and SMEDL monitors for Example 1
Table 4. Note that mon0 is omitted because it has only one instance and always stays at the initial
state. In MOP, each event is equipped with a field flag to indicate whether this event can start
a monitoring process. As stated in the specification [101], updateM does not start the process,
thus no instance is created. createC (m1 , c1 ) and createC (m2 , c2 ) are received by mon0 , which
creates two instances of mc. createI (c1 , i1 ) triggers the creation of mci (m1 , c1 , i1 ) by sending
createMCI(i1 ) to mci. mci (m1 , c1 , i1 ) is in state 3 after creation. useI (i1 ) triggers a self-loop
transition in mci (m1 , c1 , i1 ) and creates an instance of mci (m2 , c2 , i1 ) by extending mc(m2 , c2 ).
Table 4: State update of SMEDL monitors given τ0
updateM(m1 )

createC(m1 ,c1 )

createC(m2 ,c2 )

createI(c1 ,i1 )

∅

mc(m1 , c1 ):2

mc(m1 , c1 ):2
mc(m2 , c2 ):2

mc(m1 , c1 ):2
mc(m2 , c2 ):2
mci(m1 , c1 , i1 ):3

useI(i1 )
mc(m1 , c1 ):2
mc(m2 , c2 ):2
mci(m1 , c1 , i1 ):3
mci(m2 , c2 , i1 ):2

The formal transformation process is given in Algorithm 2, which creates a SMEDL specification
S (W ) from LM (W ). S (W ) is a tuple hSMon, archi where SMon is a map from a set of parameters to the corresponding parametric monitors and arch is an architecture description. A single
SMEDL monitor in S (W ), smon(W 0 ), is an FSM hStsmon , Σsmon , ιsmon , ψsmon : Stsmon × Σsmon
→ Stsmon × (Σ (W ) ∪ {null }), Fsmon i where W 0 ⊆ W . Each transition in ψsmon takes the form
hq, e(x ), q 0 , r i where r is either an event to be raised after the transition or null. We use the dot operator to access the elements of tuples. It is worth noting that the SMEDL specification introduced
here is compatible with the definition given in Chapter 3: the FSM is a scenario in each monitor and
the parameter set W 0 corresponds to the field paras of the monitor interface in Section 3.2.2, but
without order because each parameter has a name and the order does not matter.
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The process performs by traversing transitions in LM (W ). Note that f is the flag to denote whether
the event can start the monitoring process. From line 4 to 10, the SMEDL monitor mon1 parameterized by W1 is obtained by either from SMon or creating a new one. When creating a new monitor
type, its initial state is ι of LM if W1 is empty; otherwise, a dummy initial state s0 is created. For
the SMEDL with no parameters (denoted as mon0 ), only one instance will be created at the beginning of the execution. As a result, its execution starts with ι. Monitors with non-empty parameters
are created from mon0 or other monitors and the creation event will trigger the transition from the
initial state s0 in the created instance as shown below.
If W1 and W2 are identical (line 11 to 17), the transition is directly mapped to mon1 . If W1 is not
identical to W2 , instances of mon2 (W2 ) are created by instances of mon1 (W1 ) through e. The
condition at line 19 is used to avoid creating mon2 from mon0 using an event that cannot start the
monitoring process. Then, mon2 (W2 ) is obtained (line 19 to 23). To represent the behavior of
extension of parameters, two transitions are added respectively to mon1 and mon2 . The transition
added to mon1 receives e and raises crEv . The event crEv creates an instance of mon2 when
the instance does not exist and transitions from s0 to q 0 . Note that each monitor may have multiple
creation events. Each crEv is identified by x, as stated at line 24. As a side note, the order of monitors in monTypeList can also be determined in the process: mon2 (W2 ) is put before mon1 (W1 )
in monTypeList. Communication between mon1 and mon2 through crEv is specified in the architecture description (line 33 - 37). Finally, monitors in SMon are completed (line 38) by adding
self-looping dummy transitions.
4.2.2. Correctness proof of transformation
In Algorithm 1, ∆ : [[X + V ] + St] maps from a parameter instance to its current state. In
SMEDL, there is no explicit concept or notation for slicing. Instead, slicing is achieved by dynamic
evolution of monitor network. Configurations are used represent slices and the corresponding state.
We abuse the terminology configuration to denote a mapping from monitor instances to St. The
range of configuration is St because monitor instances never stay at the initial state except for
mon0 , whose initial state belongs to St. The equivalence relation between ∆ and configuration is
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Algorithm 2 Transformation from labelled FSM to SMEDL
1: procedure TRANSFORMATION 2SMEDL(LM = hLSt, Σ (W ), (ι, {}), φ, LF i)
2:
SMon ← ∅, arch ← ∅
3:
for h(q, W1 ), e(x , f ), (q 0 , W2 )i ∈ φ do
4:
mon1 ← SMon.get(W1 )
5:
if mon1 == null then
6:
if W1 == ∅ then
7:
mon1 ← h{ι}, ∅, ι, ∅, ∅i
8:
else
9:
mon1 ← h{s0 }, ∅, s0 , ∅, ∅i
10:
SMon.put(W1 , mon1 )
11:
if W1 == W2 then
12:
mon1 .St ← mon1 .St ∪ {q, q 0 }, mon1 .Σ ← mon1 .Σ ∪ {e(x )},
13:
mon1 .ψ ← mon1 .ψ ∪ {hq, e(x ), q 0 , null i}
14:
if q ∈ LF then
15:
mon1 .F ← mon1 .F ∪ {q}
0
16:
if q ∈ LF then
17:
mon1 .F ← mon1 .F ∪ {q 0 }
18:
else
19:
if W1 6= ∅ k f == true then
20:
mon2 ← SMon.get(W2 )
21:
if mon2 == null then
22:
mon2 ← h{s0 }, ∅, s0 , ∅, ∅i
23:
SMon.put(W2 , mon2 )
24:
crEv ← (creationEvName(x ), W2 , true)
25:
mon1 .St ← mon1 .St ∪ {q}, mon1 .Σ ← mon1 .Σ ∪ {e(x )},
26:
mon1 .ψ ← mon1 .ψ ∪ {hq, e(x ), q, crEv i}
27:
mon2 .St ← mon2 .S ∪ {q 0 }, mon2 .Σ ← mon2 .Σ ∪ {crEv },
28:
mon2 .ψ ← mon2 .ψ ∪ {hmon2 .ι, crEv , q 0 , null i}
29:
if q ∈ LF then
30:
mon1 .F ← mon1 .F ∪ {q}
0
31:
if q ∈ LF then
32:
mon2 .F ← mon2 .F ∪ {q 0 }
33:
patterns ← ∅
34:
for i ∈ range(0 , |W1 | − 1 ) do
35:
patterns ← patterns ∪ {i , mon1 , i }
36:
patterns ← patterns ∪ {i , crEv , i }
37:
arch ← arch ∪ {hmon1 , crEv , mon2 , crEv , patternsi}
38:
SMon ← completeFSM (SMon)
39:
return (SMon, arch)
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defined below. Note that we use m(x ) to denote the monitor type m when x is its parameters. An
instance of m with binding θ is denoted as m(θ). If the monitor type is not important, we also use
θ to denote the monitor instance.
Definition 31 Let ∆ be a mapping from parameter instances to monitor states of a MOP monitor
and config be the configuration of a SMEDL monitor network. ∆ is equivalent to config (denoted as
∆ ≡ config) if : 1) for each θ ∈ dom(∆) and ∆(θ) = s, there exists an instance θ ∈ dom(config)
that config(θ) = s; and 2) for each θ ∈ dom(config) where θ 6= ∅ and config(θ) = s, θ ∈ dom(∆)
and ∆(θ) = s.
Suppose a SMEDL specification Mon SMEDL is constructed from a MOP monitor Mon mop , the
relation of states between them are described as the theorem below:
Theorem 32 Given an event trace τ , if ∆ is the state of Mon MOP computed by ChXi and config is
the state of Mon SMEDL computed according to the semantics of the SMEDL monitor network, then
∆ ≡ config.
The theorem states that the SMEDL monitor network obtained by the transformation above implements the trace slicing of MOP. The proof of Theorem 32 is performed by induction on the length
of trace τ and then comparing the state update between Mon mop and Mon SMEDL given a new
incoming event.
Proof (sketch): Basic step. Suppose τ = {e(θ, f )} where θ is the parameter binding and f is the
flag field mentioned above. If f is true, ChXi creates a mapping [θ 7→ σ(ι, e)] and puts it into ∆.
If θ is empty, no new instance needs to be created because mon0 , the monitor with no parameters,
exists at the beginning of execution. If θ is not empty, mon0 receives e and creates a monitor
instance mon(θ). In both case, mon0 and mon will be updated in consistent with σ according to
the transformation. If f is false, e is ignored in ChXi. In SMEDL, there is no transition triggered
by e and no instance is created. Consequently, the equivalence relation holds in the basic step.
Inductive step. Suppose after consuming a trace τ , the state of Mon mop is ∆ and the state of
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Mon SMEDL is config and ∆ ≡ config according to the inductive hypothesis. After an event e(θ, f )
is consumed, Mon mop is updated to ∆0 and Mon SMEDL is updated to config 0 . We want to prove
that ∆0 ≡ config 0 . There are two cases:
case 1: ∆(θ) is defined. According to the inductive hypothesis, for any θ1 ∈ dom(∆) and ∆(θ1 ) =
s1 , θ1 ∈ dom(config) and config(θ1 ) = s1 . If θ1 is equal to or has more parameter information
than θ, we assume ∆0 (θ1 ) = s2 where s2 = σ(s1 , e), denoted as tr. According to Algorithm 2
(line 13), tr is directly added to the monitor instance θ1 , which leads to the same state update such
that config 0 (θ1 ) = s2 . If θ1 does not have more information than θ, ∆0 (θ1 ) = ∆(θ1 ) = s1 . A
corresponding creation event e0 is raised for a monitor m(dom(θ1 t θ)). However, according to
Lemma 29, ∆(θ1 ∪ θ) must have been defined so there must have already existed a corresponding
instance of m defined in config. e will trigger an equivalent transition in it as stated above while e0
will trigger a self-loop transition because a monitor is constructed completely in Algorithm 2. As a
result, ∆0 ≡ config 0 .
case 2: ∆(θ) is not defined. ChXi first tries to find an existing parameter instance θ0 which is
maximal among all instances with less parameter information than θ and temporarily set state of
θ to ∆(θ0 ). If no such θ0 is found and f is true, instance of θ is created with the initial state
ι. Otherwise, no instance will be created. Then, θ is used to create new instances by extending
existing compatible bindings in ∆ in reversed topological order of parameter information. Finally,
each θ0 defined in ∆ that has equal or more parameter information than θ are updated with e.
In SMEDL, updating and extending is conducted in the similar way. We need to prove that 1) an
equivalent instance for θ is created; and 2) equivalent instances by extending parameter of existing
instances are created; 3) updates of instances by e(θ, f ) are also equivalent.
Suppose we have mon(dom(θ)) in monTypeList. For 1), we need to consider the case in which f
is true, which means there exists a creation event e0 raised from mon0 when it receives e. However,
because e is dispatched to monitors in reversed topological order of parameter information enforced
in monTypeList and mon0 is the last element in monTypeList, mon(θ) will be created by mon0 only
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when there are no existing instances from which mon(θ) can be created. Furthermore, the behavior
of creating mon(θ) from mon0 and updating its state is equivalent to the behavior of Algorithm 1
at line 19 and line 17.
For 2), the target is to prove dom(config 0 ) = dom(∆0 ). In Algorithm 1, θ is combined with all
compatible instances in dom(∆). As a result, given an arbitrary instance θ0 ∈ dom(∆), if θ ∼
θ0 ∧ θ 6v θ0 , a parameter instance θ t θ0 is defined by extending from an instance θ00 ∈ dom(∆) that
θ t θ0 = θ t θ00 . Note that θ0 may be identical to θ00 or not. Since SMEDL monitors are complete,
an instance parameterized by θ t θ0 will be generated by extending an existing instance because θ0
and θ00 exist in the domain of config due to the inductive hypothesis.
For 3), we need to prove the state equivalence between them. For an arbitrary instance θ0 ∈
dom(∆0 ), there are two cases. If θ0 ∈ dom(∆), e(θ) update its state when θ v θ0 . Line 12 and
13 in Algorithm 2 guarantees that config 0 (θ0 ) = ∆0 (θ0 ). If θ0 is a newly created instance, it must
take the form θ1 t θ where θ1 is either empty or θ1 ∈ dom(∆). We have ∆0 (θ0 ) = σ(∆(θ2 ), e)
where max (θ2 , dom(∆), θ0 ) because the traversal is performed in the reverse topological order of
the parameter information. For SMEDL, multiple creation events may be raised to create an instance
parameterized by θ0 . The inductive hypothesis and the semantics of the monitor network guarantees
that it is extended from θ2 . Since config(θ2 ) = ∆(θ2 ), config 0 (θ0 ) = σ(∆(θ2 ), e) = ∆0 (θ0 ).



Discussion on the specification size. Each MOP specification is transformed into a set of SMEDL
monitors. Suppose there are n parameters, there are at most 2n SMEDL monitor specifications.
Although the size of specification is exponential to the number of parameters, it is still acceptable
because the number of parameters for a parametric property is usually small.

4.3. Expressing trace slicing of QEA using SMEDL
A QEA Q(Λ) contains two parts. Q is an EFSM and Λ ∈ ({∀, ∃} × vars(Q))∗ is a list of quantified
parameters (quantifier list for short) where vars(Q) is the set of parameter variables appearing in Q.
QEA adopts a similar slicing strategy to MOP. However, unlike MOP, in which parametric property
is a mapping from sub traces to verdicts, QEA aggregates the results of all full bindings. The
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interpretation of a quantifier list in QEA leads to a significant difference between QEA and MOP in
generating bindings: QEA stores any binding that can be built from the derived domain that has a
non-empty projection.
Example 2 (CandidateSelection) [14]: for every voter there must exist a party that the voter is a
member of, and the voter must rank all candidates for that party. The QEA specification, denoted as
Qcan , is illustrated Figure 8 (a). There are three quantified variables, v (voter), c (candidate) and p
(party) and three parametric events member, candidate and rank. The third parameter r of rank is an
unquantified variable. Self-looping transitions are omitted. We impose a restriction on event order
of traces: all candidate events always happen after all member events and all rank events happen
after all candidate events, which hints that candidate is the event to start the monitoring process.

Figure 8: QEA and SMEDL specification of CandidateSelection
When feeding the event trace τ : member(tom,red), member(ali,blue), candidate(jim,red), candidate(flo,red), candidate(don,blue), rank(tom,jim,1), rank(ali,don,1), rank(tom, flo, 2), Qcan generates the set of full bindings as shown in Table 5. QEA generates bindings from combinations
across the domain of each parameter, except for ones that are not compatible with any incoming
events. Consequently, 9 full bindings are generated by Qcan . Then the overall verdict is computed
by aggregating the verdicts of each full binding based on the big-step semantics. However, not all
bindings represent the genuine relation between voters, parties and candidates. For instance, the
triple (tom, red , don) states that don belongs to the party red , which is not true for τ .
We transform the FSM of Qcan into the SMEDL specification Scan , as shown in Figure 8 (b). Since
candidate is the only event to start the monitoring process, there is no specification for (c, p) or
(v , c). When feeding τ , Scan only generates three bindings, as illustrated in Table 6. We can observe
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voter
tom
tom
tom
tom
ali
ali
ali
ali
ali

party
red
red
red
blue
red
red
blue
blue
blue

candidate
jim
flo
don
don
jim
flo
jim
flo
don

state
4
4
2
1
1
1
2
2
4

voter
tom
tom
ali

Table 5: Bindings generated by QEA [14]

party
red
red
blue

candidate
jim
flo
don

state
4
4
4

Table 6: Bindings generated by SMEDL

that these three bindings correctly represent the relations between voters, parties and candidates.
Furthermore, if we perform proper logical aggregation over these three bindings, as stated below,
the identical verdict with the QEA monitor can be obtained. This result hints that SMEDL monitors
may be able to monitor properties of QEA while generating fewer bindings.
In this section, we present a transformation from QEA (denoted as Q(Λ)) to SMEDL (denoted
as S (Λ)). Each SMEDL monitor in S is denoted as qMon(l ) where l ⊆ Λ. The transformation
contains two steps, transformation of the EFSM and the quantified parameter list. For the EFSM,
Algorithm 2 is directly used. The semantics of quantifiers over parameters is encoded as a SMEDL
monitors for aggregation. The intuition is to generate aggregation monitors for each parameter,
which are connected in a list according to the position in the quantifier list. Verdicts will be grouped
according to the parameter values of bindings that generate them. The universal and existential
quantifier are respectively implemented by conjunction and disjunction over grouped verdicts.
We encode the algorithm of MOP for trace slicing in SMEDL. As a result, an equivalent relation
between QEA and SMEDL specifications cannot be built in general. However, we specify two
subsets of QEA specifications that can generate identical verdicts. In the first case (Section 4.3.1),
if all parameters are universally quantified and all bindings that are not created in the SMEDL
monitor are guaranteed to stay at a final state (the verdict returns true), the SMEDL monitor only
needs to aggregate the verdicts of full bindings it maintains. In the second case (Section 4.3.2), if
all bindings that are not created in the SMEDL monitor are guaranteed to stay at a non-final state,
we can get identical results through enhancing aggregation monitors for all universally quantified
variables by checking the size of the domain and the number of values appearing. If two values are
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different, it means there would exist a binding that is only maintained by the QEA monitors. Since
the corresponding verdict is false, the final verdict is also false.
4.3.1. Encoding aggregation semantics in SMEDL
The big-step semantics of QEA can be described as a function VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) ≡ Πv1 ∈dom(p1 )
Πv2 ∈dom(p2 ) ...Πvn ∈dom(pn ) (F (∆τQ (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ))) where (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ) ∈ dom(∆τQ ). Πpx is ∧
(∨) when the corresponding quantifier of a parameter variable px in Q is ∀ (∃). By default,
dom(∆τQ ) ≡ dom(p1 ) × ... × dom(pn ). We abuse the notation ∆tQ as the mapping from bindings to states when fed with the trace t. t may be omitted when the context is clear. We also reuse
the symbol F and define F (s) to map a state s to true (false) if it is a final (non-final) state.
Similarly, VerdictSMEDL computes the verdict from the SMEDL specification S: VerdictSMEDL (S ,
τ ) ≡ Πv1 ∈dom(p1 ) Πv2 ∈dom(p2 ) ...Πvn ∈dom(pn ) (F (configSτ (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ))) where (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ) is
a full binding and (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ) ∈ dom(configSτ ). configSτ is the mapping from bindings to the
states when fed with the trace τ . The domain of configSτ contains generated full bindings. When the
context is clear, τ is omitted.
The abstract function VerdictSMEDL is implemented as a set of aggregation monitors. Intuitively,
we group full bindings that has the same value over the sub list of parameters p1 , p2 , ..., pn−1 .
Logical conjunction (disjunction) is performed over the verdicts of bindings in the same group
when pn is universally (existentially) quantified. The verdicts obtained at this level will be further
grouped based on the value of sub list p1 , p2 , ...pn−2 . This process is repeated in a hierarchical
way until getting the final verdict. Following this idea, each aggregation monitor takes the form
aMonpx (p1 , p2 , ...px −1 ) for each parameter px except for p1 because aMonp1 () has no parameters.
The aMonpx (p1 , ..., px −1 ) is an FSM hStsmon : {ι1 , ι2 }, Σ : {countx , resultx }, ιsmon : ι1 , σsmon ,
Fsmon : {ι1 }i. Two input events countx and resultx are sent from the upstream aggregation monitor
aMonpx +1 . countx indicates the number of results to receive while each resultx (..., b) carries the
verdict value b of a binding where the values of p1 , p2 , ..., px −1 match the parameter values of
aMonpx . For the universal quantifier, the conjunction over verdicts carried in the resultx is defined
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Table 7: Transitions of aMonpx (p1 , ..., px −1 ) for the universal quantifier
source
ι1
ι1
ι1
ι1
ι1

event
countx (p1 , .., px )
countx (p1 , .., px )
resultx (p1 , ..., px , b)
resultx (p1 , ..., px , b)
resultx (p1 , ..., px , b)

guard
countpx == 0
countpx ! = 0
countpx > 1 && b
countpx == 1 && b
!b

action
countpx
countpx
countpx
countpx
countpx

= 1 ; raise countx −1 (p1 , ..., px −1 );
+ +;
− −;
− −; raise resultx −1 (p1 , ..., px −1 , b)
− −; raise resultx −1 (p1 , ..., px −1 , b)

target
ι1
ι1
ι1
ι1
ι2

as the transition set σsmon in Table 7. The action in the first transition indicates that countx −1 is
the creation event of aMonpx −1 . The aggregation for the existential quantifier can be defined in a
similar way with disjunction over verdicts collected from the upstream monitor.
The aggregation monitors are chained in the reversal order of Λ from the fully-bound monitor
qMon(Λ) down to aMonp1 (). During execution, whenever a new instance of qMon(Λ) is created,
corresponding aggregation monitor instances are created or updated. The specification of qMon(Λ)
is updated as follows: 1) for each state s, a transition (s, end (), s, {resultn (p1 , ..., pn , b)}) is added
where b is true/false when s is a final/non-final state; and 2) for each transition triggered by a creation event, an action of raising the event countn (p1 , ..., pn ) is added. Upon receiving the event
end , verdicts generated by instances of qMon(Λ) are sent to corresponding instances of aMonpn to
triggering the computation of aggregation.
Figure 9 illustrates the architecture of the monitor network of Scan . mon0 , mvp and mvcp correspond to the monitors in Figure 8. The aMonc (v , p) and aMonv () monitors perform the conjunctions to implement the universal quantifier for c and v while aMonp (v ) implements the semantics
of the existential quantifier for p. After merging the verdicts generated by the bindings illustrated in
Table 6 using these aggregation monitors, we can get the same verdict with QEA.
Comparison of SMEDL and QEA. The difference between VerdictQEA and VerdictSMEDL comes
from creation and maintenance of bindings. Given a trace τ , bdSMEDL (S (Λ), τ ) and fullbdSMEDL (S
(Λ), τ ) respectively denote the set of monitor instances and instances bound with all parameters
generated from S by consuming τ . bdQEA (Q(Λ), τ ) and fullbdQEA (Q(Λ), τ ) denote the set of
bindings and full bindings in QEA. When the context is clear, Λ and τ are omitted. It is obvious that
bdSMEDL (S ) ⊆ bdQEA (Q) and fullbdSMEDL (S ) ⊆ fullbdQEA (Q). infer (Q, S , τ ) (fullInfer (Q, S ,
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Figure 9: Connections between SMEDL monitors for Example 2
τ )) are inferred (full) bindings that do not have corresponding monitor instances in SMEDL.
The relation between QEA and SMEDL are studied by comparing VerdictQEA and VerdictSMEDL .
Lemma 33 states that for a binding that appears in both SMEDL and QEA, the state of that binding
between SMEDL and QEA are identical.
Lemma 33 Suppose Q(Λ) is a QEA specification and S(Λ) is the corresponding SMEDL specification. For each binding θ ∈ bdSMEDL (S , τ ), configS (θ) == ∆Q (θ).
Proof (sketch): by Theorem 32, we already proved that dom(configS ) = dom(∆) and for each
binding θ ∈ dom(∆), ∆(θ) = configS (θ) where ∆ is the mapping from bindings to states in Algorithm 1. Since QEA follows the same semantics on updating existing bindings and creating
new bindings from existing ones, we have ∆Q (θ) = ∆(θ) for each θ ∈ dom(∆). Moreover
bdSMEDL (S , τ ) ⊆ dom(∆Q ). As a result, for each binding θ ∈ bdSMEDL (S , τ ), configS (θ) = ∆Q
(θ).



Using Lemma 33, we only need to consider the state of inferred bindings. Whether VerdictQEA and
VerdictSMEDL generate the identical result depends on the characteristics of the inferred bindings.
Lemma 34 states that for a QEA specification Q of which all parameters are universally quantified,
if all inferred full bindings are created and stay at a final state by consuming an input trace τ , Q and
S generates the same verdict for τ .
Lemma 34 For a QEA specification Q(Λ) of which all parameters are universally quantified and
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its corresponding SMEDL monitor S, given an input trace τ , if ∀θ ∈ fullInfer (Q, S , τ ), ∆Q (θ) ==
true, then VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) == VerdictSMEDL (S , τ ).
Proof (sketch): because all quantifiers are universal, and the verdict of all inferred bindings are all
true, both VerdictSMEDL and VerdictQEA are equivalently reduced to computing conjunction over
bindings belonging to fullbdSMEDL (S (Λ), τ ), which means VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) = VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ).

.

To prove Theorem 37, we first prove Lemma 35 and Lemma 36, which respectively state the relation between inferred bindings and SMEDL monitor instances and the property of the inferred full
bindings.
Lemma 35 Given a QEA specification Q(Λ), its corresponding SMEDL specification S and an input trace τ , for a binding θ ∈ infer (Q, S , τ ) that does not project to an empty trace, if ∆τQ (θ) == s,
there must exist a binding W that max (W , bdSMEDL (S , τ ), θ) ∧ configSτ (W ) == s.
Proof (sketch): The proof is performed by induction on the input trace τ .
Base step: if τ has only one event e(θ0 ), there are no inferred bindings.
Inductive step: given an input trace τ0 , ∃θ ∈ infer (Q, S , τ0 ) that ∆τQ0 (θ) = s. There exists a
binding W that max (W , bdSMEDL (S , τ0 ), θ) ∧ configSτ0 (W ) = s. When an event e(θ0 ) arrives,
we first consider cases where θ0 is treated as a whole. τ is obtained by appending e to τ0 .
1) θ0 v θ: e triggers a transition for θ that ∆τQ (θ) = s 0 . For W , if θ0 v W , the same transition
is triggered so that configSτ (W ) = s 0 and max (W , bdSMEDL (S , τ ), θ) still holds because for any
other binding W 0 ∈ bdSMEDL (S , τ0 ) ∧ W 0 v W , W 0 t θ0 v W . Otherwise, a new binding W 0 ≡
W t θ0 v θ is created and configSτ (W 0 ) = s 0 . Since W is maximal in S with respect to θ and
θ0 v θ, max (W 0 , bdSMEDL (S , τ ), θ) still holds.
2) θ v θ0 : e will not update θ in Q and W in S and no other bindings that have less information in
W will be updated either.
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3) θ0 ∼ θ: a new binding θtθ0 is created in Q and ∆τQ (θ t θ0 ) = s 0 . In S, A new binding (W tθ0 ) v
(θ t θ0 ) is created and configSτ (W t θ0 ) = s 0 . Moreover, max (W t θ0 , bdSMEDL (S , τ ), θ t θ0 )
holds.
4) θ0 6∼ θ: θ0 will not trigger the transition for θ so both ∆τQ (θ) and configSτ (W ) are equal to
s. max (W , bdSMEDL (S , τ ), θ) still holds because W 0 t θ0 6v θ for any binding W 0 v θ that is
compatible with θ0 .
QEA also creates bindings by adding a subset of θ0 . Suppose a binding θ00 v θ0 is compatible with
θ while θ0 is not. A new inferred binding θ t θ00 is created and ∆Q (θ t θ00 ) = s because e is not
projected to this binding. There is no corresponding monitor instance θ t θ00 created in S. As a
result, max (W , bdSMEDL (S , τ ), θ t θ00 ) holds and configSτ (W ) = s.

.

Lemma 36 Given a QEA specification Q(Λ) of which all parameters are universally quantified
and its corresponding SMEDL specification S, if

∀λ ∈ dom(S .SMon) ∧ λ ⊂ Λ, S .SMon(λ).Stsmon \{s0 } ⊆ S .SMon(λ).Fsmon ,
then ∀θ ∈ fullInfer (Q, S , τ ), F (∆τQ (θ)) == true for any arbitrary input trace τ .
Proof (sketch): the proof is performed by induction on the length of τ .
Base step: when the event trace has only one event e(θ0 ), there is no inferred full bindings.
Inductive step: suppose ∀θ ∈ fullInfer (Q, S , τ0 ), F (∆τQ0 (θ)) = true holds. When an event e(θ0 )
arrives, we analyze the evolution of infer (Q, S ) and fullInfer (Q, S ). We use τ to denote τ0 appended with e. As stated above, e(θ0 ) may 1) update state of an existing binding; 2) create a new
binding of θ0 ; 3) create new bindings by extending existing bindings.
For 1), if e updates a partial binding or the target state is a final state, nothing changes; if e updates
a full binding θ ∈ fullInfer (Q, S , τ0 ) by a transition tr from a final state s to a non-final state
s0 such that ∆τQ (θ) = s 0 , we know that based on Lemma 35, there exists a binding W in S that
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max (W , bdSMEDL (S , τ0 ), θ) ∧ configSτ0 (W ) = s. Then, given e(θ0 ), a new instance W 0 ≡ W t θ0
is created in S and configSτ (W 0 ) = s0 . Since a non-final state only appears in the fully-instantiated
monitor, θ0 and W are compatible with θ, W 0 = θ, which means θ ∈
/ fullInfer (Q, S , τ ). As a
result, the post condition holds for τ .
For 2), according to the slicing semantics of QEA and SMEDL, we need to find two bindings WS
and WQ that satisfy the predicate max (WS , bdSMEDL (S , τ0 ), θ0 ) and max (WQ , bdQEA (S , τ0 ), θ0 ).
We only need to consider the case in which WQ ∈ infer (Q, S , τ0 ). Based on Lemma 35, we know
that WS v WQ and ∆τQ0 (WQ ) = configSτ0 (WS ). When fed with e(θ0 ), new bindings WQ t θ0 =
WS t θ0 = θ0 are created. Neither the domain or range of fullInfer (Q, S , τ ) will not be updated.
As a result, the post condition holds for τ .
For 3), e(θ0 ) can extend bindings in infer (Q, S , τ0 ) in two ways. We will use θ00 to denote the
generated binding. In the first way, θ00 is created by treating θ0 as a unbreakable entity following
the slicing strategy used in SMEDL. The projected sub trace of θ00 will contain e. If θ00 is a non-full
binding or F (∆τQ (θ00 )) = true, nothing changes. If F (∆τQ (θ00 )) = false, we can use the similar
way presented in 1) to prove that θ00 ∈ bdSMEDL so that θ00 ∈
/ fullInfer (Q, S , τ ). In the second way,
θ00 is created from an existing binding θ ∈ bdQEA that is not compatible with θ0 . Therefore, θ00 is
an inferred binding and the project sub trace for θ00 will not include e. ∆τQ (θ00 ) = ∆τQ0 (θ) holds. In


both ways, the post condition holds.

Theorem 37 Given a QEA specification Q(Λ) of which all parameters are universally quantified
and its corresponding SMEDL specification S, if

∀λ ∈ dom(S .SMon) ∧ λ ⊂ Λ, S .SMon(λ).Stsmon \ {s0 } ⊆ S .SMon(λ).Fsmon

then VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) ≡ VerdictSMEDL (S , τ ) for any arbitrary input trace τ .
Proof (sketch): since Q only contains universally quantified parameters, VerdictQEA and
VerdictSMEDL are computed by conjunction over verdicts of all generated full bindings. Lemma 33
indicates that all shared full bindings between Q and S generate identical verdicts. From Lemma 36,
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we know that verdicts of all inferred full bindings are true. As a result, VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) =
VerdictSMEDL (S , τ ) for any arbitrary input trace τ because of Lemma 34.



Note on Example 2. Example 2 does not satisfy the syntactic restrictions on the precondition of
Theorem 37. We give a trace that leads to different results in QEA and SMEDL: member (v1 , p1 ),
candidate(c1 , p1 ), member (v1 , p2 ). QEA outputs true while SMEDL outputs false on this trace.
The reason is that a referred full binding (v , p2 , c1 ) is created in QEA and stays at the final state
2. To achieve equivalent result in SMEDL, we need to add a transition in mvp(v , p) to trigger the
creation of instances of aMonc (v , p) so that the verdict of a non-full binding mvp(v1 , p2 ) can be
counted. As a future work, we will modify the definition of VerdictSMEDL and the aggregation
monitor to relax syntactic restriction on QEA so that more QEA properties such as Example 2 can
be monitored using SMEDL.
Discussion on the specification size and memory overhead of SMEDL monitors. Same with the
transformation of MOP, the upper bound of the number of SMEDL monitors transformed from the
event automaton is exponential to the number of parameters. The number of aggregation monitors
is equal to the number of parameters. During execution, the memory overhead of SMEDL monitors
include partial and full bindings and instances of aggregation monitors. As stated above, the number
of full bindings of QEA is asymptotically O(np1 ∗ np2 ∗ ... ∗ npk ) where npk is the domain size of
parameter pk . For SMEDL, the upper bound of number of full bindings is the same but in most
cases fewer bindings would be generated, especially when parameters are related. For instance,
each voter or candidate only corresponds to one party in Example 2. The number of full bindings
is about O(nvoter ∗ (ncandidate /nparty )) given that the number of candidates for each party is the
same. The number of instances for the aggregation monitors is proportional to the number of full
bindings and each instance maintains state variables such as count and result. Consequently, when
parameters are related by the semantics defined in events, SMEDL may maintain fewer instances,
potentially leading to less memory overhead.

78

sender
A
A
B

receiver
B
C
C

sender
A
A
B
B

state
4
4
4

Table 8: Bindings generated using SMEDL

receiver
B
C
B
C

state
4
4
2
4

Table 9: Bindings generated using QEA

4.3.2. Enhancement of aggregation monitors
In this section, we consider cases where all inferred bindings are guaranteed to stay at a non-final
state at the end of execution. We modify the aggregation monitor to count the domain of each
parameter to infer the state of bindings that are not available for the SMEDL specification during
runtime.
Example 3 (Broadcast) [114]: for every sender s and receiver r, after s sends a message it should
wait for an acknowledgement from r before sending again. The QEA and SMEDL specification are
shown in Figure 10. Suppose the input trace τ 0 is send (A), send (B ), ack (B , A), ack (C , A), ack (
C , B ), SMEDL and QEA respectively generate three and four full bindings, as shown in Table 8
and Table 9. Because the binding [r 7→ B , s 7→ B ] stays at a non-final state, the verdict generated
by SMEDL and QEA are different. The least information needed for the SMEDL specification to
generate the identical verdict includes 1) the size of the derived domain for the receiver and 2) the
implicit knowledge on the verdict of all inferred bindings. For 1), we define counter monitors to
keep track of the derived domain for parameters. For 2), we impose syntactic restrictions on the
QEA specification such that all inferred bindings always stay at a non-final state.

Figure 10: QEA and SMEDL specification for Broadcast
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Table 10: Transitions of frontend (px )
source
ι1

event
e(.., px , ...)

guard
true

action
raise addpx ();

target
ι1

Table 11: Transitions of backend px ()
source
ι1
ι1

event
addpx ()
end()

guard
true
true

action
dom sizepx + +;
raise sizepx (dom sizepx );

target
ι1
ι1

Counter monitors. For each universally quantified parameter px , we define a counter monitor
cMonpx to keep track of the domain size of px . The cMonpx monitor is divided into two monitors.
As stated in Table 10, the monitor frontend (px ) receives all input events of S containing px as parameters and creates new instances whenever a new value of px is observed. The backendpx monitor
keeps track of the domain size of px by receiving addpx raised by each instance of frontend (px ).
The domain size is sent to the corresponding aggregation monitor aMonpx by receiving the event
end .
The aMonpx monitor also needs to be modified as shown in Table 12. Two added transitions are triggered by sizepx (dom sizepx ) which carries the size of the domain of px raised from backend px ().
If the size of the domain is not equal to the number of values bound in the bindings generated by
S , the result will be false. sizepx must be received before any result events so that comparison of
domain size can be done before aggregating the result. To enforce this order, the event end is delivered to the counter monitor, which sends sizepx to the corresponding aggregation monitor aMonpx .
Then, one of the aggregation monitor raises the trigger event to trigger the execution of qMon(Λ).
Figure 11 illustrates the communication pattern among functional and aggregation monitors. The
diagram broadcast(r , s) represents the functional monitors illustrated in Figure 10 (b). Note that
mon2 (r , s) is modified to receive the trigger event to output events countr and resultr to aMonr .
To analyze the behavior of the enhanced aggregation monitor, we first update the definition of
VerdictSMEDL by adding the operation on checking the size of derived domain against the number of
Table 12: Added transitions of aMonpx (p1 , ..., px −1 )
source
ι1
ι1

event
sizepx (dom sizepx );
sizepx (dom sizepx );

guard
countpx == dom sizepx
countpx ! = dom sizepx
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action
raise trigger ()
raise resultx −1 (p1 , ..., px −1 , false)

target
ι1
ι3

dom
values observed in the generated bindings: VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ) ≡ Πv1 ∈dom(p1 ) ...Πvn ∈dom(pn ) (F (

configS (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ))) ∧px ∈uniQ (∧inst∈aMonpx .inst (inst.countpx == inst.dom sizepx )) where
(v1 , v2 , ..., vn ) ∈ fullbdSMEDL (S (Λ), τ ). uniQ denotes the set of universally quantified parameters of Q. The symbol aMonpx .inst denotes the set of instances of aMonpx . The symbol countpx
and dom sizepx are the state variables defined in aMonpx above. The aggregation monitors with
dom
counter monitors implement VerdictSMEDL
.

Figure 11: Communication architecture of monitors for broadcast
dom
Similar to the previous section, we can prove Theorem 38 that VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ) and VerdictQEA

(Q, τ ) can generate the identical result on an arbitrary input trace τ when the QEA specification Q
is transformed into S where all partial monitors only have are non-final states. Note that because
Example 3 satisfies the syntactic restriction on the QEA specification in this theorem, the QEA and
the SMEDL monitors can always generate identical results.
Theorem 38 Given a QEA specification Q(Λ) and its corresponding SMEDL specification S, if

∀λ ∈ dom(S .SMon) ∧ λ ⊂ Λ, ∀st ∈ S .SMon(λ).Stsmon , st ∈
/ S .SMon(λ).Fsmon
dom
then VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) == VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ) for any arbitrary input trace τ .
dom
To prove Theorem 38, we prove the relation between VerdictSMEDL
and inferred full bindings in
dom
Lemma 39. Then in Lemma 40, we prove that VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) = VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ) if all

inferred full bindings return false.
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Lemma 39 For a QEA specification Q(Λ) with at least one universally quantified parameter and
the corresponding SMEDL monitor S, given an input trace τ , fullbdQEA (Q, τ ) 6= ∅ iff there exists
a universally quantified parameter px of which an instance inst of its aggregation monitor satisfies
the property that inst.countpx 6= inst.dom sizepx .
Proof (sketch): (⇒): suppose inst.countpx 6= inst.dom sizepx for an instance inst ≡ aMonpx (v1
, v2 , ..., vx −1 ) where v1 to vx−1 are values for parameter p1 to px−1 that appear in front of px in the
parameter list. There must exist a value vx in the domain of px that there are no full bindings of
which the parameter values are v1 to vx for p1 to px . According to the big step semantics of QEA,
these bindings will be generated and they belong to fullbdQEA (Q, τ ).
(⇐): Suppose θ ≡ (v1 , ..., vn−1 , vn ) ∈ fullbdQEA (Q, τ ) where n is the length of Λ. There is no
monitor instance in qMon(v1 , ..., vn ) ∈ S . Since countpn for the instance aMonpn (v1 , ..., vn−1 )
is updated whenever a new instance of qMon(Λ) is generated, it will be smaller than dom sizepn .

Lemma 40 For a QEA specification Q(Λ) and its corresponding SMEDL specification S, given an
input trace τ , if ∀θ ∈ fullInfer (Q, S , τ ), ∆Q (θ) == false, then VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) ==
dom
VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ).
dom
Proof (sketch): if fullInfer (Q, S , τ ) = ∅, VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ) ≡ Πv1 ∈dom(p1 ) Πv2 ∈dom(p2 ) ...
dom
and VerdictQEA are computed
Πvn ∈dom(pn ) (F (configS (v1 , v2 , ..., vn ))). Since VerdictSMEDL

based on the same set of full bindings, they are equivalent.
If fullInfer (Q, S , τ ) 6= ∅ and there is at least one universally quantified variable, according to
dom
Lemma 39, VerdictSMEDL
and VerdictQEA are both evaluated to false. In the case where all varidom
ables are existentially quantified and all inferred full bindings return false, VerdictSMEDL
(S , τ ) is

true if there is a binding in θ such that configS (θ) = true. Based on Lemma 33, ∆Q (θ) = true
so VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) = true. If there is no binding θ such that configS (θ) = true, corresponding
bindings in Q are false. Since all inferred full bindings are also false, VerdictQEA (Q, τ ) = false.
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Similar to Lemma 36, Lemma 41 is proved by induction on the input trace. Since final states can
only appear in the fully-bound monitor in S, if a full binding is created or transitions to a final state
in Q, there must exist a corresponding monitor instance in S. Theorem 38 can then be proved by
using Lemma 40 and Lemma 41.
Lemma 41 Given a QEA specification Q(Λ) and its corresponding SMEDL specification S, if

∀λ ∈ dom(S .SMon) ∧ λ ⊂ Λ, ∀st ∈ S .SMon(λ).Stsmon , st ∈
/ S .SMon(λ).Fsmon
then ∀θ ∈ fullInfer (Q, S , τ ), F (∆τQ (θ)) == false for any arbitrary input trace τ .
Proof (sketch): the proof can be performed in a similar way with Lemma 36 by induction on τ . 
Discussion on the specification size and memory overhead of SMEDL monitors. We need to
consider the counter monitors cMon. For the specification size, in the worst case, each parameter corresponds to one cMon. During execution, number of instances for the counter monitors
is asymptotically O(np1 + np2 + ... + npk ), which is smaller than multiplication over the sizes of
each parameter when most parameters have a domain of which the size is greater than 1.

4.4. Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel method to encode trace slicing using a SMEDL monitor network. We first proved that SMEDL monitor network can express the efficient slicing algorithm
of MOP by proposing a transformation from MOP and SMEDL. Then, we defined two syntactic
fragments of QEA from which equivalent SMEDL monitors can be generated. As a future work,
it would be useful to formalize the relationship with MOP and QEA in Coq. By transforming into
SMEDL monitors, QEA properties can be efficiently monitored. In Chapter 5, we will perform
experiments to illustrate time efficiency of using SMEDL to monitor parametric properties. Due to
the limitation of the language design, SMEDL cannot express all QEA properties. By analyzing
Example 2, however, we see potential to further loosen the syntactic restrictions to support more
QEA properties. We also note that the size of monitoring specifications in SMEDL can grow as
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we avoid partial instantiations with multiple monitors. We believe that we can resort to monitor
templates and automatic transformation to compensate for the increased specification size.
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CHAPTER 5 : Implementation and Evaluation
In Chapter 3, we formally defined the language and generate correct-by-construction Haskell implementation for single monitors using Coq. We have also developed a compiler that generates
executable C code from SMEDL specifications 5 . Full language features such as monitor network
and flexible deployment are supported. As for the time efficiency, the C monitor is 10 time faster
than the Haskell version for the case study in Section 3.1.5. In this chapter, we will first present
the implementation of a synchronous set (Section 5.1). Then, we compare our technique to representative tools (Section 5.2) with respect to time efficiency. By profiling execution of monitors,
we discover bottleneck of the monitor code and propose intuitions for optimization from both the
perspective of language design and implementation (Section 5.3). We will also study how monitor synchronous and asynchronous deployment influence the time overhead (Section 5.4). SMEDL
specifications of benchmarks used in this Chapter are given in the Appendix A.2.

5.1. Implementation of synchronous sets
In SMEDL, multiple monitors can be organized as a synchronous set. For implementation, communication among monitors in the same synchronous set is implemented as function calls which use
queue to control event dispatching. Figure 12 illustrates the architecture of a synchronous set. Execution of a synchronous set is controlled by a global wrapper, which realizes the semantics proposed
in Section 3.2. A global wrapper maintains two queues, InnerQueue and OutputQueue. InnerQueue
stores events that are consumed within the synchronous set while OutputQueue stores events that
will be sent to the environment. Exported events raised during execution of monitors are added to
the InnerQueue or/and the OutputQueue accordingly. When an event e from the environment is
enqueued to the InnerQueue, the global wrapper fetches e from the head of the InnerQueue and
dispatches it to monitors that can handle it. As stated in Chapter 4, if multiple monitors can handle
e, calls are made sequentially according to the order specified in monTypeList. This calling order
guarantees that a new instance of monitor is always created from an existing instance with the most
5

https://github.com/PRECISE/SMEDL

85

informative identities, which is necessary for parametric monitoring. Each monitor handles e by
its local wrapper, which tries to retrieve monitor instances from the instance store that can handle
e according to the architecture description. If there is no existing instance that handles e and the
event connection is unicast, a new instance is created by the local wrapper and inserted to the store.
Then, the local wrapper updates the state of each fetched instance by executing the monitoring logic.
Events raised from instances are enqueued to InnerQueue if they are to be consumed by monitors in
the synchronous set or the OutputQueue if they are sent to monitors in a different synchronous set
or just raised as an alarm. The execution continues until the InnerQueue becomes empty, meaning
that all monitors have finished their execution in reaction to the arrival of e. Then events in the
OutputQueue will be sent out to the environment by the global wrapper.

Figure 12: Architecture of synchronous set
Instance store. As shown below, retrieving and inserting of instances are intensive. To achieve
efficient monitoring, it is important to make each such operation fast, especially when there are
million of instances to maintain. If all instances are stored in a linear data structure, the average
retrieving time would be quadratic to the number of instances if the number of instances is also
linear to the length of the trace. Instead, we use binary trees to store references to the monitor
instance, as illustrated in Figure 13. For each parameter p, an AVL tree is maintained. Each node
in the tree is the head node of a list of references to the instances that have the same value on p.
For each node, all its descendant nodes on its left sub tree have less identity value while the right
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sub tree stores nodes linking to instances with larger identity value. When the local wrapper tries to
retrieve an instance (or multiple instances), it starts with searching the AVL tree of a non-wildcard
parameter. Then, linear search is performed to filter based rest of the parameters. As illustrated in
the experiment below, tree structures lead to much better performance than the linear structure.

Figure 13: Using AVL trees as instance store

5.2. Tool evaluation
This section evaluates the SMEDL framework by comparing to RV-monitor [99] for online monitoring and QEA and MonPoly [19] for offline monitoring. Implemented in Java, RV-monitor uses
the same formalism as JavaMOP. It can generate C and Java monitors for online monitoring. Implemented in OCaml, MonPoly checks properties described in MFOTL formulas. All experiments in
this section are done under the following platform: Xeon(R) Gold 6148 CPU at 2.40GHz, 750GB
memory, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS 64-bit operating system.
5.2.1. Evaluation of online monitoring
Online evaluation is performed over three benchmark programs: Watertank, BasicCar and UnsafeFile.
• The program Watertank is a controller of water tank, which simulates the behavior of updating
water tanks based on the commands read from the environment. The monitor checks whether
the incoming commands follow the operational policy such as the valve of a tanker cannot be
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opened when the tank is not in service.
• The program BasicCar simulates the behavior of a car such as start, stop, acceleration, toggle
of lights and wipers. The monitor checks whether the program follows the policy of car
operation.
• The program UnsafeFile opens a series of files and write texts into them. The monitor checks
whether all file descriptors are closed at the end of execution and no writing operations are
performed after the file is closed.
For each program, we measure execution time of the original program and monitors at 10 different
input scales (number of instances), which is linear to the size of the event trace and the number
of instances created. At each input, the result is obtained by averaging over 10 executions. The
result is shown in Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15. We can observe that the runtime overheads
of SMEDL monitors in these examples are reasonable because 1) SMEDL monitors are efficient
and 2) instrumentation sites in these programs are sparse. As for comparison with RV-monitor,
SMEDL performs better than RV-monitor in Watertank for all inputs except for the case where the
instance number is 1000. Moreover, as shown in Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 16, SMEDL
monitors achieve nearly linear increment of execution time along with the length of the trace while
RV-monitors are quadratic because it uses lists to store instances.
Table 13: Execution time of SMEDL and RV-monitor in Watertank
trace size
1495
3084
4535
5935
7532
8909
10510
11946
13489
14960

instance number
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
9000
10000

original program time(s)
9.718
18.956
30.120
40.640
53.210
66.152
80.260
95.765
110.270
126.530
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SMEDL time(s)
0.011
0.023
0.036
0.050
0.062
0.076
0.092
0.104
0.119
0.132

RV-monitor time(s)
0.007
0.030
0.065
0.117
0.181
0.262
0.357
0.468
0.590
0.734

Figure 14: Execution time of SMEDL and RV-monitor in Watertank
Table 14: Execution time of SMEDL and RV-monitor in UnsafeFile
trace size
0.5M
1M
1.5M
2M
2.5M
3M
3.5M
4M
4.5M
5M

instance number
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000

original program time(s)
0.722
1.534
2.247
2.998
4.154
5.043
5.998
6.998
9.285
10.526

SMEDL time(s)
0.278
0.566
0.868
1.188
1.474
1.789
2.199
2.591
2.815
3.171

RV-monitor time(s)
0.928
3.706
8.336
14.709
22.366
30.793
40.126
50.206
61.371
72.628

Figure 15: Execution time of SMEDL and RV-monitor in UnsafeFile

5.2.2. Evaluation of offline monitoring
Offline monitoring is performed over 7 properties against QEA and 3 properties against MonPoly.
All properties and traces are from the competition on runtime verification in 20146 and 2016.7
• QEA-GrantCancel: every resource should only be held by at most one task at any one time
6
7

https://gitlab.inria.fr/crv14/benchmarks/-/tree/master/OFFLINE
https://crv.liflab.ca/wiki/index.php/Offline track
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Table 15: Execution time of SMEDL and RV-monitor in BasicCar
trace size
60000
120000
180000
240000
300000
360000
420000
480000
540000
600000

instance number
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
100000

original program time(s)
0.722
1.366
2.003
2.708
3.251
4.055
4.614
5.233
5.859
6.562

SMEDL time(s)
0.018
0.036
0.055
0.072
0.095
0.113
0.132
0.155
0.178
0.192

RV-monitor time(s)
0.637
4.607
12.850
23.031
38.015
54.345
76.007
99.731
130.110
155.580

Figure 16: Execution time of SMEDL and RV-monitor in BasicCar
and if a resource is granted to a task, it must be cancelled before being granted to another
task.
• QEA-NestedCommand: every command issued later must succeed before previously issued
ones.
• QEA-ResourceLifeCycle: a resource goes through three stages of free, requested and granted
in sequence.
• QEA-RespectConflict: resources that are in conflict with each other cannot be granted at the
same time.
• QEA-Auction: the auction process follows certain policies such as: 1) each bid is strictly
larger than the previous bid; 2) an item is sold if the last bid amount is greater than the initial
price; 3) an item can only be sold in the auction for once; and so on.
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• QEA-CandidateSelection: Example 2 in Section 4.3.
• QEA-SqlSanitizer: every string derived from an input string is sanitized before use.
• MonPoly-Banking-1: executed transactions of any customer must be reported within at most
5 days if the transferred money exceeds a given threshold of $2,000.
• MonPoly-Banking-2: executed transactions of any customer must be authorized by some employee between 2 to 20 days before they are executed if the transferred money a exceeds a
given threshold of $2,000.
• MonPoly-Publish: 1) any report must be approved prior to its publication; 2) the person who
publishes the report must be an accountant and the person who approves the publication must
be the accountant’s manager; 3) the approval must happen within at most 10 days before the
publication.
We transform QEA specifications and MFOTL formulas into SMEDL monitors. The transformation from QEA has been discussed in Chapter 4. There is no existing work on transformation from
MFOTL formulas into EFSMs so we manually translate these examples by considering the intention of the property and the semantics of MFOTL. Correctness of the transformation is justified by
testing against several traces. The size of the SMEDL specification for the benchmark properties
are illustrated in Table 16. The column monitor# represents the number of monitors in the specification; max parameter # represents the max number of parameters among all monitors; connection
# represents the number of connections defined in the architecture file. We can observe that CandiateSelection, SqlSantitizer and Publish are more complicated than others in number of monitors or
event connections.
The experiment is performed by measuring execution time and maximum memory allocated for
monitors during execution. The comparison between SMEDL and QEA is illustrated in Table 17.
Among 7 properties, SMEDL outperforms QEA in 6 of them in time efficiency and SMEDL uses
less memory than QEA. Although it is not totally fair to compare monitors implemented in C and
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Table 16: Size of SMEDL specifications
property
QEA-GrantCancel

monitor#
1

max parameter #
1

connection #
2

QEA-NestedCommand

2

2

6

QEA-ResourceLifeCycle
QEA-RespectConflict
QEA-Auction
QEA-CandidateSelection
QEA-SqlSanitizer
MonPoly-Banking-1
MonPoly-Banking-2
MonPoly-Publish

1
2
1
4
2
1
1
6

1
2
1
3
2
1
1
3

6
6
4
10
11
2
2
16

Java, the result still demonstrates that SMEDL is competitive tool for offline monitoring.
Table 17: Comparison between SMEDL and QEA
property
GrantCancel
NestedCommand
ResourceLifeCycle
RespectConflict
Auction
CandidateSelection
SqlSanitizer

trace size
1M
1200
1M
1M
84643
977997
9447751

QEA time(s)
2.357
1.371
2.487
3.887
0.436
26850
9.6

QEA mem (KB)
1079924
537018
1364046
1429354
149437
37973789
1929383

SMEDL time
1.994
0.018
1.915
3.123
0.251
3135
41.413

SMEDL mem (KB)
1874
1897
2749
1966
2440
2127146
1843685

speedup
1.18
76.17
1.30
1.24
1.74
8.56
0.23

The comparison between SMEDL and MonPoly is illustrated in Table 18. The result shows that
SMEDL performs better or approximately equally in Banking-1 and Banking-2 where the size of
SMEDL specification is small. For Publish, MonPoly performs much better than SMEDL. In the
next section, we explore some directions to further optimize SMEDL monitors.
Table 18: Comparison between SMEDL and MonPoly
property
Banking-1
Banking-2
Publish

trace size
320424
323308
57404

MonPoly time(s)
4.270
0.703
14.375

MonPoly mem(KB)
20281
14319
416793

SMEDL time(s)
0.951
0.785
1517

SMEDL mem(KB)
11052
11843
1003576

speedup
4.49
0.90
0.01

5.3. Optimization
Figure 12 indicates that execution of a monitor network can be divided into three disjoint parts: operations on the global queue; store operations, including fetching and insertion of created instances;
and execution of monitoring logic. To analyze the bottleneck of monitor performance, we profiled
execution of SMEDL monitors to analyze how each part contributes to the execution time. Two
representative patterns are discovered, as shown in the results of two benchmarks UnsafeMapIter
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(Example 1 in Chapter 4) and UnsafeFile respectively in Figure 17 and Figure 18. The X-axis represents the overall execution time of monitors while the Y-axis represents the number of fully-bound
instances created during execution. Note that the trace length is linear to the number of instances.
We can observe that in UnsafeMapIter, insert and fetch operation take respectively 50% and 25%
of the overall execution time; in UnsafeFile, fetch operation takes 55% of the overall execution time
while insertion operation can be negligible. The reason is that in UnsafeMapIter, both partial and
fully-bound instances are created and each instance is queried only once. In UnsafeFile, on the
other hand, each monitor instance is queried one thousand times because of the writing operation.
However, in both cases, store operations dominate more execution time than queue and monitoring
logic, which admits some optimization possibility.

Figure 17: Profiling of the SMEDL monitor for UnsafeMapIter

Figure 18: Profiling of the SMEDL monitor for UnsafeFile
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5.3.1. Optimization intuitions
The overall execution time of store operations depend on two factors: 1) the number of operations
to execute and 2) the time to execute each operation. For 1), we introduce explicit creation events
that avoid useless fetch operations; for 2), we introduce the concept of final states to remove useless
instances. At the implementation level, we use the hash map to achieve (nearly) constant time
insertion and retrieval of instances.
Avoidance of unnecessary retrieving operations. To motivate this feature, we recall the CandidateSelection property, which requires that for each voter, there must exist a party of which the voter
is a member and all candidates of that party must be ranked by the voter. The example trace we used
in the experiment 8 is distributed as follows: the first 343,135 member(v,p) indicate the relation between the voter (v) and the party (p); then the next 6,759 candidate(c,p) represent the information
between the candidate (c) and the party (p). Because there are no duplicated events, the triple (v,c,p)
is created by the only pair of member and voter. After all triples are created, the rest are rank(v, c,
r) for ranking the candidate c as r by the voter v. The SMEDL specification contains one partial
monitor mvp(v , p) and one full monitor mvcp(v , p). Instances of mvcp is created by receiving the
event createVCP . In the implementation, createVCP is an implicit creation event, which means it
will trigger the local wrapper of mvcp to retrieve a matching instance before creating it. However,
if the trace does not contain duplicated events, createVCP always creates a new instance because
no such instance has been created. As a result, the verdict would not change if we remove retrieving
operation in the local wrapper when receiving createVCP . We incorporate this change to the code
and the execution time is 19 minutes, which is much faster than the original implementation. To
generalize this idea, we extend the architecture description language with explicit creation events.
In contrast to implicit creation events, which creates an instance after failing to retrieve an instance,
an explicit creation event directly creates an instance without triggering execution of monitoring
logic. Formal definition and use of an explicit creation event and analysis on how the time overhead
would be improved are left as future work.
8

https://crv.liflab.ca/wiki/index.php/Offline Team2 Benchmark2
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Final states. When the execution time of retrieving an instance depends on the size of the instance
store, it is desirable to maintain as few instances as possible. We introduce the concept of final
states, which are specified for a scenario. For an instance, if all scenarios in which final states are
defined reach to a final state,it will be automatically removed. To evaluate the effect of final states,
we experiment against NestedCommand and GrantCancel. The experimental result is illustrated
in Table 19. For NestedCommand, the monitor with final states performs better because fewer
instances are maintained during execution. In contrast, the monitor with final states performs worse
for GrantCancel. The reason is that the event to grant a resource appears repeatedly in the trace.
As a result, monitor instances that have been removed may be created later, which leads to more
store operations. From these two examples, we could find that if a monitor can reach to a sink state
and the trace does not have any event that may trigger creation of this instance after it is removed,
setting sink states as final states can improve time efficiency.
Table 19: Comparison of monitors with/without final states for NestedCommand and GrantCancel
Property
NestedCommand
NestedCommand
GrantCancel
GrantCancel

trace length
500
1200
100000
500000

without final states(s)
0.008
0.018
0.25
1.02

with final states(s)
0.005
0.007
0.28
1.13

speedup
1.60
2.57
0.89
0.90

Hash map for instance store. We have used AVL trees as the data structure to store instances,
which performs much better than linear search. However, when retrieving an instance by multiple
parameters, only the first parameter is searched through the tree while others are filtered in a linear
way, which would lead to significant performance degradation. To overcome this drawback, we
implement hash maps to store monitor instances, as shown in Figure 19. Suppose the monitor has
two parameter variables, p and q, For each subset of non-wildcard parameter combinations, p, q
and (p, q), a hash map is created. Within a hash map, all the instances with the same identities in
the subset are stored in a list (represented by dot line arrows). For the hashing mechanism, robin
hood hashing [33] with linear probe is adopted. To compared two ways of instance store, suppose
an event with p and q arrives. The monitor using the tree would search from either the tree of p or
q to obtain a list of instances. Then, linear search is performed on the list using the value of the
other parameter. In contrast, the monitor with the hash map would directly query the hash map for
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the pair of p and q. From this example, we can observe that the hash map implementation is more
efficient for searching among multiple parameters because it avoids unnecessary linear search and
the search space is smaller.

Figure 19: Using hash map instance store
To demonstrate this observation, we perform experiments over 6 case studies on the execution time,
as shown in Table 20. The hash map version outperforms the original version in all of them. For
CandidateSelection and Publish, the performance improvement is significant while the boost for
Banking-1 and Banking-2 are small. The extent of improvement is related to the operations on
retrieving instances by multiple parameters. In Banking-1 and Banking-2, instances are retrieved by
one parameter. In contrast, there are respectively 4 and 3 monitors in the specification of Publish
and CandidateSelection that have multiple parameters, which lead to many more operations on
linear search. In general, we can expect more performance gain when the specification is more
complicated with respect to the number of monitors with multiple parameters.
Table 20: Comparison between the tree and hash map implementation on time efficiency
property
Auction

trace size
84643

CandidateSelection

977997

SqlSanitizer
Banking-1
Banking-2
Publish

9447751
320424
323308
57404

tree time(s)
0.251
1141.0
(explicit creation events)
41.413
0.951
0.785
1517
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hash map time(s)
0.23

speedup
1.09

16.02

71.22

25.56
0.827
0.78
1.974

1.62
1.15
1.01
768.49

5.4. Evaluation of monitor deployment on time overhead
For online monitoring, monitors may be deployed with the target program synchronously or asynchronously. For synchronous deployment, the target system needs to pause the execution and transfer control to the monitor thus any property violation can be detected timely. For asynchronous
deployment, on the other hand, the target system proceeds its execution after invoking APIs to deliver events to the monitor using asynchronous communication. Asynchronous monitoring is useful
when the monitor needs to receive events from sources that do not work in the same process or
even the same machine. Moreover, asynchronous monitoring may also provide with possibility to
reduce the time overhead [32]. The SMEDL framework provides flexible ways to deploy monitors. Synchronous and asynchronous communication are respectively implemented as API calls and
RabbitMQ communication middleware. This section compares performance of synchronous and
asynchronous monitoring with respect to time efficiency. All experiments in this section are done
under the following platform: 2.5 GHz Intel Core i7, 16GB memory, running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
64-bit operating system.
The evaluation is performed agains three benchmark programs, UnsafeGrant, UnsafeMapIter and
TrackQuality. The property UnsafeGrant states that a source can only be released after it has been
granted and all resources are released at the end of execution. The program TrackQuality simulates
behavior of generating track data from multiple sources, which has been introduced in Section 3.2.4.
The monitor computes statistics for each track in a sliding window divided by timestamps of events
and merge them together to check the quality of sensor data.
The experiment measures execution time of synchronously instrumented monitors and calling the
RabbitMQ API respectively. The result shown in Table 21 reveals that synchronous monitoring
incurs less time overhead in all benchmarks. Calling the RabbitMQ API and related preparation
actions such as generation of a message are more time-consuming than monitor execution on average when handling each event. However, the ratio of asynchronous time to synchronous time varies
among them. For UnsafeGrant, synchronous monitoring is 20 times faster than asynchronous communication while the difference in TrackQuality is narrower. The specification of UnsafeGrant only
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has one monitor specification in which all transitions do not contain any actions such as updates of
state variables or arithmetic computations. Moreover, almost all events delivered to the monitor
have only one receiving instance. The specification of TrackQuality, on the other hand, has 6 monitors and one event can trigger multiple transitions in different monitors with arithmetic and state
update actions. As result, synchronous monitoring is less efficient for TrackQuality. In general,
multiple factors such as the monitor structure, the distribution of events and the time overhead of
calling monitoring or communication APIs may influence the time overhead of online monitoring.
Table 21: Comparison of synchronous and asynchronous monitoring
UnsafeGrant
UnsafeGrant
UnsafeMapIter
UnsafeMapIter
TrackQuality
TrackQuality

trace length
60000
150000
60000
150000
1200300
2000500

sync time(s)
0.060
0.143
0.052
0.140
2.553
4.187

async time(s)
1.206
2.777
0.756
1.919
30.765
49.860

async/sync
20.10
19.42
14.54
13.71
12.05
11.91

5.5. Summary
In this chapter we presented the implementation of the SMEDL framework and demonstrated time
efficiency of our technique on large-scaled input by comparing with representative RV tools for
both online and offline monitoring. We then profiled execution of monitors and proposed intuition
of optimization from the perspective of language and data structure design. Finally, we compare the
current implementation of synchronous and asynchronous monitoring, which could give us hints on
how to decide monitor deployment with awareness of time overhead.
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CHAPTER 6 : Monitoring Time Interval
Timing properties describe the behavior of one event occurring after another event within certain
time bound or counting the number of events that occur during an interval of time. In both cases,
a monitor needs to not only evaluate the logic of the property but also determine whether events
fall within a given time interval. Monitoring timing properties is challenging in the situation where
the target system and the monitor are deployed in an asynchronous environment. The asynchronous
approach makes monitoring more difficult, due to the network delay and the difference between
the system and the monitor clocks. However, by using the monitor clock that is different from the
system clock, we may be able to detect that timing behavior of the target system is incorrect because
the system clock is wrong.
Although SMEDL monitoring systems supports asynchronous deployment of monitors, explicit
clocks cannot be explicitly expressed. In this chapter, we propose a method to clearly separate
monitoring of time intervals from the rest of property checking. With this framework, SMEDL can
focus on describing monitoring logic without worrying about clocks.
Compatible with SMEDL, we assume the property is checked in an event-driven fashion. To enable
checking of the timing in this way, we extend the set of events with a new kind of event that represents the end of a time interval, which we call interval closure. Now, we can reduce time checking
to temporal ordering: if a system event arrives before the closure event, it occurred within the time
interval, while if the closure event arrives first, the system event is outside of the interval. In order to
produce closure events in the right order, we introduce the interval handler module into the monitor.
The second aspect addressed is the design of the interval handler. We note two particular design
considerations for the handler: one is correctness and the other is timeliness. On the one hand, the
handler needs to correctly monitor intervals, in the sense that it should close an interval – that is,
raise the closure event – only after any event occurring within the interval has been received. In
the presence of uncertainty, correct monitoring is possible only if the handler waits long enough
to make sure it has seen all relevant events. On the other hand, closing the interval too late may
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increase unnecessary resource consumption for monitoring, which should be avoided. Moreover,
we should know what the tight one is, in order to be certain that the deadline to be set is larger than
the tight one. It is therefore important to set the monitoring deadline as small as possible under the
premise that correctness of the closure is guaranteed.
To summarize, this chapter addresses the following problem: “Given an asynchronous environment
with uncertain communication delay and imperfect clock synchronization between target system and
monitor, under what conditions can correctness of monitoring time intervals be ensured and how to
achieve it?”
We consider three parameters of monitoring setup, network delay, clock skew and clock rate, and
study how they influence monitoring time intervals. We explore the parameter space and present a
scheme for setting the deadline of monitoring for each interval. We then introduce an algorithm that
the interval handler uses to monitor intervals.
Related work. Sammapun [120] considers properties represented with time-bound operators and
analyzes several different implementations of checking properties based on timer and heartbeats
with bounded or unbounded network delay. However, clock rate and clock skew were not taken
into consideration. Lee and Davidson [90] propose algorithms for implementing timed synchronous
communication among processes having different clocks such that all processes will decide whether
the communication is successful within their own absolute deadlines and they agree on the same decision. Two communication schemes, multiple senders with one receiver and N-way communication
were analyzed. They further analyze the performance of two algorithms of timed synchronous communication using probabilistic models [91]. Pinisetty et al. [110] propose a paradigm of runtime
enforcement using time retardants on events to ensure that a system satisfies timed properties. Jahanian et al. study the runtime monitoring of time constraints specified by RTL (real-time logic) in
the distributed real-time system [80]. However, the monitoring procedure of time intervals was not
discussed. They further raise the problem of imprecise timestamps of traces influencing the correct
verification of the properties specified by MTL (metric temporal logic) formulas [17]. The paper
gave the conclusion that certain MTL fragments can be verified by existing monitors for precise
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Figure 20: Evaluation of interval operators
traces over traces with imprecise timestamps.

6.1. Motivating examples
Several kinds of commonly used timed specifications involve reasoning over time intervals. We note
that, while the logic of evaluating these properties over a stream of events is different, it invariably
involves reasoning about intervals of time given in the specification and whether the timestamp of
a given observation falls within an interval or outside of it. As we discuss below, parameters of the
monitoring setup, such as clock skew or the latency of delivering observations to the monitor, have
an impact on how this reasoning should be performed. We therefore want to separate the logic of
property evaluation, which depends only on the semantics of the specification language, and interval
management, which depends on properties of the monitoring setup.
To illustrate our approach, we first briefly revisit two of them: LTL with interval operators and
interval statistics.
LTL with time-bound operators. In LTL, operator Until (U), Weak-until (W) and R (Release)
are used to specify properties in a trace. For instance, property φ1 U φ2 is satisfied in a trace if φ1
is satisfied at each location of the trace until φ2 is satisfied at a certain point. The verdict cannot
be given to this property until getting the result from the verification of φ2 . To restrict the time
of getting the result, the time-bound operator is utilized [120]. If we want to express the property
that φ2 becomes satisfied within 5 time units from the current time and φ1 remains true within the
interval, the formula is written as φ1 U[0,5] φ2 .
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In many runtime verification approaches [85, 13, 118], temporal operators are evaluated in an eventdriven fashion. Arriving events, which could be observations from the target system or results of sub
formula evaluation, trigger changes in the operator evaluation status. We want to extend the same
approach to interval operators. Consider, for example, evaluation of the bounded-until aU[0,t1 ] b,
where a and b are target system observations. As Figure 20 (a) shows, evaluation of the operator is
a state machine that takes as inputs events a, b, and c. Event not a represents the absence of a. We
refer to the event c as the interval closure, which denotes that t1 time units have elapsed. Note that
t1 is measured in the sense of perfect clock, which may be different from the clock on the system
and the monitor side due to the clock skew. Evaluation is activated by an arrival of a, and while
further occurrences of a arrive, the state of the evaluation is unresolved. As soon as not a arrives,
or if the interval is closed, the operator evaluates to false, denoted by raising an event f . But if b
arrives before the interval is closed, the operator evaluates to true and an event t is raised. In this
way, evaluation of the operator does not depend on the value of the time bound and does not need
direct access to the clock. It is straightforward to extend this scheme to cover intervals of the form
[t1 , t2 ], as well as cover other commonly used temporal operators. Note that to monitor aU[t1 ,t2 ] b
we consider intervals [0, t1 ) and [t1 , t2 ]. When b arrives, we determine, which of the two intervals it
falls into, or if it is outside of both. For technical reasons that will be discussed later, we open both
intervals when a arrives.
Interval statistics. Some properties needs to collect statistics over a time interval. These properties
can be represented in a similar way as SQL queries using aggregate operators [16]. For instance,
Sum[0,t1 ] (occur(e)) >= b) specifies the property of the number of occurrences of event e over
the time interval [0,t1 ] is equal or greater than b. Figure 20 (b) shows the evaluation scheme for this
operator in a fashion similar to the previous case. Variable count increases with arrivals of event e.
When interval closure event c arrives, the interval is closed. An event t is raised if count is greater
or equal than b; otherwise an event f is raised.
In contrast to interval operators discussed above, calculation of interval statistics is different in
the sense that intervals are recurrent. On the system side, once an interval ends, the next one is
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immediately started and statistics calculation continues for the next interval, effectively partitioning
the time line into intervals of the same size, starting from some initial event. We can view recurrent
intervals as an extension of the two-interval case above.
Checking example. Figure 21 shows a concrete scenario for monitoring of aU[t1 ,t2 ] b when system
events can be delivered with a delay. Assume first that the clocks in both the system and the monitor
are perfect. On the monitor side, we begin processing when the event a arrives at relative time 0.
To correctly evaluate this property, the monitor needs to tell whether b falls within i1 = [0, t1 ) or
within i2 = [t1 , t2 ]. Suppose an event b is raised before t1 but is delayed more than a was and thus
arrives after the time t1 on the monitor side. Thus, at t1 the monitor cannot yet conclude that i1 has
expired. From the monitor perspective, i1 and i2 overlap; that is, an incoming event may belong to
either interval. However, once we see the timestamp of b, we can tell whether it belongs to i1 or
i2 . Therefore, we do not need to measure duration of i1 or i2 on the monitor side. Now consider
the case when b does not arrive within i2 . In order to conclude that b did not arrive in time, the
monitor has to wait. Eventually, another event with a large enough timestamp may arrive and the
monitor may be able to make the conclusion based on that. But what if it arrives after a very long
time or, worse, if the missing b was meant to be the last observation? To proceed in a more timely
fashion, the monitor has to use a timer. This timer, essentially, sets the deadline for b to arrive. This
observation underlies our monitoring approach: we use the timer only to safely close the interval,
while all other conclusions – whether the interval has started and whether an event is within the
interval – are made based on event timestamps.
Apart from the network delay, the clock rate of the system and the monitor also influence interval
monitoring. Using the same example above, assume first that there is no clock skew and delivery
delay is ranged from 0 to 1 in the sense of the perfect clock. Suppose the clock rate of the perfect
clock rp is 1, clock rate of the system rs is 0.5 and clock rate of the monitor rm is within range
[0.8, 1.5]. Interval i1 to be monitored is [0, 6] measured by the perfect clock and the monitor begins
monitoring it at time 0. To guarantee that all events occurring in i1 arrive before the monitor finishes
monitoring this interval, the deadline of monitoring is set at time 10.5 of the monitor clock, as in the
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Figure 21: Monitoring time intervals of aU[t1 ,t2 ] b
worst case, an event occurs at 3 of system clock (corresponding to time 6 in the sense of the perfect
clock as the clock rate is 0.5) arrives at time 10.5 of the monitor clock with the largest delay. If the
actual rate of rm is 1.5, when an event b happens at time 3.1 of the system clock and the network
delay is 0.2 then, it arrives at the monitor at time 9.6 (calculated by 3.1*3 + 0.2*1.5). However,
since we know the clock rate of the system is 0.5, the time on the perfect clock will be 6.2, which is
larger than 6. Therefore, even if b arrives when the monitor is monitoring the interval, the monitor
can still determine b does not belong to it. This example suggests that the deadline for monitoring
an interval depends only on the duration of the interval and the relationship between the monitoring
clock and the perfect clock, but not on the system clock. At the same time, to determine whether
an event is within an interval depends on the relationship between the system clock and the perfect
clock, but not on the monitor clock. We will make this intuition precise below.

6.2. System Architecture and preliminaries
In this section, we will present the architecture for monitoring time intervals. Then some preliminaries are given, including definitions of some key concepts and parameters of monitoring setup to
be explored.
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6.2.1. Architecture
Figure 22 illustrates the architecture for monitoring time intervals. To separate the logic of time
management, a module IntervalHandler is introduced into the monitor between the target system
and the property checker. Both the IntervalHandler and checker run under the monitor clock. The
checker can be implemented in SMEDL or other event-driven RV tools. It receives two types of
events from the IntervalHandler, one is the original events for property evaluation. Another is a
special event interval closure introduced above, which is used to acknowledge to the checker the
end of a time interval.

Figure 22: Architecture for monitoring time intervals
A checker correctly evaluates the property for a time interval i if all events occurring in i are delivered to the checker when the property is being evaluated. In the ideal situation, when events are
delivered from the system to the monitor immediately and there is no timing uncertainty, this can be
easily achieved by setting the timer in the IntervalHandler for the duration of i. Any event arriving
before the timer expires would be within i, while any event arriving after it expires is outside i.
Expiration of the timer immediately raises the closure event. If events can be delayed, however, this
approach may clearly result in incorrect checking. The closure event must be delayed to accommodate for late events. In order to close the interval in a timely manner, we need to set a deadline for
raising the closure event that would guarantee correct monitoring and minimize the delay in closing
the interval. According to the duration on the time interval and parameters of the monitoring setup,
the IntervalHandler calculates the deadline for each interval. When the current time at the monitor
reaches the deadline, the IntervalHandler sends an interval closure event to the checker to finish the
evaluation of the property for this interval.
The deadline discussed above is useful in another way. If events arrive out of order, they also should
be re-ordered according to their timestamps before being passed on to the checker which, as we
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discussed above, does not reason about time. In our approach, the IntervalHandler is storing events
in a queue in the timestamp order and uses the same deadline to release events from the queue to
the checker. We discuss event reordering further in Section 6.4.
6.2.2. Preliminaries
Time model. There are three time domains assumed: Tm for the monitor clock, Ts for the system
clock and Tp for the perfect clock. The monitor takes streams of events as input. Events are timestamped using the system clock in the time domain Ts . The system and monitor clock may be skewed
and run at different rates. In addition, there may be unpredictable delays in delivering events from
the target system to the monitor. As a result, event timestamps are not directly comparable with
readings of the monitor clock. Moreover, elements in the time domain Tm and Ts are totally ordered. An event stream ET is a sequence of timestamped observations h(o1 , t1 ), (o2 , t2 ), ...i, where
oi is a value observed at time ti ∈ Ts . The perfect clock cp in Tp is used to measure the length of
the time interval being monitored.
Time interval is a period of time between two events, the duration of which is measured by the
perfect clock. In the remainder of this chapter, when we refer the interval on the system, we use
“start” and “end” to denote the beginning and ending of the interval. On the monitor side, an interval
is “opened” or “closed” by the monitor. A closed interval i that starts at t1 and ends at t2 is denoted
as i[t1 ,t2 ] . For an event e originated from the system and an interval i, if t1 ≤ te ≤ t2 , then e ∈ i[t1 ,t2 ]
where te is the timestamp of e. Note that if we don’t care about events occurring on the bound(s),
the interval could also be half-open or open and the denotation will be modified accordingly.
Network delay, denoted as nd, represents the time to send the event from the system to the monitor.
The absolute value of the delay is measured in the sense of perfect clock.
Clock rate is the interval of the finest time unit. It is assumed that the clock rate of cp , denoted as
rp , is 1. The clock rate of the system and the monitor are respectively denoted as rs and rm . If rs
(rm ) is greater than 1, then the system (monitor) clock runs ahead of the perfect clock.
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Clock skew, denoted as ts, represents the time difference tm − ts between the monitor and the
system where ts is the time of the system and tm is the time of the monitor. Here we assume that
time synchronization is periodically conducted between (1) the system clock and the perfect clock
and (2) the monitor clock and the perfect clock.

6.3. Setting the Interval Deadline
In this section, we explore the parameter space of network delay, clock skew and clock rate and
identify several cases where correctness of monitoring can be ensured. For each case, we describe
how to calculate the deadline for closing the interval. The monitor uses this deadline to set the
timer; when the timer expires, we can be certain that no further events belonging to this interval can
arrive and the closure event is sent to the checker. Patterns of setting the timer for non-recurrent and
recurrent intervals are presented respectively. Case analysis on the three parameters is conducted.
6.3.1. Patterns of setting timer
We rely on timers to determine when an interval can be closed. The timers are set differently based
on whether the interval is recurrent or non-recurrent, shown in Figure 23. Note that the clock rate
of the system rs is used to calculate the actual time on the system side.
Non-recurrent intervals.

Here we only consider the case involving two consecutive intervals

such as the property aU[t1 ,t2 ] b. In aU[t1 ,t2 ] b, two intervals, [0, t1 ) and [t1 , t2 ], are involved. The
monitor begins checking [0, t1 ) and [t1 , t2 ] when a arrives and two corresponding timers are set to
close the intervals.
Recurrent intervals. As the number of intervals to be monitored is unbounded, only the timer for
the first interval is set. Then every time an interval is closed, the timer for closing the next interval
is set with a proper monitoring deadline. In the following section, we will denote the duration of
the recurrent interval as d.
In order to set the deadline as accurate as possible, two steps have to be done. The first step is
to estimate the time on the monitor side when an event e occurs on the system side, denoted as
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Figure 23: Scheme of setting deadlines for non-recurrent and recurrent intervals
t0 in Figure 23. The second step is to calculate deadlines for each monitor based on t0 , which is
introduced below.
6.3.2. Scheme of setting deadline
Here we give the case analysis with varying the values of the clock rate, network delay and clock
skew with the assumption of bounded network delay. Figure 23 illustrates the scheme of setting
deadline for non-recurrent and recurrent intervals. The time when the initial event e occurs on the
system side is denoted as initTsys , measured by the system clock and initTM is the time at the
monitor when e arrives at the monitor.
The monitor begins the monitoring process at initTM . For the non-recurrent case, ddl1 and ddl2
for interval [0, t1 ) and [t1 , t2 ] need to be calculated. Then, as the timers are set at initTM with a
relative value, deadline for [0, t1 ) is set with value ddl1 − initTM + t0 and deadline for [t1 , t2 ] is
set with value ddl2 − initTM + t0 . For the recurrent case, the deadline for the first interval can
be calculated in a similar way to the non-recurrent case: ddl is calculated according to the duration
of interval and the monitoring setup and the deadline for the first interval is ddl − initTM + t0 .
From the second interval, timers are set with a period inter. The reason the first interval is different
from the rest of them is that for the initial event e, we know the exact time when e arrives at the
monitor, but for the rest of intervals, we only consider the worst case where the last event for a
interval occurs at the boundary and the delay for the delivery is the maximum value of the network
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delay. In the following case analysis, we will estimate the value of t0 and calculate ddl1 and ddl2
for the non-recurrent case; ddl and inter for the recurrent case.
Case 1 : rs = 1, rm = 1, nd = 0. In this case, interval durations of the system and monitor are
identical and there is no delay, so t0 = initTM . For the case of non-recurrent intervals, ddl1 and
ddl2 are respectively t1 and t2 . For the case of recurrent intervals, ddl and inter have the same
value d since there is no network delay.
Case 2 : rs = 1, rm = 1, nd is fixed and known. In this case, clock skew ts can be directly
calculated by initTM − initTsys − nd and t0 = initTsys + ts. For the case of non-recurrent
intervals, ddl1 and ddl2 are respectively t1 + nd and t2 + nd since events occurring at the boundary
of these two intervals have the delay of nd. For the case of recurrent intervals, ddl is set to d + nd,
similar to the case of the non-recurrent interval. The value of inter is set to d because the interval
is of length d and the network delay has already been taken into consideration when calculating the
deadline of the first interval.
Case 3 : rs = 1, rm = 1, nd ∈ [b1, b2], ts is known. As ts is known, t0 = initTsys + ts. We only
need to consider the worst case in which network delay has the maximum value, which is when an
event e with timestamp t arrives on the monitor side at t + b2. The least delay b1 is not relevant for
computing deadlines. For the case of non-recurrent intervals, ddl1 and ddl2 are respectively t1 + b2
and t2 + b2. For the case of recurrent intervals, ddl is d + b2 and inter has value d.
Case 4 : rs = 1, rm = 1, nd ∈ [b1, b2], ts is unknown. The analysis is similar to the case 3 but t0
cannot be determined precisely since ts is unknown and network delay is not fixed. Consequently,
we approximate its value using the network delay. The worst case is when the value of t0 is as late
as possible. Therefore, we set t0 = initTM − b1. The same formulas setting deadlines used in case
3 are also used here.
Case 5: rs is fixed, rm ∈ [r3, r4], nd ∈ [b1, b2], ts at time initTsys is known. Like in case 3, t0 is
calculated using the formula t0 = initTsys + ts. Because of the clock rate difference between the
system and the monitor, clock skew may change. However, since we do not compare time values
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Table 22: Summary of deadline setting scheme
Non-recurrent
Recurrent
Monitoring setup
t0
ddl1
ddl2
ddl
inter
rs = 1, rm = 1, nd = 0
initTM
t1
t2
d
rs = 1, rm = 1, nd is fixed and initTsys + t1 + nd
t2 + nd
d + nd
d
known, ts is known
ts
rs = 1, rm = 1, nd ∈ [b1, b2], initTsys + t1 + b2
t2 + b2
d + b2
ts is known
ts
rs = 1, rm = 1, nd ∈ [b1, b2], initTM −
ts is unknown
b1
rs is fixed, rm ∈ [r3, r4], nd ∈ initTsys + (t1 +b2)∗ (t2 +b2)∗ (d + b2) ∗ r4 d ∗ r4
[b1, b2], ts at time initTsys is ts
r4
r4
known
rs is fixed, rm ∈ [r3, r4], nd ∈ initTM −
[b1, b2], ts is unknown
b1 ∗ r3
between the system and the monitor anywhere else, the value of the clock skew does not affect
calculations of the deadline value. To cover the worst case of event arrival when calculating the
deadline, rm and nd need to be at their upper bounds. For the case of non-recurrent intervals, ddl1
and ddl2 are respectively (t1 + b2) ∗ r4 and (t2 + b2) ∗ r4. For the case recurrent intervals, ddl has
value (d + b2) ∗ r4 and inter has value d ∗ r4.
Case 6: rs is fixed, rm ∈ [r3, r4], nd ∈ [b1, b2], ts is unknown. Similar with case 4, we need to
approximate t0 using its maximum value: initTM − b1 ∗ r3. The formulas used in case 5 are used
in this case.
One can observe that case 5 and 6 are generalization of special cases 1 to 4 and there is no conflicts
between them. The summary of case analysis on deadline setting is shown in Table 22. We can prove
that given monitoring setup in case 5 and 6, correctness of monitoring intervals can be guaranteed,
shown in Lemma 42.

Lemma 42 (Correctness of Monitoring Interval for Setup in Case 5 and 6) If rs is fixed, rm is
fixed and known with in the range [r3, r4] and nd ∈ [b1, b2], we can always set a deadline for
monitored intervals as illustrated in Table 22, such that all events of the interval will fall within the
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deadline.
Proof(sketch): Based on whether ts is known at the beginning of monitoring process, we split into
two cases corresponding to case 5 and 6 above. Here we give the sketch for proving the case of
monitoring non-recurrent intervals [0, t1 ). The proof for interval [t1 , t2 ] and recurrent intervals is
similar. Recall that t0 is the estimated time, by the monitor clock, when the initial event occurs on
the system side. The deadline is set in two steps, illustrated in Figure 23, and we argue correctness
of these two steps separately. First, we compute the largest possible value for t0 and this is correct
because 1) if ts known, we can calculate the accurate time t0 of the monitor given the timestamp of
initTsys when the initial event occurs on the system side; and 2) if ts is not known, we compute t0
having the maximum value using the initTM and the lower bound of nd. Then, we set the deadline
relative to t0 and we do it correctly because we over-estimate the deadline with the upper bound
of rm and nd. We then compare the deadline with tr , the relative time between initTsys and the
latest possible arrival time of the event occurring at t1 at the monitor. The value of tr is t1 + b2
in the sense of perfect clock. Translating deadline to the perfect time scale, the value would be
(t1 + b2) ∗ r4/rm , which is greater than or equal to tr . Since t0 is equal to or greater than the time
when the initial event occurring within the interval, we can always ensure that all events will fall


within the deadline.

Lemma 42 can be extended to Theorem 43 describing sufficient condition for correctly monitoring
time intervals.
Theorem 43 (Correctness of Monitoring Interval) If rs is fixed, rm is fixed and known with in the
range [r3, r4] and nd is bounded, we can set a deadline for each monitored interval as illustrated
in Table 22 such that all events of the interval will arrive at the monitor within the deadline.
Proof(sketch): The proof proceeds by case analysis of entries in Table 22. Note that cases 1-4 are
special cases of 5 and 6 and need not be considered separately. The union of the monitoring setup
conditions in Table 22 is exactly the premise of the theorem. Therefore, correctness of cases 5 and
6, established by Lemma 42, proves the theorem.
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6.4. Monitoring Procedure
This section presents the procedure for monitoring time intervals using the scheme of setting monitoring deadline proposed in the previous section. The procedure describes operation of the IntervalHandler introduced in Section 6.2.1.
The procedure relies on two key functions. First, calculateDeadline sets the deadline for each
interval according to Section 6.3. Second, getInterval is given an event and returns an interval to
which this event belongs, as follows. Given an event e with the timestamp t and initTsys which
indicates the occurring time of the initial event, we need to get the interval that e belongs to. With the
condition that the rate of the system rs is fixed, the interval can be determined. For the non-recurrent
interval, if t−initTsys < t1 ∗rs , e belongs to the interval [0, t1 ); if t1 ∗rs ≤ t−initTsys ≤ t2 ∗rs , e
belongs to the interval [t1 , t2 ]; otherwise, e falls out of these two intervals. For the recurrent interval,
the interval is calculated using the formula b(t − initTsys )/(d ∗ rs )c. As stated below, each interval
is identified by an integer according to the order, starting from 0.
Figure 24 shows the detailed structure of the IntervalHandler and how it connects to the Property
Checker . The IntervalHandler is responsible for managing intervals and the checker evaluates
the logic of the property. Note that the monitoring process is slightly different between the cases
of in-order-delivery and out-of-order delivery. The IntervalList is the data structure representing
intervals of interest. In the non-recurrent case, there are the two intervals [0, t1 ) and [t1 , t2 ]. In the
recurrent case, if in-order delivery is assumed, we just need to remember the earliest non-closed
interval. For out-of-order delivery, the IntervalList needs to remember all non-closed intervals for
which at least one event has been received. We also associate a data structure eventQueue(i ) for
each interval i in the IntervalList: each arrived event is put into the corresponding eventQueue
ordered by the timestamp. Once the interval i is closed — that is, no more events from this interval
can arrive, — the IntervalHandler sends all events in the eventQueue(i) to the checker, followed by
the interval closure event.
In the IntervalHandler, intervalManager is used to relay events from the system and manage in-
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Figure 24: Structure for the IntervalHandler
tervals. It first examines whether the received event e is the initial event arriving at the monitor.
If so, it computes the deadline and sets the timer for the first interval. According to the setting of
network delay, clock rate and clock skew, calculateDeadline computes the deadline using the value
of initialTS , initialTM as well as the left and right boundary of the interval. The second attribute
of setTimer is the index of the corresponding interval upon which the timer is set. In the case of
properties involving two non-recurrent intervals, two timers with corresponding deadlines need to
be set. Then, the interval i that e belongs to is computed. If in-order delivery is assumed, the current
interval being evaluated by the checker, denoted as i0 , is obtained from the IntervalList by calling
the procedure getLeastOpenedInt. If i is not equal to i0 , i0 is closed and the corresponding timer
will also be unset. Event e is then sent to the checker. If out-of-order delivery is assumed, it is put
into corresponding eventQueue(i).
void intervalManager (){
while(true) {
Interval i;
Event e = receiveEvent();
if (initialEvent(e)){
initialTS = e.getSystemTimeStamp();
initialTM = getcurrentTime();
deadline = calculateDeadline();
setTimer(deadline,0);
}
i = getInterval(e);
if (out-of-order-delivery){
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addQueue(e,eventQueue(i));
}else{
i’ = getLeastOpenedInt();
if(i != i’){
closeInt(i’);
unsetTimer(i’);
}
PropertyChecker.handlingEvents([e]);
}
}

Procedure closeInt(i ) is responsible for closing the interval i, which is called when the corresponding timer is up or an event for the next interval has arrived in the case of in-order delivery. It first
calculates the deadline for the next interval i + 1 to be evaluated and sets the corresponding timer.
For the case of non-recurrent interval, the timer is not reset. Then events in eventQueue(i) are sent
to the checker if out-of-order delivery is assumed. Finally, intervalClosure(i ) is called to close the
interval i and modify the IntervalList. For the case of recurrent interval, interval i is removed from
the IntervalList and i + 1 is set as the earliest non-closed interval if in-order delivery is assumed.
void closeInt(integer i){
ddl = calculateDeadline();
setTimer(ddl, i+1);
if (out-of-order-delivery){
liste = getEventsForQueue(eventQueue(i));
PropertyChecker.handlingEvents(liste);
}
intervalClosure(i);
}

6.5. Summary
This section presented an approach to monitoring of time intervals in an event-driven fashion. To
do this, we introduced an interval closure event, with the property that all events that fall into the
interval occur before the interval closure. The two challenges are (1) correctness of the procedure
and (2) timeliness of the event closure. To address these two challenges, we offered a procedure
to determine when all events that can fit into the interval have been observed. The answer to this
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question depends on parameters of monitoring setup, namely network delay, clock skew between
the system and the monitor and clock rates of the two. We performed case analysis and show how
to close intervals in different cases.
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CHAPTER 7 : Reflexive Adaptation Framework
Runtime enforcement (RE) is a dynamic technique to guarantee satisfaction of formally specified
properties in event traces. EMs (enforcement monitors), synthesized from these specifications, describe how to transform event streams using abstract adaptation actions (also referred to as enforcement actions) to preserve properties. During execution, EMs intercept actions generated from the
target system and change the state of the program for adaptation. Although pre-defined adaptation
actions are usually trivial and would not permanently solve the problems, they can be used as temporary repairs and are more feasible for validation compared to more sophisticated methods. In
this chapter, we will extend SMEDL as an adaptation framework. Then, we present a method to
statically verify correctness of actions with respect to the execution of the target program.

7.1. Extension of SMEDL framework for software adaptation
The architecture of the extended framework is illustrated in Figure 25. In the setting of online monitoring, program behaviors are extracted as events and delivered to monitors. For software adaptation, event delivery is bi-directional: events raised from monitors are transformed into executable
adaptation actions, which are inserted at specified program points during runtime. In Section 2.3.3,
we have briefly introduced several formalisms for runtime enforcement, which have different capabilities to transform input event streams. Among those formalisms, edit automata [96] has been
successfully applied to enforce properties in Java [24] and Android applications [117]. Moreover,
composition of multiple EMs has been studied. However, there is little work on analyzing interference between the adaptation actions and the target program. In this section, we encode edit automata
using SMEDL. Furthermore, we present an initial work on it by defining an operational semantics to
describe how the target program behaves after the integration of adaptation actions. We then further
propose a method to generate the implementation of adaptation actions and instrument them into
the target program.
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Figure 25: Architecture of the response framework

7.1.1. Introduction to edit automata
Figure 26 illustrates the automaton of the policy Iterator hasNext, which says that next needs to be
called when hasNext returns true and next cannot be called when the corresponding collection object
has been modified. If a program breaks this policy by calling next without checking accessibility of
the memory cell to be traversed, it may abort abnormally due to undefined behaviors. To enforce
this specification, one can either insert a call to hasNext or suppress the call to next if hasNext has
not been called, which can be described using edit automata.

Figure 26: Policy of the Iterator as a state machine
Figure 27 illustrates two edit automata as the EMs to enforce the policy in Figure 26. When the
iterator is created, each EM is initialized to the ready state. Each transition is decorated with a pair
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of input event e and output event el, denoted e/el , which means that whenever e is received, the
automaton takes the transition and outputs el. The event hasNextTrue and hasNextFalse respectively represent that the call to hasNext returns true and false. The event checkedNext represents
conditional execution of next when hasNext returns true. Figure 27 (a) suppresses every call to next
in the ready state while Figure 27 (b) inserts a call to hasNext and executes next when it returns true.
Moreover, both EMs suppress all next calls after the corresponding collection has been modified.

Figure 27: Two enforcement specification for the policy in Figure 26
Definition 44 (Edit automaton) An edit automaton is a tuple (A, Q, q0 , δ) where A is an action set;
Q is a set of states; q0 is an initial state; δ is a partial function Q × A + Q × A∗ that transforms
an input action into a list of actions to emit and updates the state:
• (q, a) → (q 0 , a) (nop)
• (q, a) → (q 0 , ·) (suppression)
• (q, a) → (q 0 , σ; a) (insertion)
• (q, a) → (q 0 , a 0 ) (replacement)
7.1.2. Encoding of edit automata
Edit automata can be encoded in a SMEDL monitor M monitor by defining a partial function
adapation mapping : M .E + AdapationActions that maps events to a set of adaptation
Actions where
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adaptationAction := insert(action block )|suppress(n)|replace(n, action block )
The types of adaptationAction correspond to the actions of edit automata. action block contains
a list of statements of general programming languages. The parameter n in suppress resp. replace
indicates that the next n statements will be skipped resp. replaced with the code specified in the
action block.
Operational semantics of adaptation actions. Since adaptation actions may change the state of
the target program, we need to formally describe their behavior in the target program. First, we
define an action-step to be applied after the macro-step is taken to obtain the actions to be executed:
e

conf * conf 0
∀re 0 ∈ EXconf , re 0 .event ∈
/ dom(adaptation mapping)
(1)
conf ,→e (conf 0 , ·)
e

conf * conf 0
re ∈ EXconf 0 ∧ adaptation mapping(re.event) = action
∀re 0 ∈ EXconf ∧ re 0 6= re, re 0 .event 6= re.event ∧ re 0 .event ∈
/ dom(adaptation mapping)
(2)
0

conf ,→e (conf , action)
Rule (1) states the case in which there is no raised event that can map to an adaptation action.
Rule (2) restricts that there must only exist one event that can trigger an adaptation action. It is
straightforward to extend the rules of synchronous set to maintain this restriction. Combination of
multiple adaptation actions is left as future work.
To describe how generated actions influence the execution of the target program, we define a set of
semantic rules for the target program with respect to the monitor execution. Here are some assumptions on the setting: 1) the monitor has been synchronously instrumented to the target program;
2) the monitor execution is abstracted by calling call monitor and the process of extracting the
event e has been omitted; 3) instrumentation of adaptation actions will not cause compilation errors.
For simplicity, our work does not support abort and goto and the monitor is not called in the
adaptation actions.
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We overload the operator ⇓ to represent the evaluation rule. The program state is an tuple (δ, conf )
where δ is the store of the program state while conf is the monitor configuration. The evaluation relation hC , δ, conf i ⇓ (δ 0 , conf 0 ) says that starting in configuration (δ, conf ), the program is
evaluated to (δ 0 , conf 0 ) after executing the program statement C.
Since the program state and monitor state are disjoint, the monitor execution will not interfere with
the target program if no adaptation actions are generated, as shown in the rule nop. The rule insertion
states that τ , the code block of the adaptation action block generated by the monitor execution, will
be executed at the instrumentation point. The rule suppression states that the next n statements after
the instrumentation points will be skipped. The rule replacement suppresses the next n statements
and then execute τ .
conf ,→e (conf 0 , ·)
(nop)
0

hcall monitor (e), δ, conf i ⇓ (δ, conf )
conf ,→e (conf 0 , insert(τ ))
hτ, δ, conf 0 i ⇓ (δ 0 , conf 0 )
(insertion)
0

0

hcall monitor (e), δ, conf i ⇓ (δ , conf )
conf ,→e (conf 0 , suppress(n))
(suppression)
hcall monitor (e); stmt1 ; ...; stmtn , δ, conf i ⇓ (δ, conf 0 )
conf ,→e (conf 0 , replace(n, τ ))
hτ, δ, conf 0 i ⇓ (δ 0 , conf 0 )
(replacement)
hcall monitor (e); stmt1 ; ...; stmtn , δ, conf i ⇓ (δ 0 , conf 0 )
7.1.3. Code generation of adaptation actions
In our current setting, adaptation actions are always executed at instrumentation points where the
monitor API is called and the code to be suppressed or replaced is statically determined. This section
presents a procedure that generates the adaptation code that are instrumented into the target system.
Note that the code to be constructed is C-like pseudo code, which can be easily transformed into
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executed code.
Given an imported event, there may be multiple possibilities of which action block will be executed
and the restriction in the semantics guarantees that at most one event that maps to adaptation actions
is raised. Algorithm 3 computes a code template for each imported event. For the input parameters,
mon is a monitor specification; action map is an adaptation mapping; call monitors is a map
from imported events to corresponding monitor APIs. The algorithm traverses all imported events
defined in mon (line 3). The procedure computeDependency (line 6) computes a set of exported
events that may be raised by transitions triggered directly or indirectly by e. The corresponding
action block can be obtained from action map (line 8). The variable max is used to store the
largest code block that may be suppressed or replaced (line 9-10). Action blocks are added to
action lst (line 11). The implementation of call monitor e, the monitor API for e, is updated
to add return value (line 13). As presented below, the return value decides which action block to
execute. The procedure buildReturnVal constructs the code to generate the return value, which
is the index of the corresponding action in action lst that the exported event maps to. For each
imported event e, the code template is constructed (line 14).
Algorithm 3 Construction of template for adaptation actions
1: procedure CONSTRUCT T EMPLATE(mon, action map, call monitors)
2:
switch map ← ∅
3:
for e ∈ mon.ImportedEvents do
4:
max ← 0
5:
action lst ← ∅
6:
exported evset ← computeDependency(mon, e)
7:
for ev ∈ exported evset do
8:
action ← action map(ev )
9:
if (action = suppress(n)||action = replace(n, )) && max < n then
10:
max ← n
11:
action lst ← action lst.append (action)
12:
call monitor e ← call monitors(e)
13:
call monitor e ← call monitor e.code.append (buildReturnVal (action lst))
14:
codeTemplate ← hcall monitor e, max , action lsti
15:
switch map ← switch map ∪ [e 7→ codeTemplate]
16:

return switch map

After computing the code template for each imported event, Algorithm 4 generates the code for
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each instrumentation point in the program. Note that instrumentation of the monitor API is omitted.
For the input parameters, prog is the target program to be instrumented; switch map is the code
template generated by Algorithm 3; and instru map is the map from the instrumentation point
(represented as a line number in the program) to the corresponding imported event extracted at it.
The algorithm proceeds by traversing all instrumentation points (line 2). At line 4, the code block
(denoted as code) to be replaced by the code block switch is obtained. c.subList(n1 , n2 ) returns
a list of statements of c from line n1 (included) to n2 (excluded). As its name indicated, switch is
a code block in the form of a switch structure. The guard condition of switch is the return value
of call monitor e (line 5), which is decided by the event raised by the monitor. Then, for each
action that may be triggered by e, a corresponding case is constructed (line 7-15). For insertion
(line 9), the action τ is inserted before code. For suppression, the first n statements of code are
removed (line 11). For replacement, the first n statements of code are replaced by τ (line 13).
Note that n is smaller or equal to max . The condition for each case is the index value (idx ) in the
action lst of the template, which is consistent with the return value of the monitor API constructed
in Algorithm 3. After switch is constructed, it replaces code in prog (line 16). Note that the position
is p + 1 because the monitor API would be instrumented at p.
Algorithm 4 Instrumentation of the adaptation implementation into the target program
1: procedure INSTRUMENTACTIONS(prog, switch map, instru map)
2:
for (p, e) ∈ instru map do
3:
codeTemplate ← switch map(e)
4:
code ← prog.subList(p, p + codeTemplate.max )
5:
switch.guard ← codeTemplate.call monitor e
6:
idx ← 0
7:
for action ∈ codeTemplate.action lst do
8:
if action = insert(τ ) then
9:
new code ← τ.append (code)
10:
else if action = suppress(n) then
11:
new code ← prog.subList(p + n, p + codeTemplate.max )
12:
else if action = replace(n, τ ) then
13:
new code ← τ.append (prog.subList(p + n, p + codeTemplate.max ))
14:
switch.cases ← switch.cases.append (idx , new code)
15:
idx ← idx + 1
16:
prog.remove(p, code).insert(p + 1 , switch)
return prog
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Figure 28: SMEDL specification for the edit automata in Figure 27 (b)
object enforceIterator;
events:
imported next();
imported hasNextTrue();
imported hasNextFalse();
imported modify();
exported suppress();
exported checkedNext();
scenarios:
main:
ready -> next() {raise checkedNext();} -> ready;
ready -> hasNextTrue() -> next;
next -> next() -> ready;
next -> modify() -> modified;
ready -> modify() -> modified;
modified -> next() {raised suppress();} -> modified;

Figure 29: adaptation mapping for iterator-enforcer
suppress => suppress(1);
checkedNext => replace(1, checkNextBlock);
checkNextBlock{
if(hasNext(&i)){
value = next(&i);
}
}

We use the iterator policy in Figure 26 to illustrate how to specify an adaptation specification and
generate the code to be inserted in the target program. Figure 28 is the SMEDL specification for
the edit automata in Figure 27 (b) (denoted as iterator-enforcer). The exported event checkedNext
and suppress correspond to the adaptation action triggered at the state modified and next. The
adaptation mapping and the action block are shown in Figure 29.

Figure 30 is a code block that uses the iterator API. By analyzing iterator-enforcer, we know that
there are two adaptation actions that may be triggered by the API next. As stated above, return value
of the monitor call decides which action to execute. The monitor API, call monitor next, may
return two values, 0 and 1, corresponding to suppress and checkedNext in iterator-enforcer. The
code is instrumented into the program as shown in Figure 31. Note that although checkNextBlock is
not parameterized with the iterator, it can be achieved by connecting the parameter of the monitor
to the parameter in the action block. We will leave it as future work.
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Figure 31: Instrumentation of the adaptation
action
...
int value = 0;
while(k < n){
int ret = call_monitor_next(&i);
switch(ret){
case 0: break;
case 1:
if(hasNext(&i)){
value = next(&i);
}
break;
}
if (value == v) {
idx = i.iterator_pointer-1;
}
k++;
}

Figure 30: Original code block
...
int value = 0;
while(k < n){
value = next(&i);
if(value == v) {
idx = i.iterator_pointer-1;
}
k++;

As mentioned in Section 2.3.3, correctness is an important issue for runtime adaptation. At the specification level, soundness and transparency are two principles [96], which has been well-studied [96,
52, 27, 83, 26]. At the level of implementation, existing works have used type-theory [69], theorem
proving [4] and model checking [129] to guarantee that the implementation of monitor code follows
the semantics of the specification. In Chapter 3, we have also proposed a correct-by-construction
code generation of monitor code from Coq. However, there is little work, to the best of our knowledge, on analyzing how a poor implementation of an action or ill-formed instrumentation may
interfere with the application. The next section presents an approach to solve this problem.

7.2. Verification of adaptation actions
To further motivate this problem, we consider a use case of an application that uses a library API.
Figure 32 illustrates assume-guarantee reasoning to verify correctness of an application that uses an
external library through a well-defined API. Such a correctness proof contains two parts. The first
part, performed on the application itself, proves functional correctness of the application with respect to given API specifications. The second part, performed on the library, is to prove correctness
of API specifications. Modular verification [78] can usually tie these two parts together if the pre-
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condition of the API can be easily checked at each call site. However, for many APIs, correctness of
the specification depends on whether the application adheres to a behavioral policy over sequences
of API calls, e.g. in the form of an automaton such as the one shown in Figure 26 that illustrates the
policy of using iterator.

Figure 32: Overview of the assume-guarantee framework and our approach to assurance
Instead of statically proving compliance of the policy, which requires sophisticated interactions
between the application and the library, users can use runtime enforcement to enforce the policy. In
this way, they only need to focus on proving correctness of the application and the synthesis and
integration of EMs can be fully automated. However, a poorly implemented action may interfere
with the application and do harm, e.g. infinite loop due to ill-formed instrumentation.
To analyze the influence of actions, we define correctness of enforcement actions with respect to
the specification of the original application, which means that, given the application code instrumented with the actions, we can still construct the proof for the same specification. We assume that
functional correctness of the program is described as pre- and post-conditions and proved by generating verification conditions using weakest precondition calculus. These verification conditions
(also denoted as proof obligations) are discharged by theorem provers or proof assistants. When
analyzing correctness of the enforcement action, a straightforward way is to reconstruct the proof
obligation globally using a theorem prover. However, this method cannot be easily scaled up to
multiple instrumentation points because it assumes that any enforcement action may influence the
program globally. Each time a new instrumentation point is added to the program, proof must be
reconstructed globally. We consider a way of incrementally updating the proof of the original application to take into account effects of instrumentation, reusing most of proof obligations in the
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original proof. Proof at each instrumentation point can then be constructed independently without
influencing other parts of the program. We introduce a method for such an incremental update of
the proof and specify restrictions that make such an update possible.
Motivating example. We use a variant of the find algorithm in the C++ Standard Library [127]
which implements sequential search for an array. Instead of searching through the array directly,
the iterator is used, as shown in Figure 33. The behavioral specification language ACSL (ANSI/ISO
C Specification Language) [20] is used to describe the property of the program. The program uses
the iterator i1 to traverse the target array and checks whether the value v is in that array. A flag
array is traversed by i2. When the value of the cell in the flag array (denoted as b in the program)
is not zero, the corresponding cell in the target array can be accessed. The parameter n is the upper
bound of the number of elements to be searched. The loop invariant states that if idx is not -1, the
corresponding cell in the array is equal to v. The loop also has a variant specifying the decrement
of an integer expression at each loop execution to guarantee termination. The specification of next
(which is given in Section 7.2.6) guarantees that the call to next always returns the next value in the
array given that the iterator has not reached the last element. Figure 34 and Figure 35 respectively
implement the adaptation actions in Figure 27 (a) and (b). To save space, only the first call to
next is enforced. We adopt the pattern proposed in Chapter 7.1.3 but instead of using the switch
structure, we use the ITE (if-then-else) structure. If the return value is 1, enforcement actions will
be executed; otherwise, the program code is executed as before. The suppression implementation in
Figure 34 mistakenly includes the increment of i in the else branch, which breaks the loop variant
and makes the program unable to terminate. Figure 35 gives a correct implementation.
Our method aims at detecting interference of adaptation implementations. It is worth noting that
there may be no universally correct implementation, and if the program was implemented differently, a different implementation may be correct. We assume that adaptation implementations to be
verified have been instrumented to the target program at a specified program point.
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Figure 33: Original code of find
int find(iterator i1,
iterator i2, int n, int v)
{
int i = 0;
int idx = -1;
/*@
loop invariant idx != -1
==>i1.iterator_c.array[idx]==v;
loop variant n-i;
/
*
while(i < n){
L1:
int b = next(&i2);
if(b){
L2:
int value = next(&i1);
if (value == v) {
idx = i1.iterator_pointer-1;
}
}
i++;
}
return idx;
}

Figure 34: Suppression
int find(iterator i1,
iterator i2, int n, int v)
{
int i = 0;
int idx = -1;
/*@
loop invariant idx != -1
==>i1.iterator_c.array[idx]==v;
loop variant n-i;
/
*
while(i < n){
L1:
int b = 0;
if(call_monitor_next(&i2)){
//suppression
}else{
b = next(&i2);
if(b){
L2:
int value = next(&i1);
if (value == v) {
idx = i1.
iterator_pointer-1;
}
}
i++;
}
}
return idx;
}
%\end{figure}

Figure 35: Insertion
int find(iterator i1,
iterator i2, int n, int v)
{
int i = 0;
int idx = -1;
/*@
loop invariant idx != -1
==>i1.iterator_c.array[idx]==v;
loop variant n-i;
/
*
while(i < n){
L1:
int b = 0;
if(call_monitor_next(&i2)){
if(hasNext(i2))
b = next(&i2);
else
b = 0;
}else{
b = next(&i2);
}
if(b){
L2:
int value = next(&i1);
if (value == v) {
idx = i1.
iterator_pointer-1;
}
}
i++;
}
return idx;
}

7.2.1. Target program and annotation language
We consider the program being verified and enforced to be a function written in a subset of C language. The program starts with a set of variable definitions with initialization. Variables can be
either primary or struct variables. Statements include simple assignments, ITE, while-loop and
return. goto, break or continue are not supported. There is only one exit point for the program. The right-hand-side (rhs) of the assignment can be normal arithmetic or logical expressions
or a function call. All terms in the expression are either literal values or variables. Enforcement actions are implemented either as program instructions to be inserted or control structure to suppress
execution of existing instructions in the application. To avoid complexity when applying the weakest precondition calculus, actions must not free existing heap space or change the value of existing
pointer variables. Furthermore, auxiliary variables defined for the enforcement actions must only
be accessed locally.

We use a subset of ACSL to annotate the target program and specify properties. The grammar is
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given below. Annotations can be added as function contracts, assertions or loop invariants. The
function contract is decorated as a set of pre- and post-conditions. Assertions are inserted before
any C statement or at the end of blocks. Loop invariants are added at the head of the while loop.
Each loop can also have a loop variant with an integer term that must be decreased in each loop
execution. The assigns clause specifies memory locations that can be modified by the function.
hfunction-contracti ::= hrequires-clausei* hsimple-clausei*
hrequires-clausei ::= ‘requires’ hpredicatei ‘;’
hsimple-clausei ::= hassigns-clausei | hensures-clausei
hassigns-clausei ::= ‘assigns’ hlocationsi ‘;’
hensures-clausei ::= ‘ensures’ hpredicatei ‘;’
hlocationsi ::= hlocationi (, hlocationi)* | \nothing
hassertioni ::= ‘assert’ hpredicatei ‘;’
hloop-annoti ::= hloop-invarianti* hloop − varianti?
hloop-invarianti ::= ‘loop invariant’ hpredicatei ;
hloop-varianti ::= ‘loop variant’ htermi;

7.2.2. Weakest precondition calculus in Frama-C
We use Hoare logic [77] and the weakest precondition (WP) calculus to construct the proof. The
implementation of the WP calculus in Frama-C is presented to fluently transition to the subsequent
section for the methodology. We implement the verification method in the Frama-C (FRAmework
for Modular Analysis of C code) tool developed by the CEA LIST and Inria. The WP plugin of
Frama-C performs the weakest precondition calculus to transform properties into a set of first-order
logic formula as proof obligations, which can then be discharged either using SMT solvers such as
Alt-ergo [43], Z3 [45] or interactive proof assistants such as Coq [25].
Although the method we are proposing is based on general Hoare logic, some technical details in
the design of the algorithm are specific to the implementation of WP calculus in Frama-C. The
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WP plugin computes the verification condition by traversing the control flow graph (CFG) of the
program and applying the WP calculus from the post condition of the program. A CFG of a function
is a 4-tuple hG, E, S, T i where G is a set of nodes representing program elements; E is a set of
edges representing the transfer of control; S is the start node and T is the end node. Multiple types
of nodes are defined according to the corresponding program elements. Annotations are attached to
edges. For each function, the WP plugin traverses the CFG backwardly from the end node to the
start node and applies the WP rules to generate verification conditions for each node and edge. The
verification condition at each node (edge) is computed by first obtaining the verification condition
from its adjacent edges (node) and updating it with the information at the current node or edge.
During traversal, each assignment is transformed into an SSA (single static assignment) before
applying the WP rule. Therefore, predicates in the verification condition use variable instances.
A variable instance takes the form var idx where var is a variable and idx is its integer index.
Whenever a variable is updated in an assignment, a new variable instance is created by incrementing
the index. Multiple variable instances and the SSA transformation introduce technical challenges to
our approach, which will be addressed in Section 7.2.5.
The verification condition is defined as a tuple hΣ , VCS i where Σ maps variables to variable instances to obtain the next variable instance when transforming into SSA. Moreover, at each program
point, each variable instance in Σ also represents the state of that variable. We will use σ to refer an
instance of Σ. VCS is a set of sub-obligations. The post condition of a function contract, assertions,
the precondition of function calls and loop invariants are added as sub-obligations during traversal
of the CFG. When applying the WP rules, replacement of variables and update of logic formula are
performed by adding hypotheses to the post condition. Thus, each sub-obligation is represented as
a tuple hhyps, goali where hyps and goal are respectively the hypothesis and the proof goal.
7.2.3. Formal description of our approach
We study the program that uses API calls and its correctness has been proved in the Hoare proof
system given that the API specification is validated. Enforcement actions are instrumented in the
program to guarantee satisfaction of the API policy. We then need to prove that the instrumented
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enforcement actions do not break the proof of the original program. The core idea is that if the
instrumented enforcement actions influence the program only locally, the original proof is still valid
when the implication relation between the verification condition of the original and modified program at the instrumentation point can be proved.
For notation, the original program is denoted as F and the instrumented program is denoted as F 0 .
Enforcement actions are instrumented at the program point s. We assume the enforcement action
to be instrumented is insertion of a series of actions acts at s. For suppression or replacement
of instructions, the only difference is how to obtain the verification condition for F and F 0 . The
correctness property of the program is specified by a pre-condition (denoted as pre) and a postcondition (denoted as post).
We assume that the correctness criteria of F , which is defined as the proof obligation pre =⇒ WP (
F , post), has been proved. For F 0 , instead of generating the proof obligation pre =⇒ WP (F 0 ,
post) globally, the method we are taking is to extract the proof obligation VC and VC 0 for F and
F 0 at s. If the proof obligation VC =⇒ VC 0 can be discharged, the instrumented actions do not
break the correctness of the program which has been justified by the original proof. To prove this
statement, the following lemma is defined.
Lemma 45 Given a block statement S and two verification conditions VC and VC’ such that VC
=⇒ VC 0 , then WP (S , VC ) =⇒ WP (S , VC 0 ).
Proof (sketch): trivially by structural induction on S



Theorem 46 Assume programs F and F’, F’ is F with actions added at some point s and that
pre =⇒ WP (F , post). If there exist some verification conditions VC, VC’ at point s in F and F’
(respectively) such that VC =⇒ VC 0 , then pre =⇒ WP (F 0 , post).
Proof (sketch): assume pre =⇒ WP (F , post). Proof proceeds by structural induction on F at s.
We present three representative cases; the others follow directly.
Case 1 (Block Statement): the instrumentation point s is located between block statements S1 and
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S2 , such that pre =⇒ WP (F , post) is equal to pre =⇒ WP (S1 , WP (S2 , post)). We take VC
to be WP (S2 , post) so pre =⇒ WP (F , post) is equal to pre =⇒ WP (S1 , VC ). Next, note
that F 0 is S1 ; acts; S2 , and so pre =⇒ WP (F 0 , post) is equal to pre =⇒ WP (S1 , WP (acts,
WP (S2 , post))). We take VC 0 to be WP (acts, WP (S2 , post)). Then, if VC =⇒ VC 0 , by
Lemma 45, WP (S1 , VC ) =⇒ WP (S1 , VC 0 ), and thus we can conclude pre =⇒ WP (S1 ,
VC 0 ), which is precisely pre =⇒ WP (F 0 , post).
Case 2 (ITE Statement): assume F takes the form S1 ; If (b) {S2 ; S3 } else {S4 ; S5 };. WP (F ,
post) can be transformed into WP (S1 , b =⇒ (WP (S2 ; S3 , post)) ∧ ¬b =⇒ (WP (S4 ; S5 ,
post)). Suppose for F 0 , enforcement actions acts are inserted between S2 and S3 . WP (F 0 , post)
can be transformed into WP (S1 , b =⇒ (WP (S2 ; acts; S3 , post)) ∧ ¬b =⇒ (WP (S4 ; S5 ,
post)). We take VC and VC 0 to be WP (S3 , post) and WP (acts, WP (S3 , post)). If VC =⇒
VC 0 , WP (S2 , WP (S3 , post)) =⇒ WP (S2 , WP (acts; S3 , post)) holds because of Lemma 45,
which means WP (F , post) =⇒ WP (F 0 , post) holds. Since pre =⇒ WP (F , post), pre =⇒
WP (F 0 ,
post).
Case 3 (Loop Statement): the instrumentation is performed in the while loop. Assume F takes the
form S1 ; while(b){S2 ; S3 } and s is located between S2 and S3 . Similar to the previous case, we
need to prove that WP (while(b){S2 ; S3 }, post) =⇒ WP (while(b){S2 ; acts; S3 }, post). According to the rule for the while loop, we only need to consider the case of invariant preservation,


which can be reduced to case 2.

Theorem 46 proves correctness of using local implication at one single instrumentation point. Since
the construction of implication uses only the local information, the method is insensitive to the
number of instrumentation points, as justified by Lemma 47 and Theorem 48.
Lemma 47 Assume program blocks C and C’, where C’ is C with actions added at n program
points, s1 , s2 , ..., sn . If there exist some verification conditions VC1 , VC10 , ..., VCn , VCn0 respectively at point s1 , s2 , ..., sn in C and C’ such that VCk =⇒ VCk0 for all k from 1 to n, then
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WP (C , post) =⇒ WP (C 0 , post) where post is the post condition of C.
Proof (sketch): Without loss of generality, the program block C takes the form C1 ; S1 ; S2 ; C2
where C1 , S1 , S2 , C2 are block statements. Denote post as the post condition of C. After insertion
of actions, we obtain C 0 as C1 0 ; act1 ; S1 ; S2 ; act2 ; C2 0 where act1 and act2 are enforcement actions and C1 0 and C2 0 are also modified from C1 and C2 by instrumenting enforcement actions. S1
and S2 are not inserted with any actions. Proof proceeds by induction on the size of the code block
such that the lemma holds for all sub blocks of C with existing program points. As a result, we have
WP (C , post) =⇒ WP (C 0 , post). The goal is to prove that after insertion of act between S1 and
S2 , WP (C , post) =⇒ WP (C 00 , post) where C 00 ≡ C1 0 ; act1 ; S1 ; act; S2 ; act2 ; C2 0 . Based
on the hypothesis and Lemma 45, WP (act; S2 ; C2 , post) =⇒ WP (act; S2 ; act2 ; C2 0 , post).
Based on the precondition on the local implication, WP (S2 ; C2 , post) =⇒ WP (act; S2 ; C2 ,
post). As a result, WP (S2 ; C2 , post) =⇒ WP (act; S2 ; act2 ; C2 0 , post). By applying the same
strategy, we can prove that WP (S1 ; S2 ; C2 , post) =⇒ WP (act1 ; S1 ; act; S2 ; act2 ; C2 0 , post).
Due to Lemma 45, WP (C1 0 ; S1 ; S2 ; C2 , post) =⇒ WP (C1 0 ; act1 ; S1 ; act; S2 ; act2 ; C2 0 , post
). Moreover, WP (C1 , WP (S1 ; S2 ; C2 , post)) =⇒ WP (C1 0 , WP (S1 ; S2 ; C2 , post)) because
of the inductive hypothesis. As result, WP (C , post) =⇒ WP (C 00 , post).



Theorem 48 Assume programs F and F’, F’ is F with actions added at n program points s1 , ..., sn
and that pre =⇒ WP (F , post). If there exist some verification conditions VC1 , VC10 , ..., VCn ,
VCn0 respectively at point s1 , s2 , ..., sn in F and F’ such that VCk =⇒ VCk0 for all k from 1 to n,
then pre =⇒ WP (F 0 , post).
Proof: From Lemma 47, WP (F , post) =⇒ WP (F 0 , post). Since pre =⇒ WP (F , post), pre
=⇒ WP (F 0 , post).

.

We present a method to construct the local implication for each instrumentation point below. With
Theorem 48, correctness of the program is preserved as long as each obligation can be discharged.
To encode the method into Frama-C, several technical challenges need to be overcome. Section 7.2.4 presents the overall process for generating the proof obligations. Section 7.2.5 points
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out the name clashing problem and presents a method to unify names through data dependency
graph.
7.2.4. Construction of the proof obligation
This section presents construction of the proof obligation. We assume the proof obligation of the
original program has been constructed and discharged. Algorithm 5 is defined below. VC is a map
from the program point to the verification condition of the original program at that point. type is the
type of the enforcement action, which can be either suppression, insertion or replacement. If the
action type is suppression, the code block from s to s0 is removed where s0 is the point after s in the
program order; if the action type is insertion, the code block act is inserted at s; if the action type is
replacement, the code block from s to s0 is replaced by act. G is the CFG of the original program,
which will be used to unify names as presented below.
First, the proof obligation at the point s in the original program is obtained by accessing the map
VC . The overall obligation structure is represented as a tuple of σ and a set of sub-obligations
denoted as vcs. Recall that σ is the map from variables to variable instances. Based on σ, we can
obtain the CFG at s in the original program from G, denoted as subG. Then, the proof obligation
for the modified program (denoted as (σ 0 , vcs 0 )) and the corresponding CFG (denoted as subG 0 )
are obtained based on the type of action. If the action type is suppression, (σ 0 , vcs 0 ) and subG 0
are simply the verification condition and CFG at s0 . If act is inserted at s, (σ 0 , vcs 0 ) is computed
using the WP calculus while subG 0 at s can then be computed by taking into consideration act. The
definitions of updateCFG and graphAt are omitted. The logic for replacement is similar except
that the proof obligation is computed from s0 instead of s. After obtaining the verification condition
and CFG for the original and modified program, names of the variable instances are unified by the
process presented below. Both vcs update (for the original program) and vcs update 0 (for the
modified program) comply with Sigma.
Each sub-obligation of the original program is converted into a predicate by conjunction over its
hypotheses and goal using the function conj . The local implication is constructed by adding this
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predicate as a hypothesis in sub-obligations of the modified program. Note that the dot operator
represents the list concatenation. The generated proof obligation can then be discharged. Note that
more sophisticated analysis can be done to decide whether a verification condition in vcs update
may be helpful in proving the sub-obligation in vcs update 0 , which is out of the scope of this
thesis. We also assume that preconditions of API calls are not added as sub-obligations because
they are supposed to be enforced by the EM.
Algorithm 5 Construction of proof obligation
1: procedure CONSTRUCT VC(F , s, s 0 , type, act, VC , G)
2:
(σ, vcs) ← VC [s]
3:
subG ← graphAt(σ, G)
4:
if type == insertion then
5:
(σ 0 , vcs 0 ) ← WP (act, σ, vcs)
6:
subG 0 ← updateCFG(act, subG)
7:
else
8:
if type == suppression then
9:
(σ 0 , vcs 0 ) ← VC [s 0 ]
10:
subG 0 ← graphAt(σ 0 , G)
11:
else
12:
if type == replacement then
13:
(σ 00 , vcs 00 ) ← VC [s 0 ]
14:
subG 00 ← graphAt(σ 00 , G)
15:
(σ 0 , vcs 0 ) ← WP (act, σ 00 , vcs 00 )
16:
subG 0 ← updateCFG(act, subG 00 )
17:
(Sigma, vcs update, vcs update 0 ) ← nameUnify(σ, vcs, σ 0 , vcs 0 , subG, subG 0 )
18:
for vc ∈ vcs update do
19:
hypo ← conj (vc.hyps.[vc.goal ])
20:
for vc2 ∈ vcs update 0 do
21:
vc2 .hyps ← vc2 .hyps.hypo
return (Sigma, vcs update 0 )

7.2.5. Name unifying process
Verification conditions from the original and the instrumented program are generated in different
contexts. Restrictions on the implementation of enforcement actions guarantee that the stack and
heap space are compatible between two versions of the program. However, the meaning of variable
instances is not consistent. Two code snippets (denoted as P and P 0 ) are given in Figure 36 and
Figure 37 to illustrate this problem. P 0 has an extra assignment to the variable sum at the label L
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comparing to P . If we compute the verification condition for these two programs from the assertion
(denoted as VC and VC 0 ), two verification conditions will have different variable instances for the
variable sum, as shown in Figure 38. However, when we combine VC and VC 0 together, the state of
sum at L must be identical. As a result, we need to rename sum 1 and sum 2 into a common name.
After renaming the independent variable instances, others are renamed subsequently following the
data dependency. Generalizing this idea, we propose a name unifying process. The core idea is to
generate a common set of variable instances that are independent from other variables and variable
instances appearing in the obligations at the instrumentation point. All dependent variable instances
can then be renamed by simply increasing the index according to the order of data dependency
relations. We begin from the definition of data dependency graph over variable instances.
The dependency graph for the program to the instrumentation point s is constructed by analyzing
each SSA when traversing the CFG from the post condition of the function to s. The left-hand-side
(lhs) of the SSA depends on all variable instances appearing at the rhs of the SSA. We also need to
consider the dependency relation specified in the auxiliary predicates generated for the function call
and the ITE structure. For the function call x = f (args), x depends on the return value of function
call. The post condition in the function contract may also define dependency relation between the
return value and actual parameters. For the ITE structure, equality predicates are generated to
specify the identical program state at the beginning of two branches. These predicates are also
used to create the dependency graph. The dependency graph is guaranteed to be acyclic due to the
properties of SSA construction. Figure 39 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the dependency graph
for P and P 0 .
To unify the name, we first find independent variable instances from two graphs and then rename
them into a fresh name. Following this rule, sum 1 and sum 2 for variable sum in Figure 39 (a)
and (b) are renamed into sum 3. Then, other variable instances can be renamed by traversing two
graphs independently in a breadth-first manner. Variable j does not need to be renamed because its
occurrences in two programs are consistent with respect to indices. The result of VC and VC 0 is
illustrated in Figure 40. Note that we only use primary variables in the example. Although there
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Figure 36: Original program P

Figure 37: P’ with an extra assignment

L:

L:

sum = sum + j*2;
//@ assert even(sum);
return 0;

sum = sum + j*2;
sum = sum + j*2;
//@ assert even(sum);
return 0;

}
}

Figure 38: Proof obligation VC and VC 0 before name unification
VC: (sum_0 = sum_1 + j_0*2) -> (even sum_0)
VC‘: (sum_1 = sum_2 + j_0*2) /\ (sum_0 = sum_1 + j_0*2) ->

(even sum_0)

are no fundamental difficulties to extend the method to fully support aliases and heap structures, we
will leave it as future work.

Figure 39: Dependency graphs for P and P’
7.2.6. Case study
We have implemented the method in Frama-C version 20.0. We use the variant of the find function
illustrated in Figure 33 as the case study to demonstrate the application of our method.
The data structure of Iterator is defined in Figure 41. An iterator contains iterator c, the array it
points to. The field iterator pointer denotes the next available index to access and iterator size
stores the size of the array. The specifications of the iterator API are defined in Figure 42. Defined
as the predicate p next, the specification of next requires that the iterator point is less than the
size of the array to traverse, the return value is equal to the cell referred by the pointer and the
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Figure 40: Proof obligation VC of P at L
VC: (sum_4 = sum_3 + j_0*2) -> (even sum_4)
VC‘: (sum_5 = sum_3 + j_0*2) /\ (sum_6 = sum_5 + j_0*2) ->

(even sum_6)

pointer is increased by 1. Similarly, the specification of hasNext guarantees that the call returns 1
only when the pointer is smaller than the size of the array. The clause assigns is used to restrict
variables that can be modified by the function.
Figure 41: Data structure of iterator
typedef struct {
int iterator_pointer;
int iterator_size;
collection iterator_c;
}Iterator;

To illustrate the application of our technique, we first prove the loop invariant in Figure 33 using
Frama-C and then insert instructions to enforce the precondition of API specification of next at
call sites L1 and L2 . By applying Theorem 48, we can build local implication and verify each
of them independently. We assume the instrumented code block is an ITE structure that calls
call monitor next as shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35. While the if branch contains the
actual enforcement actions to be verified, the code block in the else branch is identical to the
one replaced by this ITE structure. As a result, we will ignore the else branch and generate
verification conditions only for the if branch in the following discussion.
We first focus on L1 at which the value b is computed by calling next. For the enforcement action,
we can either suppress the call to next or insert a call to hasNext. In both cases, the variable b
needs to be assigned with a default value. However, because the proof target says if idx is not
equal to -1, the value in the corresponding cell in the target array must be equal to v, the value of
b actually does not influence the proof. As a result, neither suppression nor insertion will break
the original proof. Nevertheless, if the instrumentation is incorrect, the proof will be broken. For
instance, the instrumentation in Figure 34 mistakenly moves the action of updating the variable
i in the else branch. When we try to prove the increment of i at each pass of the loop, the
constructed local implication would take the form old (i ) + 1 > old (i ) =⇒ i > old (i ) where the
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Figure 42: Predicates for next and hasNext
predicate p_next(iterator *i, iterator *j, integer v) =
v == j->c[j->iterator_pointer]
&& i ->iterator_pointer == j->iterator_pointer + 1;
*/
/*@
predicate p_hasNext(iterator *i, integer v)=
\result==1 ==> i->iterator_pointer < i.iterator_size
&& \result == 0 ==> i ->iterator_pointer >= i.iterator_size;
*/
/*@
requires i -> iterator_pointer < i.iterator_size;
ensures p_next(i, \old(i), \result);
assigns i -> iterator_pointer;
*/
int next(Iterator *i);
/*@
ensures p_hasNext(i, v);
assigns \nothing;
*/
int hasNext(Iterator *i);

pre- and post-condition are respectively the proof obligation at L1 for the original and the modified
program. Since this obligation cannot be discharged, the user could discover that the instrumentation
is problematic.
To demonstrate usability of constructing the local proof, we prove correctness of the implementation of insertions at L2 using Coq. For the call to next at L2 , we insert a call to hasNext as the
condition to check before calling next and subsequent instructions. We denote the proof obligation
at L2 for the original and the modified program as VC and VC 0 , as shown in Figure 43 and 44, represented using the syntax of Coq. Since no instruction will be executed when hasNext returns false
and instructions from L1 to L2 is orthogonal to the loop invariant to be proved, the precondition
generated from the function call hasNext and the verification condition are removed.
Accessing to the field of iterator pointer of iter is represented as the expression iterator pointer
iter . branch e1 e2 e3 returns the value of e2 (e3 ) if e1 is evaluated to true (false). collection arr
ay c represents the array pointed by c in which c is the field iterator c of the iterator type. next 0
and next 2 represent the return value of calling next in two versions of the code block. v 3 and
v 4 indicate that the pointer value may be changed during the call of next. x 0 and x 1 are used
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Figure 43: Verification condition VC of the
original program at L2

Figure 44: Verification condition VC 0 of the
instrumented program at L2

let x_0 := iterator_pointer iter_12 in
(iter_10 = iter_11)
/\ (value_3=next_0)
/\ (x_0=(1+ iterator_pointer iter_11))
/\ (p_next iter_12 iter_11 next_0)
/\ (branch ((value_3=v%Z))
(x_0=(1+idx_7)%Z) (idx_6=idx_7) % Z)
/\ ({|
iterator_c := iterator_c iter_11;
iterator_size :=
iterator_size iter_11;
iterator_pointer := (v_3)%Z
|}=iter_12)
/\ ((idx_7 <> -1)->
((((collection_array (iterator_c
iter_12))))
.[ (idx_7)%Z ] = v)

let x_1 := iterator_pointer iter_14 in
(idx_9 <> -1) -> ((idx_6=idx_8)
/\ (iter_10=iter_13)
/\ (value_4=next_2)
/\ (x_1= (1+ (iterator_pointer
iter_13)))
/\ (p_next iter_14 iter_13 next_2)
/\ ({|
iterator_c := iterator_c iter_13;
iterator_size := iterator_size
iter_13;
iterator_pointer := (v_4)%Z
|}=iter_14)
/\ (branch ((value_4=v%Z))
(x_1=(1+idx_9)%Z)
(idx_8=idx_9) % Z))
-> ((((collection_array (iterator_c
iter_14))))
.[ (idx_9)%Z ] = v)

for succinct representation. Other identifiers taking the form a b represent the instance of variable
a with index b. Variable names have been unified and verification conditions in VC have been refactored as conjunctions as stated in Algorithm 5. Then VC is integrated as the precondition of VC 0 .
To prove VC 0 in Coq using the information give in VC , we need to prove 1) iter 12 is equivalent
to iter 14 with respect to the array they traverse and 2) idx 7 is identical to idx 9. Recall that
the specification of next defined in Figure 42 guarantees that only the field iterator pointer will
be changed, so 1) can be proved. 2) can also be proved trivially be rewriting terms. This is what
we expect because the code at the branch where hasNext returns to true is identical to the original
code. As a result, VC 0 can be proved in Coq by solely unfolding the definition and rewriting terms.
On the other hand, building the proof obligation globally would make the user prove the same target from scratch or revising the existing proof, which requires duplicated work. It would be more
problematic for complicated proof obligations.

7.3. Summary
In this chapter, we have extended the SMEDL framework to support specifying actions to be instrumented into the target program for reflexive adaptation. Exported events raised from the monitor
are mapped to adaptation actions such as insertion of code block and suppression or replacement
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of subsequent statements in the program. The semantic rules that consider the execution of adaptation actions were defined. Implementation and instrumentation of actions were proposed based on
which a framework to verify the implementation of enforcement actions with respect to functional
correctness of the target program was proposed. We presented a method to construct a proof obligation locally. If the generated obligation can be discharged, the enforcement action will not break
the correctness proof of the original program. To connect verification conditions obtained from two
programs, we proposed a name unifying algorithm.
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CHAPTER 8 : Conclusion
In this thesis, we have presented a framework for efficient runtime verification and software adaptation. In this chapter, we summarize the contributions and discuss possible research directions.

8.1. Overview of work
SMEDL framework for runtime verification. In chapter 3, we proposed SMEDL, a formalism for
runtime verification. A SMEDL specification is composed of a set of single monitor specifications
connecting with each other following the specification defined in the architecture description. Single monitors use automata-based formalism for describing properties at multiple abstraction levels
while a dynamically scalable monitor network is used to specify more sophisticated requirements.
We implemented our framework in two ways. To monitor a critical system which treats correctness
over performance, we utilized the Fiat framework to generate correct-by-construction monitor implementations by refinement from the mechanized semantics of single monitors. When efficiency is
more important, C programs are generated as monitors. The evaluation in chapter 5 illustrates that
it outperforms many existing RV tools in both online and offline settings.
Parametric monitoring using SMEDL. Parametric properties are widely used to describe behavior
of large-scale systems. In chapter 4, we proposed a novel perspective of parametric monitoring using
monitor network. By model transformation, we demonstrated that SMEDL can express the trace
slicing algorithm in MOP. We then proposed a method to encode a quantified parameter list of QEA
specifications as aggregation monitors. For a subset of QEA specifications, SMEDL monitors can
generate identical verdicts more efficiently, which was demonstrated in chapter 5.
Monitoring time interval in asynchronous environments. Asynchronous deployment is necessary for monitoring distributed systems. However, under network delay and clock discrepancy,
monitoring properties with time intervals is challenging. In chapter 6, we made initial efforts to
parameterize the model of communication between a system and a monitor, which takes into consideration network delay, clock rate and clock skew. Based on this model, we proposed an interval
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closure event and a method to decide which interval an incoming event belongs to. With this mechanism, users can separate concerns of monitoring intervals from the rest of property checking.
Reflexive adaptation framework. In chapter 7, we proposed an extension of SMEDL for reflexive
software adaptation. Users can specify a map between events raised from a monitor and adaptation actions, including insertion, suppression or replacement of code blocks in the target program.
We further defined the semantic rules to describe possible interference between the instrumented
adaptation actions and the target program. To formally verify correctness of the adaptation implementation with respect to execution of the target program, we proposed a Hoare-logic based method
to construct proof obligation locally, which has been implemented in the Frama-C framework.

8.2. Future directions
Asynchronous monitor network. In this thesis, we do not study behavior of asynchronous monitor
network. Current implementations of asynchronous monitoring rely on underlying communication
middleware, which do not have a formal semantics. Borrowing the idea from actor-based monitoring
system [59] and generating Erlang programs [131] for asynchronous communication could be a
promising direction.
Parallelization of SMEDL. In chapter 5, we have demonstrated time efficiency of SMEDL. However, there is still a lot of room for further optimization and one promising direction is parallelization within a synchronous set, which could be achieved at two levels. At the monitor level, multiple
monitors handle an incoming event sequentially, which conforms to the semantics of trace slicing.
However, two monitors can execute in parallel if they are not related through common parameters.
At the instance level, parallel updates of instances of a monitor may also improve efficiency. It
would be interesting to explore parallelization of SMEDL monitors and study how to guarantee
compliance between the semantics and the implementation.
Overhead-aware deployment of SMEDL monitors. SMEDL supports hybrid deployment of
monitors to achieve balance between overhead and performance. However, current setting requires
users to decide the architecture manually. We have proposed an initial idea [140] to decide de-
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ployment of a hierarchical monitor structure by analyzing the overhead brought by asynchronous
communication and monitoring logic. It would be interesting to explore a general mechanism or
process to achieve optimized deployment of monitors in an automatic or semi-automatic way.
Towards a more realistic method for monitoring time intervals. Our work in monitoring time
intervals has two limitations. First, we can exactly determine when we have seen all the events only
if the network delay is bounded. Second, we assume that we can precisely determine whether a given
event is within the bounds of an interval or outside. In general, neither of these two assumptions
are true. This means that the monitoring procedure needs to be augmented to accommodate the
uncertainty. It would be interesting to explore a more realistic model for analyzing behaviors of
monitors in asynchronous environments. For instance, if the network delay is unbounded, we can
consider more widely used self-similar traffic models [93]. With this approach we can have a
monitoring procedure with probabilistic guarantees of correctness. We will consider a three-valued
semantics for the temporal logic, with the “unknown” value corresponding to an error, which may
happen when we discover an event that belongs to an already-closed interval. Another issue comes
from uncertainty in the system clock rate, which would lead to wrong decision on which interval the
incoming event belongs to. In this case, we can also use a 3-valued semantics, with the third value
representing the uncertainty whether the event occurs before or after the interval closure event. It
remains to be seen whether the two three-valued approaches – the one capturing an error and the one
capturing the ordering uncertainty – can be combined together in an effective checking procedure.
Software adaptation at multiple levels. Software adaptation involves both high-level repair process and low-level reflexive enforcement actions. In our work, we have integrated into SMEDL
low-level enforcement actions. High-level repair may utilize more information such as sophisticated program profiling from multiple executions to synthesize repair solution. These two types
of adaptation could have influence on each other. On one direction, execution of enforcement actions may give hints to the high-level repair. On the other direction, the modified code may require
changes to monitors. It would be interesting to study how to combine them to achieve software
adaptation with good performance.
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Fully mechanized semantics and proofs. In this work, we have proposed the formal semantics of
synchronous aspect of SMEDL and several theorems and lemmas. However, only the semantics of
single monitors and related theorems in Section 3.1 have been encoded in Coq. It would be useful
to mechanize the semantics of the whole SMEDL language and all proofs proposed in the thesis.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Concrete syntax of SMEDL
A.1.1. Syntax of the single monitor specification
The EBNF (Extended Backus-Naur Form) of single monitors is given below. Some common definitions such as types and expressions are omitted. Not mentioned in the thesis, users can import C
header files which provide side-effect-free helper functions. In the definition of a scenario, there is
an optional field to state final states, which have been discussed in Chapter 5. In the definition of
event declaration, the comma is used as the delimiter of multiple event signature.
hstarti ::= hdeclarationi [hhelper listi] [hstate sectioni] hevent sectioni hscenario sectioni
hdeclarationi ::= ‘object’ hidentifieri ‘;’
hhelper listi ::= {hhelper definitioni}*
hhelper definitioni ::= ‘#include’ hhelper filenamei
hstate sectioni ::= ‘state:’ {hstate declarationi}*
hstate declarationi ::= hidentifieri [ ‘=’ hsigned literali ] ‘;’
hevent sectioni ::= ‘events:’ {hevent declarationi}*
hevent declarationi ::= (‘imported’

|

‘internal’

|

‘exported’)

‘,’.{hevent signaturei}+ ’;’
hevent signaturei ::= hidentifieri ‘(’ htype listi ‘)’
hscenario sectioni ::= ‘scenarios:’ {scenario}*
hscenarioi ::= hidentifieri ‘:’ [‘finalstate’ hidentifieri ‘;’] {htransitioni}*
htransitioni ::= hidentifieri ‘->’ hstep definition listi [helse definitioni] ‘;’
hstep definition listi ::= hstep definitioni ‘->’ hstep definition listi
|

hstep definitioni ‘->’ hidentifieri

hstep definitioni ::= hstep event definitioni [‘when’ ‘(’ expression ‘)’] [haction listi]
helse definitioni ::= ‘else’ [haction listi] ‘->’ hidentifieri
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hstep event definitioni ::= identifier ‘(’ hidentifier listi ‘)’ ;
haction listi ::= ‘{’ haction inner listi ‘}’
haction inner listi ::= hactioni ‘;’ haction inner listi | hactioni | ()
hactioni ::= hassignmenti | hraise stmti
hassignmenti ::= hidentifieri ‘=’ hexpressioni
hraise stmti ::= ‘raise’ hidentifieri ‘(’ hexpression listi ‘)’ ;
hexpression listi ::= ‘,’.{hexpressioni}*

A.1.2. Syntax of the architecture description
The architecture description imports files of all single monitor specifications for type checking.
Then, the interface of all monitors are declared. Note that identities of a monitor are defined as a list
of types without names, which means they cannot be used in monitoring logic. In the definition of
event connection specification, wild cards are represented by ‘*’. An identity parameter of a monitor
and an attribute of an event are respectively represented by #.n and $.n where n is the position in
the parameter or attribute list. Synchronous set is specified in syncset decl .
hstarti ::= hdeclarationi ‘;’ {( himport stmti | hmonitor decli | hevent decli | hsyncset decli
| hconnection defni )‘;’}*
hdeclarationi ::= ‘system’ hidentifieri
himport stmti ::= ‘import’ hsmedl filenamei
hmonitor decli ::= ‘monitor’ hidentifieri ‘(’ htype listi ‘)’ [‘as’ hidentifieri]
hevent decli ::= ‘event’ hidentifieri ‘(’ htype listi ‘)’
hsyncset decli ::= ‘syncset’ hidentifieri ‘{’ hidentifier listi ‘}’
hconnection defni ::= [hidentifieri ‘:’] hsource speci ‘=>’ htarget speci
hsource speci ::= [hidentifieri ‘.’] hidentifieri
htarget speci ::= htarget eventi
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htarget eventi ::= hidentifieri [‘[’ hwildcard parameter listi ‘]’] ‘.’ hidentifieri [‘(’
hparameter listi ‘)’]
hwildcard parameter listi ::= ‘,’.{hwildcard parameteri}*
hparameter listi ::= ‘,’.{hparameteri}*
hwildcard parameteri ::= hparameteri | ‘*’
hparameteri ::= ‘#.’ hnaturali | ‘$.’ hnaturali
hnaturali ::= /[0-9]+/

A.2. SMEDL examples
This section lists SMEDL specifications appearing in Chapter 5. Watertank and TrackQuality are
not included. Each specification contains a set of single monitor specifications and an architecture
description when the specification contains multiple monitors. For simplicity, import stmt clause
in the architecture descriptions are omitted.
A.2.1. BasicCar
The policy of a car is modeled as a SMEDL specification Car below. When the policy is violated,
an exported event violation is raised.
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object Car;
events:
imported toggle_lights();
imported toggle_wipers();
imported accelerate();
imported create();
imported destroy();
exported violation();
scenarios:
sce1:
init -> create() -> start;
init -> toggle_lights() {raise violation();} -> init;
init -> toggle_wipers() {raise violation();} -> init;
init -> accelerate() {raise violation();} -> init;
init -> destroy() {raise violation();} -> init;
start -> toggle_lights() -> start;
start -> toggle_wipers() -> start;
start -> accelerate() -> start;
start -> create() {raise violation();} -> start;
start -> destroy() -> done;
done -> create() -> start;
done -> toggle_lights() {raise violation();} -> done;
done -> toggle_wipers() {raise violation();} -> done;
done -> accelerate() {raise violation();} -> done;
done -> destroy() {raise violation();} -> done;

A.2.2. UnsafeFile
The monitor UnsafeFile checks whether file operations are legal. The end event is used to test
whether the file has been closed when the program exits.
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object UnsafeFile;
events:
imported open();
imported close();
imported put();
imported end();
exported violation();
scenarios:
sce1:
init -> open() -> start;
init -> close() {raise violation();} -> init;
init -> put() {raise violation();} -> init;
start -> put() -> start;
start -> close() -> done;
start -> open() {raise violation();} -> start;
done -> put() {raise violation();} -> done;
start -> end() {raise violation();} -> start;

A.2.3. GrantCancel
The monitor GrantCancelResource detects a violation of the GrantCancel property when a resource
is granted multiple times or cancelled by a task not owning it. The monitor keeps track of granting
and canceling of a resource to a task. As a result, the number of instances corresponds to the number
of resources during runtime.
object GrantCancelResource;
state:
int task;
events:
imported grant(int);
imported cancel(int);
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
free -> grant(granted_task) {task = granted_task;} -> granted;
granted -> grant(granted_task) {raise violation();} -> granted;
granted -> cancel(granted_task) when (granted_task == task) -> free
else {raise violation();} -> granted;
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A.2.4. NestedCommand
The specification has two monitors. FirstCommand is created whenever a new command is issued.
A command issued later will be combined with all existing commands by creating an instance
of CommandPair. If an previously issued command succeeds before an later one, a violation is
detected.
object FirstCommand;
events:
imported command(int);
imported success();
exported second_command(int);
scenarios:
export_pairs:
finalstate done;
running -> command(id) {raise second_command(id);} -> running;
running -> success() -> done;

object CommandPair;
events:
imported first_success();
imported second_success();
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
finalstate done;
both_running -> second_success() -> done;
both_running -> first_success() {raise violation();} -> done;
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system NestedCommands;

monitor FirstCommand(int);
monitor CommandPair(int, int);

cmd1: command => FirstCommand[*].command($0);
cmd1: command => FirstCommand($0);
cmd2: FirstCommand.second_command => CommandPair(#0, $0);
succ: succeed => CommandPair[*, $0].second_success();
succ: succeed => CommandPair[$0, *].first_success();
succ: succeed => FirstCommand[$0].success();

A.2.5. ResourceLifeCycle
The monitor Resource raises a violation event if three stages of a resource are not issued in order.
The end event is used to check whether a resource is eventually cancelled when the program exits.
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object Resource;
state:
int task;
events:
imported request();
imported deny();
imported grant();
imported cancel();
imported rescind();
imported end();
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
free -> request() -> requested;
free -> deny() {raise violation();} -> fail;
free -> grant() {raise violation();} -> fail;
free -> rescind() {raise violation();} -> fail;
free -> cancel() {raise violation();} -> fail;
free -> end() -> pass;
requested -> deny() -> free;
requested -> grant() -> granted;
requested -> request() {raise violation();} -> fail;
requested -> rescind() {raise violation();} -> fail;
requested -> cancel() {raise violation();} -> fail;
requested -> end() -> pass;
granted -> cancel() -> free;
granted -> rescind() -> granted;
granted -> request() {raise violation();} -> fail;
granted -> deny() {raise violation();} -> fail;
granted -> grant() {raise violation();} -> fail;
granted -> end() {raise violation();} -> fail;

A.2.6. RespectConflict
To monitor behavior of two conflicting entities (denoted as A and B) with respect to the resource,
we need to use two monitors RespectA and RespectB. Both of them are Respect but with reversed
identities, as shown in the architecture description RespectArch. If a resource has been granted to
either A and B, it cannot be granted to the other one. Moreover, a resource can only be cancelled by
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the entity to which it has been granted to.
object Respect;
state:
int state;
int pre;
int post;
events:
imported conflict(int, int);
imported grant(int);
imported cancel(int);
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> conflict(pr, po) {pre = pr; post = po; state = -1;} -> s1;
s1 -> grant(v) when (state == -1 && v == pre) {state = pre;} -> s1;
s1 -> grant(v) when (state == -1 && v == post) {state = post;} -> s1;
s1 -> grant(v) when (state != -1) {raise violation();} -> s1;
s1 -> cancel(v) when (state != v) {raise violation();} -> s1;
s1 -> cancel(v) when (state == v) {state = -1;} -> s1;

system RespectArch;

monitor RespectA(int, int) as Respect;
monitor RespectB(int, int) as Respect;

con: conflict => RespectA[$0, $1].conflict($0, $1);
con: conflict => RespectB[$1, $0].conflict($1, $0);
gr:

grant => RespectA[$0, *].grant($0);

gr:

grant => RespectB[*, $0].grant($0);

cl:

cancel => RespectA[$0, *].cancel($0);

cl:

cancel => RespectB[*, $0].cancel($0);
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A.2.7. Auction
object Auctionmonitor;
state:
float reserve_price;
float current_price = 0;
float duration;
float days_passed = 0;
events:
imported create_auction(int, int, int);
imported bid(int, int);
imported sold(int);
imported end_of_day();
exported alarm_recreation();
exported alarm_low_bid();
exported alarm_sold_early();
exported alarm_not_sold();
exported alarm_action_after_end();
exported alarm_action_before_start();
scenarios:
main:
init -> create_auction(item, minimum, period) {reserve_price = minimum; duration = period;} -> bidding;
bidding -> bid(item, amount) {current_price = amount;} -> above_reserve;
bidding -> sold(item) {raise alarm_sold_early();} -> error;
bidding -> end_of_day() when (days_passed < duration - 1) {days_passed++;} -> bidding
else -> done;
bidding -> create_auction(item, minimum, period) {raise alarm_recreation();} -> error;
above_reserve -> sold(item) when (current_price < reserve_price ) {raise alarm_low_bid();} -> error
else -> done;
above_reserve -> bid(item, amount) when (amount > current_price) {current_price = amount;} -> above_reserve;
above_reserve -> end_of_day() when (days_passed < duration - 1) {days_passed++;} -> above_reserve
else -> done;
above_reserve -> create_auction(item, minimum, period) {raise alarm_recreation();} -> error;
done -> end_of_day() -> done;
done -> bid(item, amount) {raise alarm_action_after_end();} -> error;
done -> sold(item) {raise alarm_action_after_end();} -> error;
done

-> create_auction(item, minimum, period) {raise alarm_recreation();} -> error;

A.2.8. CandidateSelection
The specification principally follows Figure 8 (b) and Figure 9 with slight modifications such as
removal of mon0 and combination of mvp and aMonc .
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object Mvp;
state:
int canNum = 0;
events:
imported member(string, string);//(voter, party)
imported candidate(string, string);//(candidate, party)
imported countcan();//(voter, party)
imported valid();//(voter, party)
imported end();
internal check();
exported createVCP(string);//(voter, candidate, party)
exported result(int);
exported addP();
scenarios:
sce:
init -> member(v, p) {raise addP();} -> start;
start -> member(v, p) -> start;
start -> candidate(c, p) {raise createVCP(c); canNum = canNum + 1; } -> start;
sce1:
start -> valid() {canNum = canNum - 1;} -> start;
start -> end() {raise check();} -> start;
sce2:
start -> check() when (canNum == 0) {raise result(1); canNum = 0;} -> start;
start -> check() when (canNum > 0) {raise result(0); canNum = 0;} -> start;

object Mvcp;
events:
imported createVCP();//(voter, candidate, party)
imported rank(string, string, int);//(voter, candidate, rank)
exported valid();//(voter, party)
scenarios:
sce:
init -> createVCP() -> start;
start -> rank(v, c, i) {raise valid();} -> end;
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object AMonP;
state:
int pNum = 0;
int res = 0;
events:
imported addP();
imported inRes(int);
internal check();
exported result(int);//
exported addV();
scenarios:
sce:
init -> addP() {pNum = pNum + 1; raise addV(); } -> start;
start -> addP() {pNum = pNum + 1; } -> start;
sce1:
start -> inRes(i) when (pNum > 1) {res = res + i; pNum = pNum - 1; } -> start;
start -> inRes(i) when (pNum == 1) {res = res + i; raise check(); pNum = pNum - 1;
} -> start;
sce2 :
start -> check() when (res > 0) {raise result(1);} -> start;
start -> check() when (res == 0) {raise result(0);} -> start;
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object AMonV;
state:
int vNum = 0;
int vNumTemp = 0;
int res = 0;
events:
imported addV();
imported inRes(int);
exported result(int);
scenarios:
sce:
start -> addV() {vNum ++; } -> start;
sce1:
init -> inRes(i) when (vNum > 1) {res = res + i; vNumTemp = vNum; vNum --; } -> start;
init -> inRes(i) when (vNum == 1) {res = i - vNum; raise result(res); vNum = 0;}
-> start;
start -> inRes(i) when (vNum > 1) {res = res + i; vNum --; } -> start;
start -> inRes(i) when (vNum == 1) { res = res + i - vNumTemp; raise result(res);
vNum = 0;} -> init;

system CanSys;

monitor Mvp(string, string);
monitor Mvcp(string, string, string);
monitor AMonP(string);
monitor AMonV();

ch1: member => Mvp[$1, $0].member($0, $1);
ch2: candidate => Mvp[$1,*].candidate($0,$1);
ch3: end => Mvp[*,*].end;
ch5: Mvcp.valid => Mvp[#2,#1].valid;
ch6: Mvp.createVCP => Mvcp[$0, #1, #0].createVCP;
ch7: rank => Mvcp[$1, $0, *].rank($0, $1, $2);
ch8: Mvp.addP => AMonP[#1].addP;
ch9: Mvp.result => AMonP[#1].inRes($0);
ch10: AMonP.addV => AMonV.addV;
ch11: AMonP.result => AMonV.inRes($0);
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A.2.9. SqlSanitizer
An instance of Sql input is created for an input not derived from any other ones. For a derived
input, an instance of Sql derived is created, which is parameterized by the identity of the original
and the derived input. An input can also be derived from another derived input, which is modeled
by the last transition in Sql derived. The operation of sanitization can be propagated from an input
to its descendants.
object Sql_input;
state:
int is_san = 0;
events:
imported input(int);
imported sanitize();
imported use();
imported derive(int);
exported derivation_out(int);
exported propagate_sanitization();
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> input(s) -> s2;
s2 -> use() when (is_san == 0) {raise violation();} -> s2;
s2 -> sanitize() {is_san = 1; raise propagate_sanitization();} -> s2;
s2 -> derive(t) {raise derivation_out(t);} -> s2;
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object Sql_derived;
state:
int is_san = 0;
events:
imported sanitize();
imported use();
imported derive(int);
imported derivation_in(int, int);
exported derivation_out(int);
exported propagate_sanitization();
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> derivation_in(t, s) -> s2;
s2 -> use() when (is_san == 0) {raise violation();} -> s2;
s2 -> sanitize() {is_san = 1; raise propagate_sanitization();} -> s2;
s2 -> derive(t) {raise derivation_out(t);} -> s2;

system Sql_sanitize;

monitor Sql_input(int);
monitor Sql_derived(int,int);

ch1: input => Sql_input[$0].input($0);
ch2: derive => Sql_input[$0].derive($1);
ch2: derive => Sql_derived[$0, *].derive($1);
ch3: use => Sql_input[$0].use;
ch3: use => Sql_derived[$0, *].use;
ch4: sanitise => Sql_input[$0].sanitize;
ch4: sanitise => Sql_derived[$0, *].sanitize;
ch5: Sql_input.derivation_out => Sql_derived[$0, #0].derivation_in($0, #0);
ch7: Sql_input.propagate_sanitization => Sql_derived[*, #0].sanitize;
ch8: Sql_derived.propagate_sanitization => Sql_derived[*, #0].sanitize;
ch9: Sql_derived.derivation_out => Sql_derived[$0, #0].derivation_in($0, #0);

A.2.10. Banking-1
The MFOTL formula of this property is ALWAYS FORALL c, t, a. trans(c,t,a) AND 2000 < a
IMPLIES EVENTUALLY[0,6) report(t). MonPoly explicitly handles time and all events are attached
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with a timestamp, which makes it efficient to check properties with time intervals. In contrast,
SMEDL monitors do not have an internal clock to count ticks, which will lead to incorrect result or
delay in outputting verdicts. To handle this issue, we insert a tick event between two consecutive
events with increased timestamp. Whenever TransactionReport receives a tick event, it will check
the time difference between the current timestamp and the timestamp of the last transaction (stored
in the state variable t0).
object TransactionReport;
state:
int t0;
events:
imported trans(int, int, int, int);
imported report(int, int);
imported tick(int);
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> trans(ts, c, t, a) when (a > 2000) {t0 = ts;} -> s2;
s1 -> report(ts, t) -> s1;
s2 -> report(ts, t) when (ts - t0 > 5) {raise violation();} -> s1
else -> s1;
s2 -> tick(ts) when(ts - t0 > 5) {raise violation();} -> s1;

A.2.11. Banking-2
The MFOTL formula of this property is ALWAYS FORALL c, t, a. trans(c,t,a) AND 2000 < a
IMPLIES ONCE[2,21) EXISTS e. auth(e,t). The tricky part is that multiple auth events may arrive
and as long as one of them satisfies the timing requirement, the property is not violated. However,
SMEDL monitors do not directly support arrays or dynamic data structure. To solve this issue, we
use an integer typed window to represent a list of consecutive timestamps. A bit is set when an auth
happens at that timestamp. The least (most) significant bit represents the left (right) boundary of
the window and t0 and t1 are the corresponding time stamps. A violation is raised when a trans
event arrives: 1) before any auth events or 2) less than 2 days after the earliest auth event or greater
than 20 days after the latest auth event. When an auth event arrives, the right boundary of the
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window is updated and the corresponding bit is set with its timestamp. For the left boundary, 1)
if the timestamp is 20 days greater than the left boundary but not 20 days greater than the right
boundary, the left boundary moves right to its nearest time that corresponds to an auth event; 2) if
the timestamp is 20 days greater than the right boundary, the window size shrinks to 1. Note that
there is a corner case in which the transaction happens 1 day after the nearest authorization and the
next earliest authorization happens more than 20 days ago. In that case, a violation event is also
raised.
object TransAuth;
#include "helper.h"
state:
int t0;
int t1;
int window;
events:
imported trans(int, int, int);
imported auth(int, int);
internal check(int, int, int);
exported violation();
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> auth(ts, t) {t0 = ts; t1 = ts; window = 1;} -> s2;
s1 -> trans(ts,

t, a) when (a > 2000) {raise violation();} -> s1;

s2 -> trans(ts,

t, a) when (a > 2000 && (ts - t0 < 2 ||

ts - t1 > 20)) {raise violation();} -> s2
else {raise check(ts, t0 + log2((window - 1) & -(window - 1), a);}-> s2;
s2 -> auth(ts, t) when (ts - t0 <= 20) {t1 = ts;
window = window | (1 << (ts - t0));} -> s2;
s2 -> auth(ts, t) when (ts - t0 > 20 && ts - t1 <= 20) {t0 = t0 + log2((window - 1)
& -(window - 1)); t1 = ts;
window = window | (1 << (ts - t0));} -> s2;
s2 -> auth(ts,t) when (ts - t1 > 20) {t0 = ts; t1 = ts; window = 1;} -> s2;
corner:
s1 -> check(ts, n, a) when (a > 2000 && ts - t1 == 1 && ts - t0 > 20 && n == t1)
{raise violation();} -> s1
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A.2.12. Publish
The MFOTL formula of this property is ALWAYS FORALL a, f. publish(a,f) IMPLIES (NOT
acc F(a) SINCE[0,*) acc S(a)) AND ONCE[0,10] EXISTS m. (NOT mgr F(m,a) SINCE[0,*)
mgr S(m,a)) AND approve(m,f). acc S(A) and acc F(A) indicate starting and ending of A being
an accountant; mgr S(M,A) and mgr F(M,A) indicate starting and ending of M being a manager
of A. The property says that if a publishes a report f, then a must be an accountant and there must
exist an approval from m within 10 days before publishing and m must be the manager of a when
the approval happens. The property is violated in the following cases: 1) a report f is published by
a person a who is not an accountant; 2) there is no approval of f within the specified range; 3) there
is no approval of f from a person m who is the manager of a who publishes f.
Parameterized by a person a (not used in the monitoring logic), Account keeps track of the status of
a. When state is 1, a is not an accountant. The state is sent to Validation through is acc, which is
required when a publishes a report.
object Accountant;
state:
int state;
events:
imported acc_S();
imported acc_F();
imported checkAcc(int, int);
exported is_acc(int, int, int);
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> acc_S() {state = 0;} -> s1;
s1 -> acc_F() {state = 1;} -> s1;
s1 -> checkAcc(m, f) {raise is_acc(m, f, state);} -> s1;

Similar to Account, Manager(m) is parameterized by a pair of (m, a): m is the manager of a iff state
is 0. Whenever m approves a report f, we send the status of (m, a) to Validation.
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object Manager;
state:
int state;
events:
imported mgr_S();
imported mgr_F();
imported internal_approve(int);
exported createValidation(int, int);
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> mgr_S() {state = 0; } -> s1;
s1 -> mgr_F() {state = 1; } -> s1;
s1 -> internal_approve(f) {raise createValidation(f, state);} -> s1;

Parameterized by a report f, Approve does three things: 1) raise final result to indicate violation
of the property when a report f is not approved before publishing; 2) creation of an instance of
Aggregation(f) and 3) trigger execution of Manager and Internal Approve when f is approved by a
manager.
object Approve;
events:
imported approve(int, int, int);
imported publish(int, int, int);
exported internal_approve(int, int, int);
exported create_aggregator();
exported final_result(int);
scenarios:
main:
s0 -> approve(ts, m, f) {raise create_aggregator();
raise internal_approve(ts, m, f); } -> s1;
s0 -> publish(ts, a, f) {raise final_result(1);} -> s1;
s1 -> approve(ts, m, f) {raise internal_approve(ts, m, f);} -> s1;

Internal Approve is parameterized by (m, f ). When m approves f, an incr event is sent to Aggregation to count the number of managers that have approved f. The state variable t0 stores the time
of approval. When f is approved, it raises an event internal publish(a, v ) in which a is the accountant that publishes f and v is 0 (1) when the nearest approval (does not) happen within 10 days
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before publishing. check acc is sent to Accountant to check whether a is an accountant at the time
of publishing, as shown above.
object Internal_Approve;
state:
int t0;
events:
imported internal_approve(int);
imported publish(int, int, int);
exported internal_publish(int, int);
exported check_acc(int);
exported check_mgr(int);
exported incr();
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> internal_approve(ts) {t0 = ts; raise incr();} -> s1;
s1 -> publish(ts, a, f) when (ts < t0 || ts - t0 > 10)
{raise internal_publish(a, 1); } -> s1
else {raise internal_publish(a, 0); raise check_acc(a);} -> s1;

Validation is parameterized by (m, a, f ). Variable state is 0 iff m is the manager of a. The attribute
of internal publish and acc result are explained above. If the attribute of violation is 0, the triple
satisfies the relation specified in the property.
object Validation;
state:
int state;
events:
imported internal_publish(int);
imported createValidation(int);
imported acc_result(int);
exported violation(int);
scenarios:
main:
s1 -> createValidation(st) {state = st;} -> s1;
s1 -> internal_publish(v) when (state == 1 || v == 1) {raise violation(1);} -> s1
else -> s3;
s3 -> acc_result(v) {raise violation(v);} -> s1;
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Aggregation collects results from Validation. For each report f, we only need to find one pair of (m,
a) that satisfies of the property. Note that we do not consider how to reset the state of monitors after
a verdict for a report has been output.
object Aggregation;
state:
int num = 0;
int num0;
events:
imported create_aggregator();
imported violation(int);
imported incr();
exported final_result(int);
scenarios:
main:
s0 -> create_aggregator() -> s1;
s1 -> incr() {num = num + 1;} -> s1;
s1 -> violation(v) when (v == 0) -> s3;
s1 -> violation(v) when (v == 1 && num > 1) {num0 = num - 1;} -> s2;
s1 -> violation(v) when (v == 1 && num == 1) {raise final_result(1);} -> s1;
s2 -> violation(v) when (v == 1 && num0 > 1) {num0 = num0 - 1;} -> s2;
s2 -> violation(v) when (v == 1 && num0 == 1) {raise final_result(1);} -> s1;
s2 -> violation(v) when (v == 0) -> s3;

165

system Publish;

monitor Accountant(int);
monitor Manager(int, int);
monitor Approve(int);
monitor Internal_Approve(int, int);
monitor Validation(int, int, int);
monitor Aggregation(int);

syncset Pub {Accountant, Manager, Approve, Internal_Approve, Validation, Aggregation};

ch1: acc_S => Accountant[$1].acc_S;
ch2: acc_F => Accountant[$1].acc_F;
ch3: mgr_S => Manager[$1, $2].mgr_S;
ch4: mgr_F => Manager[$1, $2].mgr_F;

ch5: approve => Approve[$2].approve($0, $1, $2);
ch6: publish => Approve[$2].publish($0, $1, $2);
ch6: publish => Internal_Approve[*, $2].publish($0, $1, $2);

ch7: Accountant.is_acc => Validation[$0,$1,#0].acc_result($2);

ch9: Approve.internal_approve => Internal_Approve[$1,#0].internal_approve($0);
ch9: Approve.internal_approve => Manager[$1,*].internal_approve($2);
ch10: Approve.create_aggregator => Aggregation[#0].create_aggregator;

ch11: Internal_Approve.internal_publish => Validation[#0, #1, $0].internal_publish($1);
ch12: Internal_Approve.check_acc => Accountant[$0].checkAcc(#0, #1);
ch14: Internal_Approve.incr => Aggregation[#1].incr;
ch15: Validation.violation => Aggregation[#1].violation($0);
ch17: Manager.createValidation => Validation[#0,$0,#1].createValidation($1);

A.2.13. UnsafeMapIter
The specification follows Figure 7 with slight modifications: 1) mon0 is removed and 2) useI is not
dispatched to MC.
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object MC;
events:
imported createC();//mid, cid
imported createI(pointer);//cid, iid
exported createMCI(pointer);
scenarios:
sce1:
init -> createC() -> start;
start ->createI(i) {raise createMCI(i);} -> start;

object MCI;
events:
imported createMCI();//iid
imported updateM();//mid
imported useI();//iid
exported violation();
scenarios:
sce1:
init -> createMCI() -> start;
start -> useI() -> start;
start -> updateM() -> updateM;
updateM -> useI() {raise violation();} -> error;

system MapArch;

monitor MC(pointer, pointer);
monitor MCI(pointer, pointer, pointer);

syncset sync {MC, MCI};

ch1: createC => MC[$0,$1].new_mc;
ch2: createI => MC[*,$0].createI($1);
ch3: MC.createMCI => MCI[#0,#1,$0].createMCI;
ch4: updateM=> MCI[$0,*,*].updateM;
ch5: useI=> MCI[*,*,$0].useI;
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